Revolutionism as Revisionism: Early British Views of Bonaparte, 1796 - 1803. by Gray, Phillip John
REVOlUTIONISM AS REVISIONISM: 
EARLY BRITISH VIEWS OF BONAPARTE, 1796 ~ 1803. 
A thesis 
submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Master of Arts in History 
in the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
PHilLIP J. GRAY 
Department of History 
University of Canterbury 
1995 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
ABSTRACT 
INTRODUCTION 
TrlESOURCES 
CHAPTER ONE 
CHAPTER 1\'110 
CHAPTER THREE 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
REFERENCES 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
The press, society and public opinion 
in Great Britain in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. 
Bonaparte as revolutionary general: 
Italy, 1796 - 8. 
Bonaparte as roving revolutionary: 
the Egyptian expedition, 1798 - 9, 
Bonaparte as revolutionary ruler: 
i i 
iii 
1 0 
23 
36 
from the coup of Brumaire to the summer of 1800. 56 
Bonaparte and peacemaking: 
from the summer of 1800 to the autumn of 1801. 80 
The Peace of Amiens: 
from the autumn of 1801 to April 1803. 
Bonaparte and the language of tyranny: 
an exploratory analysis. 
1 01 
140 
162 
170 
AC~~O~EDGEMENTS 
Many people have encouraged and supported me in many ways during the writing 
of this thesis, and I would like to take the opportunity to thank them here. 
Pauline Wed!ake, Judy Robertson and Rosemary Russo, secretaries in the 
Department of History, have offered invaluable general assistance. Pat Robertson 
at the Interloans Desk in the James Height Library has been of great assistance in 
the supply of books, pamphlets and newspapers, sometimes under trying 
circumstances. My father assisted with the formatting of the final version. 
Dr. Marie Peters introduced me to British history, the eighteenth century and 
the use of newspapers as historical sources. I am sure that my writing has 
improved as a resuit of her trenchant and entirely justified criticism of my work 
in the past. 
I am very grateful to Greg Ryan, Suzanne 0019 and Damien Powell for commenting 
on chapters. Along with the aforementioned. I would iike to thank Greig Fleming 
and Tracy Tu!loch for their friendship and encouragement in academic life. For 
their friendship and support outside the History Department I thank especially 
Mark Balcar, Graham Muir, Stephanie Prosser and Rochelle Thickpenny. 
My supervisor, Dr. John Cookson, has listened patiently to my more improbabie 
ideas. and has been consistentiy approachable and supportive. 
Finally, this thesis and all my academic achievements owe an enormous debt to 
my aunt, Lesley Johnston, who has demonstrated constant faith in me and 
continues to inspire me in everything I do. 
PHILLIP J. GRAY 
22 September 1995 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines British views of Napoleon Bonaparte from 1796 to 
1803. It argues that a chronological approach is the most appropriate because of 
both the relative neglect of the subject, and because of faults in the existing 
historical literature. Generalisations in this literature have been formuiated on 
the basis of evidence juxtaposed across the entire period between 1796 and 
1815, which has resulted in a distorted picture in which shifts in perception 
cannot be detected. The treatment of events and themes in the historiography is 
also coloured by teleology and Whiggish assumptions, while the most recent study 
has compounded these problems through the appiication of sophisticated 
techniques of literary analysis. 
This thesis attempts to avoid these errors in the construction of a ciear 
picture of early British views of Bonaparte. The chapters are based on defined 
periods and explore the subject in event-based contexts. tv1aterial from outside 
the defined periods is not included, thus creating credible generalisations which 
reflect contemporary beliefs. The final chapter examines the deployment of the 
language of tyranny with reference to Bonaparte and comparisons made with 
Cromwell in the three years following his assumption of political power. The 
sources for the investigation are a selection of newspapers, pamphlets and 
magazines, and a section of the thesis is devoted to considering the implications of 
their use. 
The thesis posits a shift in historical understanding from the intrinsic 
significance of a Great Man conception to an emphasis on the primacy of 
revolutionism. Napoleon Bonaparte was regarded as a revolutionary general 
actively involved in the transmission of republican ideologies in Italy and Egypt 
from 1796 - 99. The thesis argues that a shift in paradigm occurred after the 
coup of Brumaire in November 1799, which installed Bonaparte as the military 
ruler of a revolutionary state. The chronological examination of the news 
reporting and commentary in the years from 1800 - 1803 suggests that a 
further shift to seeing Bonaparte as a military dictator seems to have occurred. 
Although this shift has been difficult to locate precisely, it was probably 
stimulated by Bonaparte's assumption of office for life in the summer of 1802. 
iii 
INTRODUCTION 
The subject of contemporary British 1 views of Napoleon Bonaparte2 is one 
in which historians have shown little interest. Aside from observations made in 
the context of examining anti-war liberal opinion in England by J. E. Cookson in 
The Friends of Peace,3 there has been no detailed examination of the topic in the 
last eighty years. The standard works remain F. J. MacCunn's The Contemporary 
English View of Napoleon, published in 1914, and Wheeler and Broadiey's 
Napoleon and the Invasion of England, which is of the same vintage. 4 Owing to 
their advanced age, these studies contain methods and assumptions unacceptable 
to modern historical practice. The most recent contribution to the subject, a 
dissertation by Stella Cottrel!, subscribes to many of the same teleological and 
achronological assumptions characteristic of the older literature.5 
1 There are several terms here which require definition. The first, 'contemporary', is 
used in this study to mean views which were expressed within the five defined periods 
between 1796 and 1803. Historians of British views of Bonaparte have used the term 
too broadly, referring to opinions spread across the twenty years of the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars. The use of the term 'British' is not unproblematic, although it is 
the opinion of this writer that if an historian has attempted to use sources from 
Scotland, Wales andior Ireland as weli as England, then sihe is justified in claiming 
that their work is representative of 'British' opinion. This study broadly follows the 
use in Linda Coiley Britons. Forging the nation, 1707 - 1837 (New Haven, 1992, 
corrected paperback edition, 1994), p. 8. The only study which touches sketchily on 
Irish views of Bonaparte, particularly those of the United Irishmen, is Marianne Eliiott 
Partners in Revolution. The United Irishmen and France (New Haven, 1982), pp. 276 -
281, 298 - 302, while the only indications of Welsh opinion comes with the comment 
that 'the trend of opinion in Wales towards the French Revolution foliowed closely that 
in England.': E, H. Stuart Jones The Last Invasion of Britain (Cardiff, 1950), p. 29. 
2: For the sake of consistency this thesis has adopted the spelling 'Bonaparte', which 
was used fairly consistently after 1799. The italianate 'Buonaparte' was used before 
this date. 
3 J. E. Cookson The Friends of Peace, Anti-war liberalism in England, 1793 - 1815 
(Cambridge, 1982), pp. 169 - 176. 
""F. J. MacCunn The Contemporary English View of Napo/eon (London, 1914) and H. F. 8, 
Wheeler and A. 1'11. Broadley Napoleon and the Invasion of England. The Story of the 
Great Terror. li/ilh numerous iifustrations from contemporary prints, caricatures etc. 
BfyN in Colour. 2 vols. (London, 1908). 
2 
The major reason for the neglect of this subject has been a wider failure to 
examine British attitudes towards the events of the French Revolution6 after 
Great Britain declared war on France in February 1793. Especially overlooked 
have been the years 1795 - 1799, the period when the revolutionary Terror 
was replaced by the oligarchical Directories.? Napoleon Bonaparte first appeared 
in the Bntish consciousness in this period, and this thesis will argue that his 
initial conception as a revolutionary was fundamental in shaping his reputation 
over the following seven years. 
.. .... "* *: 
Much of the older literature about British views of Bonaparte is expansive 
in nature. its generalisations are biOad in both methodoiogical and chronological 
senses. Wheeler and Broadley's account is of French plans and attempts to invade 
Great Britain between 1796 and 1805, and it makes sweeping statements 
generalislng across this entire decade. The following is not untypical: 
-----"""""""--""""-_._ ......... _--
5 Stella Cottrell 'English views of France and the French, 1789 - 1815', D. Phil. 
dissertation, Oxford University, 1990. A section of this dissertation, although not the 
chapter dealing in particular with Bonaparte, was published as The Devil on two 
Sticks: franco-phobia in 1803' in Raphael Samuel (ed.) Patriotism. The Making and 
Unmaking of British National Identity volume I. History and Poiitics {London. 1989}, pp. 
259 - 273. 
6 The terms 'Revolution' will be used in this study to denote the events in France 
between 1789 and 1799. 'Revolutionism' refers to the republican ideologies the French 
attempted to transmit to the other peoples of Europe from 1792, while 'revolutionary' 
is used as an adjective, and to mean someone associated with these events. 
7 Historians oj British attitudes towards the French Revolution have demonstrated a 
tendency to extend the arguments of the years 1789 - 93 as evidence of beliefs in the 
foliowing five years. The Convention, and especiaily the Directories, have received 
little attention. The essays in the recent collections Britain and the French Revolution 
(Houndsmill, 8asingstoke, 1989), edited by H. T. Dickinson, and The French Revolution 
and British Popular Politics (Cambridge, 1991), edited by Mark Philp. are good 
~xample$ of this. The nearest attempt is probably Cookson, The Friends of pp. 
!43 • 169, although what is needed is a detailed exploration of British attitudes 
towards t1E1 successive revolutionary governments. 
Far from regarding Bonaparte as a saviour and an envoy of Utopia, many of 
the country folk firmly believed that he ground the bones of his own 
maimed soldiers in the dust beneath his chariot-wheels, and found his chief 
pieasure in listening to the groans of the dying; in a word, that he was the 
devil in sheep's clothing . ., Stories about the "Corsican monster," 
especially those of an atrocious character, gained wide circulation. 8 
3 
Hatred is also one of the chief defining characteristics of MacCunn's 
account. Constructing his model along party political lines, MacCunn claims that 
the Tories detested Bonaparte because he had usurped legitimate qovernment and 
the Whigs because he had betrayed their hopes of a moderated Revolution. The 
ordinary man is presented as hating Bonaparte because he was the most 
significant individual ever faced by Britain, and because of financial pressure 
towards the end of the Napoleonic war.9 Whether such comments are an accurate 
appraisal of the state of feeling in the 1810s is not at issue. The point is that, 
like Wheeler and Broadley, MacCunn juxtaposes evidence between different 
events, and within the entire period 1796 to 1815. This approach has not 
allowed his study to assess shifts in the relative significance of themes, and 
unable to identify shifts in paradigm. When generalising about British opinions 
of Bonaparte during the expedition to Egypt in 1798 - 9, MacCunn cites both a 
polemical pamphlet from 1803 and a rhymed satire from June 1798. This 
juxtaposition does not ailow him to draw attention to the most siginificant feature 
of the rhyme, its revolutionary topoL The indication that the expedition was 
regarded by satirists in 1798 as an ideological exercise is overshadowed by the 
simultaneous citation of comments made five years later, comments written in 
different contexts and almost certainly prompted by different concerns. 1 0 
----_._-------------------------
8 Wheeler and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion of England, vol. I, p. 80. 
9 MacCunn, The Contemporary Engiish View of Napoleon, pp. 266 - 267. 
10 ibid., p, 15. To be fair, both IlJheeler and Broadley and MacCunn's accounts make 
i$olated comments with which this study agrees. and these are acknowledged in the 
4 
There is also a tendency in the existing literature to depict eariy parts of 
Bonaparte's career as inevitably presaging his later achievements. This 
Whiggishness 11 is most obvious in generalisations about the Egyptian expedition, 
which is cast as the first step along the path which would lead to the assumption 
of domestic rule in France in November 1799, and of the imperial dignity five 
years later. Such a teleological approach appears to stem from a fascination with 
Bonaparte's personal qualities (as opposed to contemporary views of these 
qualities). Historians have been too heavily influenced by Bonaparte's later 
successes in their assessment of British beliefs about the early parts of his 
career. Wheeler and Broadley state that as early as 1797 - 8, Bonaparte was 
regarded as cultivating the people around him in preparation for power; that 
'Even now he was gathering about him the men who were to be his marshals and 
the future pillars of his throne.'12 It is certainly not the intention of this study to 
argue that the British did not see Bonaparte in political terms. But it is 
unjustifiably Whiggish to imply that commentators could have possessed 
foreknowledge that Bonaparte was to assume a position of politicai authority. 
Wheeler and Broadley's attempts to link Bonaparte with a succession of 
invasion attempts against Great Britain, and their concentration in particular on 
the invasion crisis of 1803 - 4, injects further teleology into their account. 
Undue emphasis is placed on the Hood of literature produced in these years as 
containing all the information necessary for a comprehensive account of British 
attitudes towards Bonaparte. Much of the narrative in Napoleon and ttle Invasion 
of Eng/and is constructed backwards from 1803 - 4; the previous seven years 
footnotes where applicable. But the fact remains that the credibility of these comments 
is rendered suspect because of their basis in juxtaposed evidence. 
11 This term is used in the sense argued by Herbert Butterfield in The Whig 
interpretation of history (Cambridge, 1931). 
12 Wheeier and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion of England, vol. i, p, 88. 
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are depicted as 'building up' to this monumental confrontation between Napoleon 
and The British People. 13 The narrative doggedly criticises contemporaries who 
did not foresee the 'inevitable' resumption of war in 1803, and congratulates 
those it regards as having the 'foresight' to do so.14 At one point the authors do 
acknowledge that 'There is a very marked divergence between the state of public 
opinion in England during the two phases of the Great Terror, divided from each 
other by the Treaty of Amiens and the brief cessation of hostilities which 
ensued',15 but they fail to elaborate on this postulated 'marked divergence'. Many 
of the statements in Wheeler and Broadley's volumes might very weil be accurate 
appraisals of the mood of the British public in the summer of 1803. 16 But it is 
obviously inaccurate to imply, as their narrative does, that these sentiments can 
be used to assess British views of Bonaparte across the entire period from 1796 
to 1805,17 
The credibility of generalisations in the older accounts is rendered further 
questionable by the intrusion of present-centredness. The authors of Napoieon 
and the invasion of Engiand acknowledge that their work was prompted by fears 
about the undefended state of Britain's northern and eastern coasts in the first 
decade of the twentieth century.18 The jingoistic self-congratulation into which 
Wheeler and Broadley's volumes occasionally lapse is at its worst in the sections 
on the national mood in 1803, where it is claimed that: 'It is a fortunate 
characteristic of the British that when once they are aroused they do not cease 
13 ibid., vols. I and II, passim; see especially vol. I xii, pp. 210 - 211. The reader will 
recognise the illustrative irony in the use of these terms. 
14 ibid., vol. I, p. 197; vol II, p. 38. 
15 'b'd I I . ! i .• vo. , p. 195. 
16 ibid., vol. II, p. 104. 
17 For an explicit statement of this, see ibid., vol. I, p. 255: 'The continuity of the 
literary and artistic landmarks of the Great Terror was scarcely interrupted.' 
IS ibid., vol. i. xxxi. 
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their vigilance or doggedness until affairs are put to rights, otherwise the 
Empire would long since have perished.'19 This writer is aware of the hubristic 
temptation of excessive criticism when examining the work of one's 
predecessors; all studies are shaped to a certain extent by the intellectual 
currents of their time. The preceding comments are recounted not from any 
position of superiority, but because they undermine the reader's trust that the 
evidence used in the narrative was not selected to iHustrate contemporary 
concerns. 
The most recent study which has contributed to historical knowledge of 
British views of Bonaparte perpetuates some of these faults. although it avoids 
present-centredness. except perhaps in a methodological sense. Stella Cottrell's 
Oxford doctoral dissertation is entitled 'English views of France and the French, 
1789 - 1815', and thus an examination of attitudes towards Bonaparte is 
subsumed into wider lines of enquiry. Cottrell has applied sophisticated 
techniques of literary criticism to her sources, and this has allowed her to make 
innovative and significant generalisations about English responses to the French 
Revolution and the resulting wars. It is probably inevitable that these methods 
have also led to a study which fails to enunciate clear chronological boundaries to 
its generalisations. The chapter specifically on Bonaparte follows the precedent 
established in the older literature, making generalisations based on evidence 
from periods as widely separated as the Egyptian expedition of 1798 - 9 and the 
final stages of the Napoieonic war in 1814 - 15. The statement that the most 
significant characteristic attributed to Bonaparte was that of being a social 
ciimber is sourced from broadsides and prints from 1810, for instance.20 
Hi 'b'd I II ~ I ( ., vo, ,p, .:l8. 
20 Cottrell, 'English views of France and the French', p, 214. Although Cottreil does 
provide some in-text comments about where the evidence she is dealing with at that 
particular pomt is corning from (i.e, pp. 218, 223, 228), the overa!! impreSSion is stiil 
that tM statements apply across the entire period. 
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Cottrell occasionaily qualifies statements chronologically within her text, but 
such comments are proffered infrequently, and are not a substitute for a careful 
and thorough chronological approach.21 
These criticisms need to be tempered by awareness that Cottrell's study is 
not concerned specificaliy with opinions about Bonaparte. The dissertation 
focuses primarily on analysing the English reaction to the French, and explores 
the resulting construction of English identities between 1789 and 1815.22 An 
examination of the relationship between mass 'patriotism' and the mass 
ephemera published in 1803 - 4 is the other aim.23 Cottrell is also usually 
careful to emphasise that her sources are the cheaper mass tracts, although she 
does claim at one point that her statements are also representative of the more 
expensive publications.24 This thesis does not question whether or not Cottrell's 
generalisations are representative of the content of the former; indeed, by its 
very nature the cheaper literature might very well be the location of the stock 
themes emphasised in the historical literature. Rather, it assesses the degree to 
which her comments are accurate generalisations about the content of the more 
expensive publications. 
It is this writer's contention that a study which aims to test the received 
beiief that hatred was the major feature of British views of Bonaparte must 
examine evidence within defined chrono~ogical boundaries, in order to avoid 
21 ibid., p. 225. 
22 ibid., Introduction p. 1, Chapter 1 , pp. 6 - 7 and 10 - 12. 
23 As argued in her fifth chapter of the dissertation, 'Propaganda and Patriotism in 
1803', pp. 252 - 297. 
24 ibid., pp. 207 - 208: given her profession not to have studied the more expensive 
literature in detail, this is not a generalisation Cottreil is qualified to make. 
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generalisations made on the basis of juxtaposed evidence. Chronological 
approaches to the study of history are currently rather unfashionable, but this 
should not detract from awareness of their value in the construction of a clear 
account. This is particularly relevant to a topic where a body of older literature 
remains definitive, and where the latest contribution to the subject has repeated 
and compounded many of its faults. 
This study adopts such an approach. It begins with the first point at which 
Bonaparte came to the attention of the British, his campaign in !taly in the 
summer of 1796, and traces his reputation over the following seven years, 
concluding in the weeks before the resumption of war between Britain and France 
in May 1803. The following chapters are each based on a defined, event-based 
period. Material from outside these periods has not been included, thereby 
creating an account which can posit reliable generalisations based on analysis of 
information in its chronological contexts. 
The sources for this study are a selection of the newspapers, magazines and 
pamphlets which were published between 1796 and 1803. Sampling techniques 
have been applied consistently. The daily newspapers The Times, the Morning 
Post and the Morning Chronicle were sampled twice-weekly, alternating 
Mondays and Wednesdays with Tuesdays and Thursdays. This has provided regular 
comprehensive coverage of most days of the week, and a!lowed for consideration 
of both the regular and irregular reception of news.25 Every second issue of the 
evening and Sunday newspapers The Observer, Bell's Weekly Messenger and the 
Leeds Mercury has been examined, while each issue of the The Annual Register, 
The Aberdeen Magazine, the Gentleman'S Magazine and the Criticai and Monthly 
~~~-. .._ ... _ .... _ ..... __ ._ .. _._.-
25 The single exception to this is The Times in October 1801, when the news of the 
conclusion of peace preliminaries arrived on a Saturday. To have ignored this would 
have been to ignore the immediate reaction to one of the most significant events 
associated with Bonaparte. 
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Reviews has been examined. The nature of these sources is discussed in the 
following section, entitled The press, society and public opinion in Britain in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.' 
*" * *" * * 
Chapter One examines the eighteen months from the spring of 1796 until 
the winter of 1797 - 8. In this period Bonaparte fought a successful campaign in 
Italy against the Austrians, Britain's major continental allies, before creating 
and administering republics based on the French model. Chapter Two examines 
the eighteen months from the winter of 1797 - 8, when Bonaparte was rumoured 
to be preparing an invasion of Great Britain in the foliowing spring, until his 
return to Europe from Egypt in the autumn of 1799. Chapter Three examines the 
six months following the coup of Brumaire which installed Bonaparte at the head 
of a revolutionary government in France in November 1799. Chapter Four 
examines the eighteen months of European peacemaking from the summer of 
1800, until the conclusion of peace between France and Great Britain in the 
autumn of 1801. Chapter Five examines the events of the Peace of Amiens, 
between late 1801 and April 1803. The final chapter is an exploratory analysis 
of the deployment of the language of tyranny with reference to Bonaparte between 
1800 and 1803. 
* * * .... .... 
1 0 
THE SOURCES 
The press, society and public opinion in Britain in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, 
The sources for this study include examples of most of the printed 
publications which existed In Great Britain in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. The use of these publications as historical sources cannot 
be treated as unproblematic. Given their varying generationai dynamics, to say 
nothing of potentially differing degrees of social and geographical penetration, it 
would be a dubious practice to treat these sources as a united body. The foilowing 
paragraphs will explore the reiationship between the press and society in late 
eighteenth-century Britain, and examine in more detail the three major kinds of 
publication used in this study: newspapers, pamphlets and magazines. It will then 
consider cautionary comments which have been offered about the use of these 
publications as historical sources. 
The study of the British press in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries lags considerably behind the burgeoning research in the mid-
eighteenth,1 although some valuable work has been published. The iion's share of 
Michael Harris and Alan Lee 'General Introduction' and 'Introduction' in ibids. (eds.) 
The Press in English Society from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Centunes (London 
and Cranbury, N.J., 1986), pp. 13 - 15 and 19 - 24; Jeremy Black 'The development 
of the provincial newspaper press in the eighteenth century', British Journal for 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 14, 2, Autumn 1991, pp. 159 - 70: John Brewer Pa rty 
ideology and popular pOlitics at the accession of George III (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 139 
" 160; .. Marie Peters 'Historians and the Eighteenth-Century English Press; A Review of 
Possibilities and Problems', Australian Journal of Poiitics and History 34, 1988, and 
Peters pm and popularity, The patriot minister and London opinion during the Seven 
Yea.rs' War (Oxford, 1980) esp. pp. 16 - 24, are among the most useful. 
this has been devoted to the publication and distribution of the newspapers.2 The 
polemical pamphlet and the published sermon, which remained significant 
features of the genre, have been overlooked. This reiative negleci means that 
when considering the generation, publication and distribution of the press, these 
occasional publications must be included in generalisations derived from 
research into newspapers. This writer has distinct reservations about such an 
approach, but in the absence of discrete research into the circulation and social 
penetration of the pamphlets and published sermons, research on the newspapers 
must be accepted as the existing state of knowledge on the matter. 
The nature of the publications consumed rather than technological change 
seems to have been the most significant development in the British press in the 
early nineteenth century. The iniroduction of the Koenig steam press on The 
Times in 1814 signalied the beginning of technologicai change in the industry, 
but this did not lead to increased circulations for aimost twenty years.3 The 
2 Arthur Aspinail 'The circulation of newspapers in the eariy nineteenth century', The 
Review of English Studies 22, 85, January 1946, pp. 29 - 43; the stili standard 
Arthur Aspinal! Politics and the Press c. 1780 - 1850 (London, 1949): more recently, 
Ivon Asquith 'Advertising and the Press in the iate eighteenth and eariy nineteenth 
centu ries: James Perry and the Morning Chronicle, 1790 - 1821', The Historical 
Journal 18, 4, 1975, pp. 703 - 724; Ivon Asquith. 'The Whig Party and the Press in 
the early Nineteenth Century', Bulletin of the Institute of /-fistorical Research, 49, 120, 
November 1976, pp. 264 - 283; Ivon Asquith 'The structure, ownership and control of 
the press: 1780 - 1855' in George Boyce, James Curran and Pauline Wingate (eds.) 
Newspaper history: from the 17th century to the present day (london, 1978), pp. 98 -
116; Cookson, chapter on 'The liberal press' in The Friends of Peace, pp. 84 - 114; I. 
R. Christie, chapter 'British Newspapers in the later Georgian Age' in A1yth and Reality 
in Late-Eighteenth-Century British Politics and Other Papers (london, 1970), pp. 311 -
333: Harris and lee, 'General Introduction'; Karl Schweizer and Jeremy Black 'The 
Eighteenth Century British Press: Problems and Perspectives' in ibids. (eds.) Poiitics 
and the Press in Hanoverian Britain (Lewiston, 1989), vii - xxi, and lucyle 
Werkmeister A Newspaper History of England 1792 - 1793 (lincoln, Nebraska, 1967), 
esp. pp. 19 - 44, 163 - 179 and 488 - 491. The most useful recent work is the chapter 
entitled 'The right-wing press from Jacobitism to the Reform crisis: a discussion of 
the sources' in James J, Sack From Jacobite to Conservative. Reaction and orthodoxy 
in Britain, c. 1760 - 1832 (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 8 - 29, 
3 Asquith, 'The structure, ownership and control of the press', pp. 100 - 101; Olivia 
Smith The Politics of Language 1791 - 1819 (Oxford, 1984), pp. 159 - 160. I. R. 
GhnsHe argues in Myth and Reality p. 324 that even this did not necessarily lead to 
substantial increases in circuiation. 
1 2 
greatest growth took place in the number and circulation of daily evening and 
Sunday newspapers,4 two of which, The Observer and Bell's Weekiy 11Aessenger, 
have been used in this study, There were also changes in the geographicai nature 
of the press, The numbers of provincial newspapers published tripled in the 
period between 1782 and 1830,5 the most significant feature being increases in 
the numbers of periodicals published rather than in individual circulations. 6 The 
'growth' of the press in this period was primarily one of choice and variety of 
individual titles, not in circulation figures. 
The production and distribution of newspapers was dominated by 
commercial rather than political concerns. Editors were relatively free from 
overt political influence because of an increasing revenue basel Active 
government inlluence does not seem to have been a significant factor, although 
there were of course many subtle ways of exerting pressure. This relative 
independence seems to have been because of a lack of personal initiative by 
politicians: Foxite Whig efforts to influence the press during the years examined 
in this study were subdued, and did not revive until the return of a Pitt ministry 
in 1804.8 
Commercial considerations, then, were the most significant factor 
influencing the production of a newspaper, and of these, advertising was 
essential. 9 Little is known about the relationship between the conductors of 
4 Asquith, 'The structure, ownership and control of the press', p. 99. See also Asquith, 
'Advertising and the Press', p. 703, p. 715, and Christie, f'v1yth and Reality p. 314. 
5 Asquith, The structure, ownership and control of the press', pp. 99. 
6 ibid., p. 100; Christie. 1'v1yth and Reality, p, 323, 
7 Asquith, 'Advertising and the Press', p. 721; Christie, Myth and Reality, pp. 328 -
329, although Werkmeister sees the opposition press in the 1790s as existing only 
beCause of Pitt's unpopularity: A Newspaper History of England, pp, 21 - 22 . 
. 8 Asquith, 'The Whig Party and the Press', pp. 266 - 268, 
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newspapers and their customers, although advertisers were aware of their 
interests in the case of a newspaper in decline. 10 The need to sustain revenue 
through advertising was essential even to newspapers which have been identified 
strongly with particular political interests. James Perry juggled advertising 
revenue in the Morning Chronicle with an expressed commitment to poiitical 
reporting through regular and detailed publication of pariiamentary proceedings. 
Perry was prepared to sacrifice advertising revenue for poiiticai coverage, 
although probably only because he could afford to do so because of increased 
revenue from the advertising he did print. 11 Although relative financial 
independence through advertising signalled a liberation from direct government 
influence, it could also make a newspaper owner hesitate to offend his customers, 
particularly in provincial communities.: 2 
Modern as these concerns may seem, the student of the early nineteenth-
century press should not assume that the relationship between proprietors and 
advertisers was the same as that of today, Ivon Asquith has argued that there does 
not seem to have been any significant relationship between general economic 
conditions and the profits made from advertising. Advertisers may have increased 
their patronage during times of economic decHne to drum up more business, 
while staples of advertising such as servants and books seem to have been 
unaffected by fluctuating economic conditions. 13 
._------------------ -------------------------------------------
9 Harris and Lee, 'Introduction', p. 19; Asquith, 'Advertising and the Press', pp. 704 -
705, and Christie, Myth and Reality, pp. 326 - 327. 
10 Asquith, 'Advertising and the Press', p. 708. 
11 ibid., p. 720. 
12 Asquith, 'The structure, ownership and control of the press', pp. 113 -114. 
13 Asquith, 'Advertising and the Press', p. 711. 
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While political considerations were not the most significant feature of the 
production and distribution of newspapers, the same cannot be assumed of their 
consumption. Most papers were regarded as having some political affiliations or 
sympathies. The Times was widely regarded as being a ministerial paper, 
although its fortunes were on the decline in the 1790s. 14 The proprietors, the 
Walter family, had Pittite connections and received a ministerial pension of some 
£300 per annum between 1789 and 1799.15 Another ciuster were known as the 
opposition newspapers, because of their broad poiitical sympathies with the 
fortunes of the opposition Whigs gathered around Charles James Fox. The two 
prominent papers in this group were the f\l1orning Chronicie and the Morning 
Post. Perry's Morning Chronicle acquired the reputation of being a vehicle for 
the Foxite Whigs, although as the previous paragraph suggests, the relationship 
was rather more complicated. 16 The fluctuating fortunes of the party did affect 
the newspaper's sales, however, suggesting the existence of a iink between the 
fortunes of a newspaper and the politicians it was beHeved to support. 17 The 
evening and Sunday newspapers do not seem to have acquired the same 
reputations, possibly because they were recent arrivais. The Observer had been 
founded in 1791, five years before the issues examined in this study and without 
a history of pre-Revolutionary sympathies,1B while Bellis Weekly Messenger 
only commenced publication in May 1796. 
14 The History of The Times'. "The Thunderer" in the making, 1785 - 1841 (London, 
1935), p. 35, pp. 75 - 76: John Ashton The Dawn of the XIXth Century in Eng/and. A 
social sketch of the times (London: 5th edition, 1906) p. 380. 
15 T.lJe History of The Times', pp. 60 - 61. 
16 Aspinall, Politics and the Press, pp. 281 - 282; G. A.. Cranfield The Press and 
Society From Caxton to Northcliffe (London and New York, 1978), p. 79. 
17 Asquith, 'Advertising and the Press', p. 709. 
18 Aspinall, Politics and the Press, pp. 83 - 85. 
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Although newspapers might have specialised in certain aspects of 
advertising and news reporting, and might have been identified in the public 
mind with certain parties or political figures. to remain a profit-making 
business they had to maintain a general appeal through as wide a circulation as 
possible. 19 The trade connection between the London booksellers and provincial 
cities was vital in this process.20 Newspapers were distributed also through the 
free government post, newspaper carriers and newsagents. 21 The time of year 
was also a significant factor in the circuiation of a periodical. Direct sales were 
much greater during the parliamentary session and the London social seascn. 22 
The numbers sold were not high by modern standards. But historians are 
now recognising that there was a considerable secondary circulation not reflected 
in direct sales figures.23 Town dwellers, in particular, had wide access to 
newspapers when they wanted them.24 As well as the coffee and gin houses of 
London, most provincial towns had reading rooms where newspapers were taken 
1 9 Asquith, 'Advertising and the Press', p. 709; Asquith, 'The structure, ownership 
and control of the press', p. 107; Peters, 'Historians and the Eighteenth-Century 
English Press', p. 43, and Christie, Myth and Reality, p. 327. 
20 Cookson, The Friends of Peace, p. 84. 
21 Donald Read Press and People 1790 - 1850. Opinion in three English cities (London, 
1961), pp. 65 - 66. 
22 Asquith. 'Advertising and the Press', p. 709; Harris and Lee 'Introduction', p. 20, 
and Brewer, Party ideology, p. 143. The Times sOld fewer copies durmg the summer 
period between May and September: The History of 'The Times', pp. 38 - 39. 
23 Asquith, 'The structure. ownership and control of the press'. pp. 100 - 101; 
Asquith, 'The Whig Party and the Press', p. 265; Peters, 'Historians and the 
Eighteenth-Century English Press', p. 38; Harris and Lee, 'Introduction', pp. 22 - 23; 
Brewer, Party ideology, pp. 148 - 152; Peters, Pitt and Popularity, p. 20: Smith, The 
Politics of Language, pp. 160 - 161. 
24 Aspinall, 'The circulation of newspapers in the early nineteenth century', pp. 29, 
35; Christie. Myth and Reality, pp. 324 - 325. For the development of urban culture in 
the eighteenth century, see Peter Borsay The English Urban Renaissance. Culture and 
Sooiety in the Provincial Town, 1660 - 1770 (Oxford, 1989) and Borsay , 'Ail the 
town's a stage': urban ritual and ceremony 1660 - 1800' in Peter Clark (ed.) The 
Transformation of Engiish Provincial Towns 1600 - 1800 (london. 1984), pp. 228 -
258, 
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on subscription. Reading societies and mechanics' institutes existed in the 
manufacturing cities, and pamphlets were often read at radical meetings in the 
immediate post-war period.25 Access to newspapers might also have come about 
through group purchasing, sharing, or theft. 26 Although legislation was passed 
against the lending of newspapers in i 789 it seems to have remained a 
widespread practice, particularly between London and the provinces.27 
The centrality of London to the majority of the points outlined above stands 
out. London was the British metropolis, the closest urban centre to the Continent, 
the centre of trade and politics and the focus of the annual social season, It was 
therefore the area in which the opportunities for operating a newspaper as a 
successful business venture were at their greatest in the early nineteenth 
century. Many of the practices discussed in the preceding paragraph probably 
also occurred in the smaller towns, But there are good reasons to remain cautious 
about the social penetration of the press in the provincial towns which are now 
being recognised as a crucial feature of the generation of economic and social 
growth in contemporary Britain.2B The exact nature of the clientele of the coffee 
and gin houses of these towns remains unclear. but it seems that the greater 
proportion were not from the lower classes until the reduction of costs in the 
25 Aspinali, 'The circulation of newspapers in the eariy nineteenth century', p. 33 - 34. 
26 Harris and Lee, 'Introduction', pp. 22 - 23; also Read, Press and People, pp. 201 -
202. 
27 Aspinall, 'The circulation of newspapers in the early nineteenth century', p, 42; 
Asquith, 'The structure, ownership and control of the press', p, 100. Copies of Ttl e 
Times were often lent at a penny a copy, and these were later sent into the country: 
OHver Woods and James Bishop The Story of The Times. Bicentenary Edition 1785 -
1985 (London, 1983; second edition, 1985j, p, 27, 
;?8 Borsay (ed,) The Eighteenth-Century Town; Borsay, ' 'AI! the town's a stage' '; P,J, 
Carfield The impact of Engiish Towns 1700 - 1800 (Oxford, 1982); Neil McKendrick, 
John Brewer and J,H. Plumb The Birth of a Consumer Society The Commercialization 
of Eighteenth-century England (London, 1982), 
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stamp duty in the 1830s.29 It was the middie parts of society which had the most 
consistent access to newspapers, magazines and pamphiets,30 
There is also some evidence to suggest that the lower sorts did not 'want 
literary material. Recent research by Patricia Anderson suggests that although 
the press did penetrate deeply into British society in the early nineteenth 
century, the demand from the lower sorts was primarily for pictorial rather 
than literary material. These included the cheaper prints, woodcuts and 
broadsheets,31 Despire this, it woudl be shortsighted to claim that they were not 
consumers of the Hterary publications. Town dwellers would have been 
constantly exposed to print culture through contact with posters on tavern wails, 
street hawkers, peddlers, and with the voluntary societies which were a 
significant feature of urban existence in this period,32 
This study uses only one of the provincial newspapers which were 
burgeoning in this era, so their nature and influence will be considered in a more 
cursory fashion than the London periodicals have been. Provincial newspapers 
were usuaily owned and edited by the same person or group of people, which was 
not always the case in London,33 Much has been made of the innovative nature of 
political reporting in provincial papers in this period, particularly in the Leeds 
Mercury,34 which is used in this study, Cookson cites this paper as one of those 
29 Aspinall. 'The circulation of newspapers in the early nineteenth century', p. 36. 
30 Patricia Anderson The Printed image and the Transformation of Popular Culture 
1790 - 1860 (Oxford, 1991), pp. 18 - 19. 
31 ibid .. p. 21, pp. 44 - 45. 
32 R. J, Morris 'Voluntary Societies and British Urban Eiites, 1780 - 1850: an 
analysis', The Historical Journai 26, 1, 1983, pp. 95 - 118. 
33 Harris and Lee, 'Introduciion', p. 19. For one aspect of the provincial press. see M. 
J. Murphy 'Newspapers and opinion in Cambridge, 1780 - 1850', Transactions of the 
Cambridge Bibliographicai Society 6, 1972, pp. 35 - 55 and his Cambridge Newspapers 
and Opinion 1780 - 1850 (Cambridge, 1977). 
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which promoted liberal sentiment, in particular a sympathy for the broad aims 
of the French Revolution. He plays down the originality thesis by identifying a 
renewed 'scissors and paste technique', whereby news and opinions were still 
reproduced largely from the London newspapers: 'far safer in the circumstances 
and hardly less effective than any statement of editorial views.'35 The 
relationship between the provincial papers and those sent into the country from 
London is an issue which needs further investigation by historians, although 
Donald Read has claimed that London newspapers were read as supplements and 
were not a serious threat to their provincial counterparts.36 
The nature of circulation in rural areas has received less attention than 
that in the towns. The opportunities for secondary circuiation on the same scaie 
would seem to have been very limited. Yet it appears that ways were found by 
least some sellers and eager readers to have access to the newspapers. Aspinall 
claims that in rural Scotland, a single copy of one newspaper would be shared 
between many different farms within a parish.37 While this is an example of the 
lengths some Britons would go for access to printed information, logically rural 
areas should be regarded as the weaker links in a chain of circl.Jlation which 
extended across England and Scotland, but was strongest in London and the 
provincial towns. 
The deficiency of evidence about the generation and distribution of 
occasional pubiications has already been touched upon. There has been no full-
34 Read, Press and People, p. 77; Christie, Myth and Reaiity, p. 326; Asquith, 'The 
structure, ownership and controi of the press', pp. 105 - 106. 
35 Cookson, The Friends of Peace, p. 134 (quotation). For the Leeds Mercury as 
promoter of liberal views, see p. 103, 111 - 113. 
36 Read, Press and People, p. 203. 
37 Aspinail, The circulation of newspapers in the early nineteenth century', p. 35, 
citing from M. E. Craig The Scottish Periodical Press 1750 - 1789, p. 18. 
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length publication on the subject, merely chapters and references in monographs 
on related topics. These provide limited but useful indications about the impact of 
the pamphlets in particular. One recent study of conservative politics has 
claimed that: 
there may have been a diminution in the Importance of pamphlet literature 
as a gauge of public or elite opinion in the second half of the eighteenth 
century ... [several historians] ail perceive during that period a movement 
away from pamphlets to newspapers or magazines as the important 
vehicles of communication by print,38 
but further research is needed to substantiate this generalisation. Cookson's 
study of the Friends of Peace reveals some valuabie information about the 
publication and distribution of these ephemera,39 but the question of the 
numbers published is not addressed. In the 1760s, the average edition for a 
pamphlet was about 500, rising to 1 000 or 1 500 for the most successful.40 
Given that the newspapers were not increasing in circulation in the late 
eighteenth century, it is reasonable to assume that the circulation of occasional 
ephemera followed the same pattern. Limited knowledge about the volume and 
distribution of the pamphlets and printed sermons is not, however, a complete 
barrier to generalisation about their influence. Occasional publications received 
attention through the reviews, and extracts were often printed or referred to in 
newspapers. 41 Nor should the durable natire of the opinions expressed in the 
pamphlets be overlooked. Their function as vehicles for the expression of the 
opinions of the writer makes it probable that they had more influence on their 
3a Sack, From Jacobite to Conservative, p. 131. 
39 Cookson, The Friends of Peace, pp. 84 - 114, 131 - 132. 
4Q Brewer, Party ideology, p. 145. 
41 Cookson, The Friends of Peace, pp. 131 - 132; Brewer, Party ideology, pp. 146 -
147, 
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readers' views that the newspapers, which seem to have been read mainly for 
their news content.42 
The final category of sources used in this study is the magazines and the 
reviews, which were conceived for and sold primarily to landowners, the clergy, 
urban professionals and the commercial elite. These publications also had a 
significant secondary circulation through such avenues as lending libraries, 
universities, and educational societies.43 They had a wide influence among the 
literary men of the day and among booksellers; the latter often promoted their 
wares on the basis of a favourable review.44 Because they were at the more 
expensive end of the market, the magazines and reviews probably did not have the 
same degree of sociai penetration as the newspapers. A significant liberal subtext 
has been identified in the magazines and reviews used in this study. Because of 
their exclusion from the mainstream of political discourse, these publications 
were ideal vehicles for the expression of liberal opinions.45 
There are strong reasons for not subscribing to older ideas about the nature 
of the writers and publishers of these works. The image of the scribbling, semi-
literate hack has been replaced with a hazy picture of men of some literary 
merit. for whom reviewing was not their most signi'ficant form of income. The 
poet Southey, for example, was a contributor to the Critical between 1797 and 
1804. 46 Publishers have been reconsidered in the same light. Derek Roper 
argues against the picture of corrupt booksellers promoting their own wares in 
-----------------------------------------
42 Asquith. 'The Whig Party and the Press', pp. 281 - 282. 
43 Derek Roper Reviewing before the 'Edinburgh',; 788 - 1802 (London, 1978), pp. 24 
- 25. 
44 ibid .. p. 26. 
45 Cookson, The Friends of Peace, pp. 85 - 91, p. 132. 
46 Roper, Reviewing before the 'Edinburgh', p. 21, pp. 30 - 31. 
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reviews, claiming that 'the usuai pattern was for a bookseiier to own oniy a 
share of the concern and leave its editing to other men, who might also be part-
owners.' Ralph Griffiths ceased to sell books once the Monthly Review was a going 
concern. 47 Favouritism towards books with which the review was associated 
would have been noticeable to readers and critics. because of the practice of 
including the names of the publisher and author in the details of the review.48 
Having considered the relationship between the press and society and looked 
in some detail at the three major categories of sources used in this study, it is 
now time to consider the most pressing question in the use of these sources to 
construct historical generalisations. To what degree can they be taken as evidence 
of 'views' or 'opinion' about British views of Napoleon Bonaparte? Virginia 
Berridge has explored the question of the relationship between historical 
research and the use of newspapers in depth.49 She points out that analysis which 
relies solely on the expression of editorial opinion implies that 'such editorial 
content adequately represents the opinion of individual readers and that changes 
in editorial opinion are linked to shifts in readership attitudes.'so Using content 
analysis the writer makes generalisations about topics of importance based on 
the frequency of certain themes. These are then used as evidence of 'views' or 
'public opinion', the frequency of certain topics or subjects being assumed to 
have indicated relevance to both the writer and the reader. 51 Berridge suggests 
that the researcher should consider all aspects of newspaper content and 
47 ibid" p. 31. 
48 ibid .. pp. 31 
4g Virginia Berridge 'Content Analysis and Historical Research on Newspapers' in 
Michael Harris and Alan Lee (eds.) The Press in English Society from the Seventeenth 
to the Nineteenth Centuries (London and Cranbury, N,j" 1986), pp. 201 - 218, esp. pp. 
201 - 207. The question is also considered in Asquith, The Whig Party and the Press', 
pp. 280 - 281. 
50 Berridge, 'Content Analysis and Histoncal Research on t-Jewspapers, p. 201. 
51 'b'd 2 . 02 I I ., pp. 01 - 2 . 
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production when attempting to construct generalisations about historical topics, 
Rather than simply the expressions of editorial opinion, this should include the 
nature of the generation and production of the periodical, and all its content, 
including news and advertisements. 52 
With these comments in mind, this study has approached its selection of 
newspapers and considered the news and advertisements as well as the leader 
columns, while also attempting to gather as much information as possible on the 
background to the particular newspaper. Berridge's recommendations have been 
especially useful for a study which has needed to examine news reports and 
comments in detail to assess the significance, or otherwise, of certain issues at 
certain points. But while her comments about the dangers of shallow content 
analysis are salutary, it would be unproductive to argue that editorial opinion is 
not by implication evidence of some broader views which can be regarded as 
public opinion. Its very existence indicates that readers were willing to accept 
some expanded interpretation of the disparate news items contained within the 
pages of a single issue. And while newspapers, magazines and pamphlets need to 
be used with caution, it cannot be denied that they offer the greatest degree of 
insight into public opinion about historical questions. 
* .. * * * 
52 'b'd 20'" I I "p. ~. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Bonaparte as revolutionary general: Italy, 1796 - 8. 
Historians have been reluctant to consider British views of Bonaparte's 
campaign against the Austrians in Italy as a period worthy of examination in its 
own right. The definitive work, MacCunn's The Contemporary English View of 
Napoleon, devotes a very hurried four pages to the eighteen months between the 
summer of 1796 and the winter of 1797 - 8, and some of the evidence from 
which his conclusions are drawn is taken from outside the period. 1 Wheeler and 
Broadley's study does not examine the period in any detail, because of their 
attempt to link British views of Bonaparte exclusively with invasion,2 while 
Stella Cottrell's eschewal of event-based narrative in favour of analytical 
experimentation takes her even further away from what is needed: a close 
examination of the themes and concerns which dominated British opinion in this 
period.3 
This chapter sets out firmly to examine British views of Bonaparte at a 
time when, as Wheeler and Broadley state perceptively at one point, 'the 
aftermath of the French Revolution still exercised an appreciable influence in 
English politics'.4 it argues that recognition of the persistence of revolutionism 
as a major feature of the British world view of the latter 17908 is the key to 
1 MacCunn. The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, pp. 9 - 13. 
2 Wheeler and Broadley, Napo/eon and the Invasion of England, vol. I, xii. 
:3 Cottrell's aims and methodology are explored in detail in the Introduction. i should like 
to make clear that my objection is not with Cottrell's methods per se (indeed, ! believe 
her study to be a laudable attempt), simply that I believe them to have taken her in the 
opposite direction to the treatment the subject needs. 
4 Wheeler and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion of England, vol. I. p. 195. 
Unfortunately, the authors' focus on invasion threats does not allow them to pursue 
this va!uabie line of argument further. 
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understanding perceptions of Bonaparte, whom they regarded as a leading figure 
in the expansion of revolutionary ideologies throughout Europe. 
* * "'>: "'>: * 
Napoleon Bonaparte first came to the attention of the British public as one 
of the most successful of the French generals campaigning in Europe in the 
summer and autumn of 1796.5 He was portrayed as a young, energetic and 
profoundly republican general leading French troops against the Austrians in 
Italy. General Bonaparte was a significant figure during the following year 
because his military and organisationai successes were noted.6 His progress was 
charted through the publication of letters he sent to the Directory, subsequently 
printed in French newspapers; his battles were related and titbits of gossip 
associated with this latest republican novelty were recounted'? 
The degree of approbation accorded to Bonaparte depended on the nature of 
the magazine or newspaper. Of some interest was the relationship between the 
general and his troops. An article in The Aberdeen Magazine by Scots improver, 
statistical writer and luminary Sir John Sinclair is a useful example. Sinclair 
claimed that Bonaparte was 'abstemious in living' and 'ardent beyond every thing 
for military glory, and full of the most anxious zeal to rival the heroes 
commemorated by Plutarch, whose works he is perpetually perusing.'8 The 
5 Bel/'s ~Veekly fv1essenger 1 May 1, 1796; Bell's Weekly Messenger 2 May 8, 1796; 
The Times 3616 Monday June 20, 1796; The Times 3625 Thursday June 30, 1796; 
The Aberdeen t'v1agazine for June 1796, p. 98; The Aberdeen Magazine for September 
1796, p. 203; The Aberdeen Magazine for October 1796, p. 254; The Times 3725 
Thursday October 27, 1796, 
6 For example Bel/'s Weekly Messenger 12 July 17, 1796, pp. 91 - 92; Beil's Weekly 
Messenger 19 September 4, 1796, p. 146; The Times 3725 Thursday October 27, 
1796, 
7 Bell's Weekly Messenger 2 May 8, 1796, p, 14; Beil's Weekly Messenger 5 May 29, 
1796. p. 38; Bei/'s Weekly i"v1essenger 6 June 5, 1796, p, 45; Beli's Weekly Messenger 
,8 June 19. 1796, p, 58; The Observer 269 February 5, 1797. 
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loyalty of Bonaparte's troops to his person was especially noted. The French 
forces were described as being bound to succeed because of their enthusiasm for 
their cause and the alternate terror and adoration they felt for their commander. 
This cast Bonaparte in the role of leader of the Revoiution's military energies.9 
Others were less generous in their estimation. The Times was particularly 
scathing about the use of words such as !Iiberty! and 'freedom' in French 
revolutionary discourse, and used satirical language to ape revolutionary 
proclamations. In one of his first appearances in this newspaper Bonaparte was 
described as having extended his roie of the 'emancipator of the italians from the 
yoke of slavery and despotism' to the beils in Milan, and having 'freed the 
"sonorous beil-metal" from the constant and savage oppression of the "leaden 
hammer of time" '. i 0 This anecdote uses the catchwords 'friend to liberty' and 
'rights of humanity', phrases used to signify French enthusiasms, and the entire 
tale is presented in the tone used by The Times to ridicuie what it regarded as the 
ideological excesses of the Revolution. This undertone is evident in the majority 
of the paper's commentary on Bonaparte's activities in italy. The report which 
noted that Bonaparte had proclaimed friendship between Venice and Republican 
France, promising that the 'religion, property, government and customs should 
be respected', would surely have prompted the intended cynical response from 
readers conversant with the opinions of a newspaper which persistently 
condemned the Revolution and its expansionist consequences. 11 
~~ ~~~~~---------------------------------------------------------------
8 Sir John Sinciair 'Characters of Archduke Charles and General Buonaparte', The 
Aberdeen Magazine for JUlY 1797, p. 330. 
g'b" 3r-l1 I la., p. ~. 
to The Times 3625 Thursday ,June 30, 1796. It is worth noting that Bonaparte did not 
J;\ppear as frequently in The Times in this period as he did in other newspapers. 
11 The Times 3616 Monday ,June 20, 1796. For the anti-revolutionary sentiments of 
The Times. see The History of The Times., pp. 63 - 65. 
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This study has found little direct evidence that British views of Bonaparte 
were conceived in traditional franco phobic terms. This is not to suggest that 
British ideas about revolutionism were not shaped indirectly by the decades of 
francophobic sentiment which have been argued to have permeated British 
existence. 12 But the content of reporting and commentary about Bonaparte during 
the Italian campaign was determined by concerns about the expansion of the 
Revolution beyond French national borders. The campaign was primarily an 
ideological rather than a miiitary one; and although opinions about Bonaparte 
shifted constantly in response to events, they remained firmly within a 
revolutionary conceptual model. 
It quickly becomes obvious from reading the newspapers and magazines of 
this period that Bonaparte was not regarded as a monster-like figure, and neither 
were accounts published of sadistic behaviour or brutaiities. Rather there was an 
emphasis on Bonaparte's humanity in comparison with the horde of revolutionary 
soldiers he commanded. 13 One of the first references to Bonaparte in Bell's 
Weekly Messenger was the story that he had thrown himself among his soldiers to 
stop their carnage at the camp of the Piedmontese. 14 It is significant that the 
emphasis is on the revolutionary general having to prevent the rapacity of his 
own troops. An identifiable layer of humanity was added to Bonaparte in stories of 
this kind, while an identifiable target for disdain and fear, the base republican 
soldier, was maintained. Bonaparte was also identified with genuine acts of 
humanity which were not related directly to military matters. His freeing of 
Frenchmen such as La Fayette from Austrian prisons was noted with approvai, 
"12 Michael Duffy' "The noisie, Empty, Flutt'ring French": Engiish images of the French, 
1689 - 1815', History Today 32, 1982, pp. 21 - 26; Geraid Newman 'Anti-French 
propaganda and British liberal nationalism in the early nineteenth century: suggestions 
towards a general interpretation', Victorian Studies 18, 1975, pp. 385 - 418. 
13 Something stated expiicitiy in The Aberdeen Magazine for July 1797. p. 331. 
14 Be#'s Weekly Messenger 5 May 29, 1796, p. 38. 
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although the initiative was accorded to his political masters rather than to 
Bonaparte himself,15 
The commentary on the French occupation of Italy after the initial campaign 
demonstrates further that Bonaparte was conceived primariiy as a revolutionary 
figure. Implicit in this was recognition that revolutionary generals were also 
representatives of the French government. In this role Bonaparte was recognised 
as being deeply involved in creating republican states,16 and in negotiating the 
peace of Campo Formio between France and Austria in the autumn of 1797. 17 
During the delicate negotiations with the Pope in early 1797 Bonaparte was 
described as the vehicie of Directorial policy, although it was recognised that the 
practicalities of distance meant that he had considerabie room for persona! 
initiative. 18 The tone of an article in The Aberdeen Magazine suggests that 
Bonaparte was expected to follow the general policies set down by his political 
superiors, but that this allowed room for manoeuvre on smaller detaiis. 19 
Bonaparte was lauded for accommodating practical concern and politeness 
with republican intent; his dealings with the Pope were regarded as imposing 
hard conditions. but were acknowledged to have been conducted in respectful 
terms. 20 He was portrayed as being gracious when in a position of strength: The 
Annual Register pointed to a letter to his opponent. the Archduke Charles, which 
------------------------------
15 The Annual Register for 1798, p. 108, 
16 Beli's Weekly Messenger 42 February 12, 1797. p. 329; The Times 3894 Monday 
May 15, 1797; Bel/'s Weekly Messenger 59 June 11, 1797, p. 465. 
17 The Times 4033 Monday November 6, 1797; The Observer 3'! 0 November 12, 
1797, 
18 The Observer 275 March 12, 1797. 
19 'Anecdotes of Pius VI', The Abderdeen Magazine for September 1798, pp, 437 -
441. 
20 Bel/'s Weekly Messenger 46 March 12, 1797, p. 364; Th e Annual Register for 
1797, p, 10; see also Bell's Weekly fv1essenger 71 September 3, 1797, p 562. 
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supposedly stated that enough men had died, and that it was time to begin peace 
negotiations. This was described as 'a nobler monument than any of his victories.' 
Bonaparte's military talents, recognised as being used for the promotion of 
republican ideologies, could be appreciated publicly because he was seen to be 
seeking a peace settlement with equal determination. After all, as the narrative 
continued, his letter 'breathes the sentiments of a galiant military chief; and, at 
the same time, the subtlest sentiments of morality'.21 Another long passage stated 
that by accepting an armistice while in a superior military position, Bonaparte 
had displayed moderation and good judgement, and expressed admiration for his 
military talents. 22 Narratives slJch as these give the lie to the simplistic 
implication that he was regarded as a bloodthirsty figure from his first 
appearances in British public consciousness. 
Some pains were taken in liberal magazines to point out that Bonaparte was 
observing the liberties of person and property during the Italian occupation. The 
Annual Register stressed the influence of Bonaparte's personal character in 
determining this moderation, claiming that he 'fought on all occasions to adopt 
measures of lenity'.23 The general's primary aim was regarded as being the 
transmission of republican ideologies to the Itaiian people, Little doubt was 
expressed about the fervency of Bonaparte's personal convictions; indeed, he was 
seen as a favourite of republicans at home because of his successful propagation 
of republicanism in Italy.24 The care taken to play down the military nature of 
the occupation, and the consideration apparently shown to the italians, were seen 
as evidence of that. the republican cause was more important to Bonaparte 
----------------------
21 The Annual Register for 1797. p. 32 (both quotations). 
22 ibId., pp. 33, 34. Similar sentiments were expressed in The Observer 317 January 
7, 1798. 
23 The Annual Register for 1797, p. 19. 
2Aibid., p. 62. 
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personally than simple military conquest. It was related that by his politeness 
and good manners Bonaparte cultivated popularity and acquired as great an 
influence as he would have done through repressive military occupation.25 He 
was believed to be preparing the Italians for republican government by 
cultivating leading families, as well as encouraging young Italian men to take up 
the republican cause.26 But recognition that Bonaparte couid take harsh action 
where required illustrates an awareness of the repressive possibilities of what 
was also a military occupation. The closing of poiiticai ciubs in Milan was noted 
as being consistent with his desire to tolerate no opposition to republican 
ideologies.27 Perhaps the relatively favourable reputation Bonaparte enjoyed in 
many British publications in this period was because no significant risings 
occurred in the territories he governed. Had Bonaparte needed to exercise 
military and poiitical repression to a greater extent than he did, opinion about 
him might have been rather different. 
At this point it is useful to reflect on what Bonaparte might have 
represented on a wider scale, specifically his contribution to British conceptions 
of the revolutionary genera! as a rank. Bonaparte was regarded as a model of how 
a revolutionary general could conduct a highly successful military campaign, 
make converts to republicanism, and negotiate with legitimate authorities in 
seemingly good faith.28 His proficiency in finance and the manipulation of public 
opinion was also noted. The Annual Register stated rather pointedly that 'No 
general, no politician of the present day, appears to be more profoundly skilled 
than that leader in the management of the two great springs that move the whole 
---- --------------------------
25 ihirl" p. 21. 
§$ ibid., pp. 22 - 23; mentioned also in The Annual Register for 1798, p. 108. 
ibid., pp. 108 - 109. 
fbid, , p. 107. 
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machinery of public affairs, the passions and finance.'29 The apparently 
contradictory picture of a revolutionary general who seemed to respect property. 
but who aiso demanded much of the territories he was occupying for ideological 
reasons, seems to have been one which commentators were happy to accept. 
Perhaps this was because although Bonaparte's demands on Italian resources 
were noted, so too was his determination that his troops should respect private 
property. From these comments we can see that the British conception of the 
rank of revolutionary general was that of a figure in whom military skiil and 
ideological conviction were combined with finesse at the management of occupied 
territories. 
British awareness of Bonaparte's ethnic origin is another issue which 
requires consideration. Curiosity about this30 opened out into questioning about 
whether any connict existed between his Italian ancestry and his ideological 
aUeganices. Bonaparte's propagation of repubiicanism among the Halian people 
was perceived by some commentators to rely on a cUltivation of ethnic kinship. 
He was described as being a hero to the Italians, despite his position as the head of 
a French army of occupation. The Aberdeen Magazine claimed that they regarded 
him 'in the light of a countryman, who has revived the ancient military glory of 
Italy,' Bonaparte's decisive defeats of the Austrians were believed to have made 
him popular. 31 Despite recognition of this acclaim, British commentators had 
llttle conception of any conflict between divided loyalties. Rather, they argued 
that Bonaparte was trying to balance allegiance to both his 'countrymen' and to 
republicanism through making moderation and restraint the key features of the 
French occupation.32 Awareness of Bonaparte's ethnic origin was used to explain 
, 
2-9 The Annual Reoister for 1797, p. 34. 
- . 
30 Bell's Weekly Messenger 50 April 9, 1797, p. 397. responded to a case made by C 
F. Volney for Bonaparte being an Amencan. 
The Aberdeen Magazine for July 1797, pp. 330 - 331. 
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how he played down to the Italians the occupation of their country by foreigners. 
Bell's Weekly Messenger claimed that when announcing his decision to merge the 
Cisalpine and Transpadane Republics in July 1797, Bonaparte had told the 
National Guards at Como that the Italian people would not be subjected to rule by 
foreigners. 33 Bonaparte's popularity with the Italians was argued by Sir John 
Sinclair to have made him indispensable to the Directors, even though they 
disliked his independent spirit. 34 His ethnic origin, then, was a distinct feature 
of the discourse on Bonaparte's occupation of Italy. But it was not seen as the 
source of any conflict with his revolutionary convictions; instead it was regarded 
as an aspect of his person which he was manipulating to further the 
revolutionary cause. 
The previous paragraph has indicated that the British were aware that 
there was some friction between Bonaparte and his politicai superiors. But his 
intimate political relationship with one of the leading figures ruling France was 
also recognised. The Annual Register claimed that Bonaparte had informed his 
army on 4 July 1796 that there was a counter-revolutionary movement abroad. 
The magazine related that the general had asked his men 'to second him in all the 
measures he might propose for the service of his party' .35 This referred to his 
widely-acknowledged political relationship with Director Paul Barras. 
Bonapar1e, like others of his rank, found it necessary to maintain a presence in 
the muddied waters of French domestic politics. His career was iinked intimately 
to the influence of his patron. British newspapers and magazines saw it as one of 
mutual benefit: Bonaparte was dependent on the opportunities Barras could 
32 The Annual Register for 1797, p. 15, pp. 22 - 23. 
33 Ben's Weekly Messenger 65 July 23,1797, p, 514, 
34The Aberdeen ,'I;1agazine for July 1797, p. 331; see also TIle Aberdeen Magazine for 
tmaust 1797, pp. 415 - 416. 
~fi The Annual Register for 1797, p. 62, The emphasis is mine. 
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provide for him, while the latter was perceived to be building his career on his 
clients military successes,36 The Aberdeen Magazine predicted another change of 
regime in France in late 1797, based on its estimation that Barras could rely on 
Bonaparte's control of the Army of Italy for support,37 while The Times and The 
Observer speculated that Bonaparte would be appointed Generalissimo of the 
French forces when Barras achieved pre-eminence within the Directory,38 
Rather than being regarded as a man with a consuming desire for personal 
power,39 Bonaparte was believed to be attempting to entrench himself in Italy as 
a bargaining point in his relationship with his political superiors, Rumours that 
he was considering assuming sovereignty over Italy were linked to awareness 
that French politicians were not always generous in their treatment of successful 
generals returning home from spreading revolutionary ideologies abroad. The 
Times claimed in July 1797 that Bonaparte had been reprimanded officially by 
the Legislature for his independence. and that he was concerned about the likely 
effect of this censure on his career prospects. The newspaper speculated that 
Bonaparte might use his position of strength in Italy to bargain for greater 
responsibility,40 It seems clear, then, that conceptions of Bonaparte's politics in 
this period were limited in scope to recognition of his relationship with Barras 
and to a belief that he was attempting to ensure that he would have a future when 
he was recalled from Italy, 
36 The Observer 316 December 31, 1797; The Abderdeen Magazine for December 
1797, p. 614; The Times 4112 Tuesday February 6, 1798; The Times 4126 Thursday 
February 22, 1798. 
'p' ~ I The Aberdeen l'vlagazine for December 1797, p. 620, 
38 The Times 4112 Tuesday February 6, 1798; The Observer 326 March 11, 1798, 
3Q 
' .• ~ Ashton, The Dawn of the XIXth Century in England, p. 2: Wheeler and Broadiey, 
Napoleon and the Invasion of England, vol. I, p. 88. 
40 The Times 3945 Thursday July 13, 1797; Beli's Weekly Messenger 85 December 
1Q, 1797, p. 677. 
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The final section of this chapter deals with the question of Bonaparte's 
elative significance in British eyes between the summer of 1796 and the winter 
)f 1797 - 8, MacCunn has claimed that Bonaparte was initially a relatively 
mimportant figure in comparison with other generals, who were campaigning in 
"hat was regarded as a more strategically important area in Germany41 
itudy has assessed the amount of space devoted to coverage of Bonaparte and Italy 
",hen compared with other news and commentary as a test of this 
~eneralisation.42 It posits that Bonaparte's successes in the Italian campaign and 
lis role in negotiation with the Pope and the creation of republican regimes 
'endered him a figure of some newsworthiness. but agrees with MacCunn that he 
Nas also simply one among many of his rank.43 
Some reconsideration of the ways in which the British perceived the war in 
Europe is probably necessary to elaborate upon this. Although in terms of 
strategy events in italy in 1796 were important because Bonaparte's opponents, 
the Austrians, were Britain's major ally, they do not seem to have been singled 
out for special mention. Bell's Weekly Messenger devoted as much attention to the 
campaigns conducted by Generals Moreau and Jourdan in Germany as on 
Bonaparte and italy in July 1796.44 The 'History of Europe' section of The Annual 
Register for 1797 analysed the Italian campaign and its strategic significance, 
but it was not singled out noticeably when compared with narratives of campaigns 
In other areas.45 It seems that the press were less interested in strategy than 
might be expected. 
~---------------------------------------
41 MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, p. 9. 
42 The method followed was that advocated by Berridge and outlined in 'The sources: 
The press, society and public opinion in Britain in the iate eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries' above. 
43 An aspect emphasised in The Observer 266 January 15. 1797: The Observer 272 
february 1 9, 1797. 
44 Bell's Weekly Messenger 12 .July 17, 1796, pp. 91 - 92. 
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Other events would probably have crowded out awareness of Bonaparte's 
occupation of Italy during 1797. The subjects devoted most coverage during the 
middle months of the year were domestic: the British naval mutinies at Spithead 
and the Nore. and the resulting trials of the mutineers.46 The Pitt ministry was 
negotiating for peace with the Directory. and the parlous state of French domestic 
politics seems also to have overshadowed Bonaparte and Itaiy.47 Probably the best 
conception of Bonaparte's relative significance is one linked to the state of the 
war. He would have been regarded as important when events with which he was 
associated, such as the battles in the summer and autumn of 1796 or the peace 
conferences to which he contributed in 1797. were major news. But Bonaparte 
had little intrinsic significance. and there were no assumptions that he was 
predestined for greater things. He was simpiy one among many generals in 1796 
- 7, and British commentators looked to events to assess whether or not General 
Bonaparte would disappear from the Revolutionary conflict as suddenly as he had 
appeared. In late 1797 the first rumours were beginning to emerge of 
Bonaparte's involvement in a new project of more direct relevance to Britons. 
* * '"Ie * * 
------------------------------ ---------------
:t5 The Annual Register for 1797, pp. 1 - 17. 
:H3 Bell's Weekiy Messenger 61 June 25, 1797, pp. 485 - 487; Beli's Weekly 
Messenger 63 July 9, 1797, pp. 501 - 502. 
47 The Observer 291 JUIV 2. 1797. 
35 
The eighteen months Napoleon Bonaparte spent in Italy between the summer 
of 1796 and the winter of 1797 - 8 are critical to understanding his British 
reputation over the following six years. Bonaparte was not perceived to be an 
inhuman figure, rather, as MacCunn has acknowledged, military success and 
occupation were seen as vehicles for the promotion of French republican 
ideologies. British newspapers and magazines believed that Bonaparte was a 
revolutionary by persona! belief as much as by rank. vVhile this earned him 
ridicule from some quarters, he was depicted in others as an example of how a 
revolutionary general could combine a fervent personal belief in the republican 
cause with civilised behaviour. Awareness that Bonaparte was an italian did little 
to alter recognition that he was a revolutionary. Rather, he was perceived to be 
using his ethnic origins to further his ideological aims. Although the Itaiian 
campaign was important because Bonaparte's opponents were Britain's ailies, 
this does not seem to have prompted British newspapers and magazines to 
concentrate upon him in any greater detail than they did his fellow generais. 
Intrinsic significance was not a characteristic of British views of Bonaparte 
from 1796 - 8. 
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CHAPTER TVVO 
Bonaparte as roving revolutionary: the Egyptian expedition, 1798 - 9. 
The historical literature of British views of the Egyptian expedition has 
centred on stories of massacres, and has depicted Bonaparte as scheming 
throughout his desert sojourn to gain political power by abandoning his troops.1 
MacCunn identifies the Egyptian expedition as important for commentators 
because it allowed them to depict Bonaparte as 'a typical Oriental conqueror, 
hypocritically embracing Mohammedanism, displaying the most odious tyranny, 
barbarity and callousness, finally baffled by the honest bravery of a few British 
soldiers under Sir Sidney Smith'.2 This is the definitive existing statement on the 
subject, and it is also a good example of the most significant fault of the 
historical literature. It refers as much to the long-term consequences of the 
expedition for British views of Bonaparte as it does to the beliefs expressed in 
1798 - 9. MacCunn's account fails to distinguish dearly between contemporary 
ideas and those of later years, and therefore fails to establish clear statements 
about the reiative importance of accounts of cruelty during the period of the. 
expedition itself. 3 
Stella Cottrel! states that stories about deliberate attempts by Bonaparte to 
murder or desert his soldiers during the Egyptian expedition were the most oft-
1 This outline is, of course, a Crude sketch of the more sophisticated arguments 
presented by the respective works; but it is in my reading a fair estimation of the 
general model proposed. See Ashton, The Dawn of the XIXth Century in England; 
Wheeier and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion of Engiand. Cookson, although more 
p¢rceptive than 1118 other studies, still subscribes to this model: The Friends of Peace, 
p. 171. 
2 MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, p. 17. 
3 ~ . .i 7 Ibid., pp. 1,+ - 1 •. 
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commented upon factors about the man.4 Her conclusions are flawed in a similar 
fashion to those of MacCunn. Cottrell's statement that Bonaparte's massacre of his 
own soldiers was the most important feature of the expedition in British eyes is 
based exclusively on evidence generated by the resumption of war and invasion 
crisis of 1803. This chapter cannot either dispute or support Cottrell's 
contentions, precisely because they fall outside the immediate period of British 
response to the expedition. There are scattered indications in CottreWs narrative 
about the years to which she refers; but her inconsistent use of evidence 
contributes little to any re-assessment of the arguments in the older literature. s 
This chapter will examine British views of Bonaparte during the Egyptian 
expedition through the reporting and commentary which formed the immediate 
response, arguing that revolutionism rather than inhumanity was the dominant 
theme. 
Over the winter of 1797 - 8, it was widely believed that Bonaparte would 
be in command of an attempt to invade Great Britain in the following spring,6 
Activity on the northern French coast was taken as evidence of preparations for 
such an attempt, and was accompanied by rumours that Bonaparte was 
familiarising himself with the roads between Dover and London,? This was not a 
universal belief; The Times argued in January that the French had no such 
4 Cottrell, 'English views of France and the French', pp. 232 - 233. 
5 ibid., pp. 238 - 239. 
6 Bell's Weekly Messenger 83 November 26. 1797, p. 658, 680; The Observer 316 
December 31. 1797; Express and Evening Chronicle 521 Thursday 18 - Saturday 20 
January 1798; Lloyd's Evening Post and British Chronicle 6318 Wednesday 21 
February - Friday 23 February 1798, p. 188; The Aberdeen Magazine for March 1798, 
p. 148; Express and Evening Chronicle 539 Tuesday 6 March - Thursday 8 March 1798 
and Express and Evening Chronicie 552 Thursday 12 April - Saturday 14 April 1798. 
7 Bell's Weekiy Messenger 91 January 21, 1798, p. 20, 22; Belf's Weekly lVlessenger 
103 April 15, 1798, p. 113. 
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plans.8 Nonetheless, for the first few months of 1798, Bonaparte was regarded 
as the revolutionary general most threatening to the security of Great Britain. 
By the spring newspapers were aware that French naval energies were now being 
expended at Toulon on the southern coast, where a large fleet was being 
assembled. These preparations were reported with an understandable degree of 
trepidation; much of the discussion in these months speculated that the Toulon 
fleet was connected with the rumours about a projected invasion of Great 
Britain.9 
A close examination of newspapers in the spring and summer of 1798 
reveals that there was anything but agreement about the probable destination of 
the expedition. Egypt seems to have been one of the last places considered; as well 
as the continuing possibility of an assault on Great Britain, the establishment of 
a revolutionary republic in eastern Europe was suggested. 10 Reports that 
Bonaparte was going to Egypt were ridiculed by Bell's Weekly Messenger in April 
1798, which suspected that Naples was the true destination: 'We sincerely hope, 
however, that our Readers ... treat with the contempt it deserves, the idea of their 
sending their ablest Generals and their best troops into Egypt, upon a speculative 
and romantic adventure.'11 The same newspaper stated in June that the Toulon 
ships would probably join the Mediterranean divisions of the French and Spanish 
fleets for a greater purpose,12 while The Times did not decide that Egypt was a 
8 The Times 4088 Tuesday January 9, 1798. 
9 For example The Times 4184 Tuesday May 1, 1798. 
10 Express and Evening Chronicle 577 Saturday 16 June - Tuesday 19 June 1798; for 
confusion about where the expedition is bound, see also The Aberdeen Magazine for 
June 1798, p. 304; Lloyd's Evening Post 6372 Friday 29 June - Monday 2 July 1798, 
p. 7; The Times 4210 Thursday May 31, 1798; The Times 4204 [sic] Thursday June 
14, 1798. MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, p. 13, recognises 
this point. 
11 Bell's Weekly Messenger 105 April 29, 1798, p. 133. 
12 Bell's Weekly Messenger 111 June 10, 1798, p. 181; Bell'S Weekly Messenger 113 
June 24, 1798, pp. 197 - 198. 
39 
possible destination until it had passed by Italy, and it was still predicting Greece 
as a likely destination four days before the arrival of news of the landing in 
Egypt. 13 The initial reporting of the expedition can best be summed up, then, as 
confused. By August, however, newspapers relayed accounts of the the landing at 
Alexandria,14 and were filled with reports of the battle in August between 
Bonaparte's fleet and the British Mediterranean fleet commanded by Nelson, 
which resulted in the stranding of the French expedition in Egypt. 15 
Insufficient attention has been paid to British belief in the explicitly 
revolutionary intent of the Egyptian expedition. MacCunn acknowledges that 
Bonaparte was seen as a revolutionary figure going on a 'Republican crusade', but 
he too does not establish the centrality of this issue for contemporaries. 16 If 
contemporary newspapers were initially uncertain about the exact destination of 
the expedition, there was little uncertainty about its broad intentions. It was 
characterised consistently as a republican venture, an attempt to take 
revolutionary ideologies to foreign lands. News about the Egyptian expedition was 
constantly couched in terms which suggested to readers that it was a republican 
folly, another manifestation of the excesses the French had developed as a 
consequence of the Revolution. One newspaper commented that the French wanted 
to take the Pyramids and place them in Paris: such, it was implied, was their 
plundering enthusiasm.17 
13 The Times 4226 Tuesday July 10, 1798; for the report of Greece as the 
destination, see The Times 4263 Thursday August 23, 1798. 
14 The Observer 349 August 26, 1798; The Times 4266 Monday August 27, 1798; The 
Observer 352 September 16, 1v]98; The Times 4285 Tuesday September 18, 1798; 
The Times 4290 Monday September 24, 1798. 
15 The Times 4297 Tuesday October 2, 1798; The Observer 355 October 7, 1798; The 
Times 4302 Monday October 8, 1798; The Times 4304 Wednesday October 10, 1798 
and The Times 4309 Tuesday October 16, 1798. 
16 MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, pp. 13 - 15. 
17 Belt's Weekly Messenger 107 May 13, 1798, p. 150. 
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The news that Bonaparte had personally planted a tree of liberty among the 
cedars of Lebanon was reported satirically in the Morning Post in May 1799. The 
incident was treated in the same disparaging fashion as republican pretensions in 
Europe. It was implied that the majesty and longevity of the cedars of Lebanon, 
reaching back to Biblical times, were worth much more than the empty gesture 
of planting a French tree of Iiberty.18 The content of contemporary newspapers 
occasionally also provides fascinating insights into the ways in which the wider 
community regarded the expedition. Bell's Weekly Messenger reported the 
wording of a toast raised in Weymouth in the autumn of 1798: ' "May the Plagues 
of Egypt shake hands with the Army of Buonaparte; may the Floods of the Nile 
kiss their lips; and may the Crocodiles give them the Fraternal Embrace." '19 The 
ideological codes associated with French republicanism are clearly illustrated in 
statements such as this one, with its use of such telling textual signposts as 
'Fraternal Embrace'. 
Awareness of revolutionary intention was supplemented by speculation 
about the possible strategic aims of the expedition. Muriel Chamberlain argues 
that the Egyptian expedition was seen as an attempt by the French to re-establish 
their influence in India,20 and this was certainly one feature of contemporary 
commentary. The magazines and reviews in particular claimed that one of the 
expedition's aims was to cut off British access to India through the 
Mediterranean.21 Recognition that the expedition was a strategic threat to British 
18 Morning Post 9471 Wednesday May 15, 1799. 
19 Bel/'s Weekly Messenger 129 October 14, 1798, p. 325. 
20 Muriel E. Chamberlain 'Pax Britannica?' British Foreign Policy 1789 - 1914 
(London, 1988), p. 30. 
21 The Annual Register for 1798, pp. 134 - 135; review of Eyles Erwin An Enquiry 
into the Feasabi/ity of the supposed Expedition of Buonaparte to the East in Gentleman's 
Magazine for April 1799, pp. 322 - 335. MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of 
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interests was strengthened by appreciation of Bonaparte's military talents. The 
review of the pamphlet An Enquiry into the FeasabiJity of the supposed 
Expedition of Buonaparte to the East in the Critical Review questioned whether 
Bonaparte would be content with the establishment of a French republican 
settlement in Egypt, or whether the prospect of destroying British influence in 
India would prove too great a lure.22 
The India issue faded quickly from the newspapers after the summer of 
1798, although it lingered in the magazines.23 This was probably because the 
news of Bonaparte's difficulties in Egypt made the prospect of his crossing the 
desert to threaten British possessions in India seem increasingly unlikely. The 
promotion of republican ideologies was always believed to be more important 
than strategic aims, anyway; the expedition was to be one of intellectual rather 
than military conquest.24 The Annual Register speculated that Bonaparte was to 
spread republicanism throughout eastern Europe, being given a wide 'theatre of 
action', that he was inciting revolt of the peoples of the East against their 
Turkish masters, and that the 'ardent and aspiring genius of Buonaparte' was 
opening the area up successfully to republican influence.25 Although strategic 
concerns played their part in British opinions about Bonaparte's role in the 
Egyptian expedition, its primary motivation was always conceived as that of 
intellectual colonisation. 
Napoleon. p. 14 - 15, recognises this, but his use of evidence from between 1798 and 
1806 stretches the credibility of his generalisations . 
• 
22 Review of Eyles Erwin An Enquiry into the Feasability of the supposed Expedition of 
Buonaparte to the East in Critical Review 25. 1799. p. 335. 
23 The Observer 363 December 2. 1798 claims that Bonaparte has given up any plan to 
invade India; review of Erwin. An Enquiry into the FeaSibility of the supposed 
Expedition ... in Critical Review 25, 1799, p. 335. 
24 The Times 4542 Thursday July 25, 1799. 
25 The Annual Register for 1798, pp. 135 - 139 (quotation p. 135). 
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The origins of the expedition were attributed almost universally to the 
Directors themselves. The author of the pamphlet Egypt Delivered; or, the 
Conqueror Conquered claimed that he would examine 'the wild schemes of the 
ambitious Directory of France, which they employed this adventurous General to 
execute'.26 Opinions about the exact relationship between Bonaparte and his 
superiors were less uniform. The Times claimed on several occasions that the 
expedition had been set in motion because the Directors could not satisfy the 
financial and political demands of the recently-returned Italian campaigners. It 
described the expedition as 'an excellent expedient for quieting the present 
clamour',27 and claimed that the French government were hoping that Bonaparte 
would take his troops to far-off Egypt and never return.28 But even The Times, 
the newspaper most consistently hostile to Bonaparte, did not claim that he was 
in collusion with the Directors over this objective. The assumption was that 
Bonaparte had accepted command of the expedition because of ambition and a 
personal belief in the expansion of the Revolution, rather than to deliberately 
abandon or murder his troops. 
Other newspapers also speculated that Bonaparte was a pawn in the 
machinations of his political masters. The Morning Post argued that he was being 
sent to Egypt because he had been too successful in Europe. It claimed that the 
Directors were about to renounce territorial expansion as a trade-off in peace 
negotiations; the Egyptian expedition had been created 'not for sending him to 
make conquests, but for sending him where he could not make conquests; for 
sacrificing the best officers and troops on a ridiculous enterprise while they 
• 
26 Egypt Delivered; or, the Conqueror Conquered. pp. 2 - 3; see also The Times 4354 
Tuesday December 11, 1798; Morning Chronicle 9426 Wednesday August 7. 1799. 
27 The Times 4534 Tuesday December 11. 1798; The Times 4359 Monday December 
17, 1798. 
28 The Times 4534 Tuesday December 11, 1798. 
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were wanted to make conquests in Europe.' Bonaparte would not support the 
renunciation of territories which he had played a major role in conquering both 
ideologically and militarily, it was implied, and it was recognition of this which 
had inspired the Directors to appoint him to command of an expedition to the 
East.29 This thesis was not the only one in circulation. The Morning Post reported 
in February 1799 that the Directors were attempting to reinforce the expedition 
with more men and fresh supplies. Failing that, they were trying to find a way to 
bring Bonaparte back to the war effort in Europe.30 But this was definitely a 
minority view; the majority of the press believed that Bonaparte and his troops 
were victims of the schemes of French politicians. There was no belief that he 
was personally conspiring to abandon or destroy his troops.31 
Cynicism about Bonaparte's religious beliefs is another strong indication of 
the primacy of revolution ism in contemporary British awareness of the Egyptian 
expedition. The news of Bonaparte's religious accommodations with the natives 
which filtered into the British press from the autumn of 1798 linked him 
further with the apostatical tendencies of the Revolution. Many newspapers 
commented on Bonaparte's apparent conversion to Islam, undertaken apparently 
to facilitate his dealings with the natives. The Times questioned coyly whether 
Bonaparte's attachment to the religious customs of 'the Musselmen' was 
sufficient for him to undergo circumcision.32 Statements about Bonaparte and 
religion during the Egyptian expedition should be regarded as further examples 
of how the revolutionary French were seen to be manipulating religion for 
ideological purposes. They should not be conflated with condemnations made in 
later years, nor with the sentiments expressed in the millenarian publications 
29 Morning Post 9554 Tuesday August 20, 1799. 
30 Morning Post 9406 Thursday February 28. 1799. 
31 See the works cited in n. 1 above. 
32 The Times 4321 Thursday November 1. 1798. 
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which flourished after the resumption of war in 1803. And the tone of the 
comments about Bonaparte's revolutionary agnosticism in the expeditionary 
period are wry, or satirical, rather than harshly judgemental. There were 
references to Bonaparte's having turned native in religious terms; but at most 
they seem to have been attacks on what was regarded as the recantation of 
European civilisation.33 
There were, of course, attempts by clerics to locate Bonaparte in a 
religious context. His relationship with the religious state of the French as a 
revolutionary nation was discussed at one of the meetings of the Eclectic Society 
in November 1798. This group of ministers, drawn from both the established 
Church and the Dissenting denominations, met fortnightly at St. John's Chapel in 
London to discuss topics of religious and political significance.34 The subject of 
their November meeting was 'What is the best way of improving the next 
Thanksgiving Day', inspired almost certainly by the celebrations commemorating 
Nelson's victory at the Nile. The discussion dwelt on the French rejection of 
legitimate religion. The Reverend J. Venn, founder of the society and Rector of 
Clapham, stated in his contribution: 'So long as God is thus openly acknowledged 
by us, and despised or defied by our enemies, we may hope that 'He will withdraw 
his hand, and work for his name's sake, that it should not be polluted in the sight 
of the heathen'.'35 Nelson's victory was described by the Reverend H. Foster as 
divinely inspired. Foster contrasted the declarations made in the letters of the 
opposing commanders, stating that while Nelson ascribed his victory to the glory 
of God, Bonaparte blamed his defeat on the destinies, the implication being that 
33 For example, Morning Post 9452 Tuesday April 23, 1799. 
34 John H. Pratt (ed.) The Thought of the Evangelical Leaders. Notes of the Discussions 
of the Eclectic Society, London during the years 1798 - 1814 (Edinburgh, 1856, 
reprinted 1978), pp. 1 - 3. 
35 ibid., p. 86. 
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Bonaparte believed his god to be fortune.36 The sentiments expressed at this 
meeting suggest that contemporary clerical discourse also regarded Bonaparte as 
part of the French revolutionary rejection of God and established religion 
practices. 
The British emphasis on the ideological nature of Bonaparte's role in the 
expedition is demonstrated further by the reporting of the cultural and scientific 
activities undertaken by the French in Egypt. In the liberal journals 
particularly, some space was devoted to pointing out the efforts being made to 
contribute to European knowledge of the region. The readers of the Gentleman's 
Magazine and the Reviews were presented with a great deal of information 
suggesting that the expedition was concerned with both fostering the 
transmission of republicanism, and with conducting cultural and scientific 
projects. 
Naturally the emphasiS given to cultural activities differed according to the 
sympathies of the particular publication. Although The Observer noted not 
unfavourably details of bridge-building, the repair of canals and the 
construction of highways undertaken by the French troops,37 other newspapers 
were less impressed. The Times commented that although it was aware that 
Bonaparte had undoubted talents in these areas, even these would not be able to 
extricate him from his predicament in Egypt. 38 What is especially interesting is 
the extent to which Bonaparte was believed to be personally involved in the 
organisation of chemical, geographical and mineralogical projects.39 Some 
commentators recognised that there was probably an element of self-
36 ibid. 
37 The Observer 363 December 2, 1798; The Observer 382 April 21, 1799. 
38 The Times 4299 Thursday October 4, 1798. 
39 The Observer 382 April 21, 1799. 
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justification in this behaviour. One writer in The Annual Register claimed that 
Bonaparte was cultivating 'the republic of science and knowledge' because 'he 
appears to have been equally anxious to approve of his conduct on the whole, as 
either to the French nation, or the rulers of the French democracy'. It is 
significant that Bonaparte is here emphasised as wishing to impress on others 
the genuineness of his republican credentials.40 Commentators also believed that 
Bonaparte's military talents were contributing to the fulfilment of the cultural 
intentions of the expedition. The Annual Register claimed expansively: 
In fine, it may be observed of Buonaparte, and it is, perhaps, what most 
happily distinguishes his character, that there never was any general, 
ancient or modern, if we ought not to accept Alexander the Great, who so 
happily united the progress of arms with the advancement of science. 
Rather than a condemnation of Bonaparte as a despotic, oriental figure, this 
comment signals approval of his using his military skills for the gathering of 
knowledge. 41 It is clear, then, that the British were aware that the Egyptian 
expedition was more than just a military exercise; alongside its ideological 
intentions, its attempts at contributing to the sum of European knowledge about 
the region was also acknowledged. This is a rather more sophisticated picture of 
the subject than that suggested by historians. 
Emphasising the primacy of a revolutionary conception is not to claim that 
the press was unaware of the casualties of the expedition. The deaths of French 
soldiers under Bonaparte's command in a far off country was certainly 
acknowledged. There was a distinctly condemnatory undertone to the story that 
many of the bodies found after the siege at Acre had certificates of good conduct 
40 The Annual Register for 1799, p. 46. See also The Observer 365 December 16, 
1798 and The Observer 382 April 21, 1799. 
41 The Annual Register for 1799, pp. 46 - 47. 
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from the Italian campaign in their pockets.42 But the credence given to such 
stories depended very much on the sympathies of the particular publication. The 
narrative of the Battle of Aboukir in the Morning Chronicle in October 1799 
claimed that Bonaparte planned the assault carefully and that he was 'anxious to 
spare the effusion of his soldiers' blood'. 43 And criticism of deaths among the 
French forces should not be conflated with accusations of despotism or tyranny in 
a political sense which occurred following Bonaparte's assumption of domestic 
power. 
This chapter has so far argued that in British eyes, the Egyptian expedition 
was fundamentally an ideological rather than a military enterprise. The 
conception of the venture was ascribed to the Directors, and Bonaparte's 
command was attributed to his personal belief in the need for revolutionary 
expansion as much as to his military abilities. Scientific and cultural 
investigation were acknowledged features of the expedition intent, and Bonaparte 
was again associated with this personally. It is now appropriate to consider a 
possible conceptual model which takes all of these issues into account. The model 
offered here is that of Bonaparte as a roving revolutionary general, derived from 
a comment made by J. Steven Watson. Referring to opinions about Bonaparte in 
the aftermath of his defeat at the Nile, Watson argues: 'Thereafter though 
Napoleon might remain master of Lower Egypt, he did so not as a general of a 
great power but as the isolated captain of a roving and self-contained army of 
adventurers.'44 Such a conception is valuable, because it takes into account 
contemporary recognition that the expedition was a republican enterprise 
commanded by a military figure. That Bonaparte was regarded as an ideological 
42 Morning Post 9537 Wednesday July 31, 1799. 
43 Morning Chronicle 9492 Thursday October 24, 1799. 
44 J. Steven Watson The Reign of George III. 1760 • 1815 (Oxford, 1960), pp. 378 • 
379. 
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warrior is illustrated nicely by a comment made by Bell's Weekly Messenger 
when reporting news of the Toulon fleet's attack on Malta in June 1798. 
Bonaparte is presented as 'That worthy General of a Republic, which began by 
renouncing all conquest, but which seems inclined to subjugate the whole earth, 
has attacked another neutral state.' One reviewer in the Gentleman's Magazine 
described Bonaparte in July 1799 as 'an active and intrepid leader of a horde of 
Cossacks:45 In the reporting and commentary of this period, then, Bonaparte was 
depicted as the roving revolutionary commander, the man to whom the 
transmission of republican ideologies in the East had been entrusted. 
The value of this model is illustrated further by contemporary awareness 
of Bonaparte's potential mortality. The sporadic and fragmented nature of news 
reaching Great Britain about the Egyptian expedition has not been sufficiently 
emphasised. In June and July 1799 it was reported that Bonaparte was besieging 
the castle of St. John d'Acre near Jaffa, and that he was surrounded by hostile 
armies commanded by Turks and the British Sir Sidney Smith, but such detail 
was comparatively rare.46 When considered on a day-to-day basis the picture is 
one of uncertainty about Bonaparte's actions and whereabouts. The reading public 
would have noted the sporadic reports of inconclusive skirmishing, and these 
must have led many to doubt whether Bonaparte would return.47 The Observer of 
45 Bel/'s Weekly Messenger 115 July 8, 1798, p. 212; review of Copies of original 
Letters from the Army of General Buonaparte in £gypt, intercepted by the Fleet under 
the Command of Admiral Lord Nelson; with an £nglish Translation in Gentleman's 
Magazine for July 1799, p. 414. 
46 Morning Post 9505 Monday June 24, 1799; Morning Chronicle 9389 Wednesday 
June 26, 1799; Morning Chronicle 9394 Tu'~sday July 2. 1799; Morning Post 9512 
Tuesday 2 July, 1799; The Times 4535 Monday July 15. 1799; Morning Chronicle 
9412 Wednesday July 24, 1799; Bell's Weekly Messenger 170 July 28, 1799. p. 237. 
See also The Observer 404 September 15. 1799. 
47 Implicit in all the reports relating to the expedition, but see especially The Observer 
347 August 12, 1798; Bell's Weekly Messenger 121 August 19, 1798, p. 257: 'Equal 
uncertainty prevails concerning the issue of the negociation at Rastadt, and 
BUONAPARTE's expedition:; also The Aberdeen Magazine for August 1798, p. 415; The 
Observer 352 September 16, 1798; The Observer 362 November 25, 1798; The 
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21 October 1798 noted that insurance policies had been opened returning twenty 
guineas upon receipt of an initial five should Bonaparte return to France.48 
Awareness of Bonaparte's mortality was also fuelled by periodic rumours of his 
capture and death.49 One of the most significant stories of early 1799 was the 
assassination of Bonaparte during a meeting of native notables he had called in 
Cairo. The reason given was that he had been attempting to force republican 
symbols and customs on the participants.50 Recognition that British newspapers 
were aware of Bonaparte's failures and his potential mortality goes a 
considerable way towards discrediting the idea that he was seen as scheming to 
return to France and to political power. Britons were more concerned with 
whether or not Bonaparte would survive his time in the desert. 
Another important question has remained relatively unconsidered. How 
significant was news and commentary about Bonaparte and the Egyptian 
expedition in relation to news about the war in Europe? J. E. Cookson has 
commented that with the news of the Egyptian expedition 'the British public came 
to regard him as a man of gigantic ambition and grandiose schemes'.51 It seems 
more likely that once the initial excitement over the British victory at the Nile 
had died down, Bonaparte and the expedition receded from public consciousness. 
The coverage accorded the expedition relative to the reporting and commentary 
about the war in Europe suggests that Bonaparte and the Egyptian expedition came 
Observer 365 December 16, 1798; The Times 4359 Monday December 17, 1798; The 
Aberdeen Magazine for December 1798, p. 617. 
48 The Observer 357 October 21, 1798. 
49 The Observer 365 December 16, 1798; Bell's Weekly Messenger 141 January 6, 
1799, p. 5; The Times 4359 Monday December 17, 1798; The Aberdeen Magazine for 
December 1798, p. 617; The Observer 366 December 23, 1798; Bell's Weekly 
Messenger 168 July 14, 1799, p. 221. 
50 The Observer 370 January 20, 1799; Bell's Weekly Messenger 143 January 20, 
1799, pp. 21; Morning Chronicle 9303 Monday March 18, 1799. 
51 Cookson, The Friends of Peace, p. 171. 
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to be regarded as an interesting curiosity. The content of newspapers in the 
summer of 1798 suggests that other events were probably more significant than 
the departure of the Toulon expedition. As well as devoting much space to 
parliamentary proceedings,52 newspapers in May and June were filled with 
reports of the rebellion in Ireland and the state trials of the rebels at 
Maidstone.53 The capture of Malta in June, and reports of the Battle of the Nile 
which filtered into Britain from September were covered in some detail.54 But 
even these events were surrounded by uncertainty: news of the engagement 
between Nelson and Bonaparte at the Nile was dismissed by at least one 
newspaper as just another rumour of Bonaparte's complete destruction.55 As the 
previous paragraph has indicated, reporting of Bonaparte's activities was 
sporadic in the year following the news of the landing in Egypt. 56 The activities of 
French generals on the continent, judged to be more relevant to the state of the 
war, were accorded greater priority; more attention was paid to Bernadotte than 
to Bonaparte.57 
The situation was not appreciably different in 1799. The progress of the 
war in Europe and the parliamentary debates over the Union with Ireland 
52 The Times 4160 Tuesday April 3, 1798; The Times 4162 Thursday AprilS, 1798. 
53 The Times 4174 Thursday April 19, 1798; The Times 4177 Monday April 23, 
1798; The Times 4203 Wednesday May 23, 1798; Lloyd's Evening Post. 6356 
Wednesday 23 May· Friday 25 May 1798; Bell's Weekly Messenger 111 June 10, 
1798, p. 177; Bell's Weekly Messenger 117 July 22. 1798, pp. 226 - 227. 
54 The Times 4219 Monday July 2. 1798; The Observer 342 July 8, 1798 (Malta); for 
the Nile, see The Times 4297 Tuesday October 2, 1798; The Observer 355 October 7, 
1798; The Times 4302 Monday October 8, 1798; The Times 4304 Wednesday October 
10, 1798; The Times 4309 Tuesday October 16. 1798; The Times 4324 Monday 
November 5, 1798. See also John Ashton English Caricature and Satire on Napoleon I 
(London and New York, 1888; reissued 1968), p. 52. 
55 Bell's Weekly Messenger 123 September 2, 1798, p. 276. 
56 The Observer 359 November 18, 1798; The Observer 370 January 20, 1799; The 
Observer 382 April 21, 1799. For an indication that there was often little news 
available, see The Times 4438 Thursday March 21, 1799. 
57 The Times 4184 Tuesday May 1, 1798. 
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dominated the newspapers in the early months.58 In March Bel/'s Weekly 
Messenger devoted more attention to the French invasion of Switzerland and the 
campaign between the armies of General Jourdan and the Archduke of Austria 
than to the Egyptian expedition.59 In July the Morning Post concentrated on the 
contest in Europe between Generals Suvarov and Moreau.60 This relative 
indifference cannot be explained simply by a lack of news. Little attention was 
paid to Bonaparte and the Egyptian expedition because the renewed Anglo-
Austrian offensive against the French in Europe was seen as of greater 
significance to the direction of the war.61 The British public may also have begun 
to lose interest in Bonaparte and Egypt. As early as August 1798, The Times 
claimed that the public were tired of hearing about the Toulon fleet.62 The 
Morning Chronicle hinted at public disinterest in October 1799 when it stated: 
BUONAPARTE's fate seems to be a matter in which the public are at 
present very little inclined to interest themselves. Now and then his death 
or resurrection may be called in to afford a breathing time, but as little 
attended to as the music between the actsl63 
58 Morning Chronicle 9255 Monday January 21, 1799, in which the coverage of the 
expedition to Egypt is present but the main focus of the news coverage is relations 
between the Emperor and the King of Prussia; Morning Post 9380 Tuesday January 29, 
1799; Morning Post 9399 Wednesday February 20, 1799; Morning Chronicle 9329 
Wednesday April 17, 1799; Morning Post 9452 Tuesday April 23, 1799. The Times' 
political coverage was dominated by parliamentary proceedings in the first few months 
of 1799: The Times 4389 Thursday January 22, 1799; The Times 4408 Wednesday 
February 13, 1799 and The Times 4441 Monday March 25, 1799. 
59 Bell's Weekly Messenger 151 March 17, 1799, p. 85; Bell's Weekly Messenger 164 
June 16, 1799, p. 188 (Switzerland~ The Times 4441 Monday March 25, 1799; Bell's 
Weekly Messenger 153 March 31, 1799, p. 101 and Bell's Weekly Messenger 155 
April 14, 1799, p. 117 (Jourdan and the Archduke). 
60 Morning Post 9517 Monday July 8, 1799. 
61 A point made by Morning Post 9466 Thursday May 9, 1799. 
62 The Times 4249 Tuesday August 7, 1798. 
63 Morning Chronicle 9483 Monday October 14, 1799. 
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Had Bonaparte assumed a greater degree of significance at this time than this 
narrative is suggesting, more attention would have been paid to it. This would 
have manifested itself not merely in the news reporting, which was subject to 
availability, but particularly in the leaders which offered extended commentary 
on the news items. 
The Egyptian expedition was an especially significant opportunity for the 
drawing of historical parallels. Kathryn Moore Heleniak has suggested that many 
comparisons were made between France under Louis XIV and France under 
Napoleon Bonaparte, and that Marlborough's victories against the French in the 
early eighteenth century were referred to extensively in the early years of the 
nineteenth.64 Parallels between Bonaparte and historical figures were certainly 
drawn in the years 1798 - 9. They were, however, taken more usually from the 
classical than the modern era. A comparison was made between Bonaparte and 
Scipio setting sail for the destuction of Carthage with the departure of the Toulon 
fleet in the spring of 1798.65 Reference was also made to Alexander, though it 
seems to have referred to a great military hero who aimed to spread Greek 
civilisation into Asia, rather than to the cultivation of despotic tendencies.66 The 
Annual Register pointed out that although Bonaparte's constant championing of 
republican government made him popular with many of the French people, 
others felt threatened by his influence within the army. He was reported as being 
seen by some Frenchmen as a possible Caesar.67 Th.e classical allusion would not 
have been lost on British readers. It signalled the danger of successful generals to 
civilian governments; 
64 Kathryn Moore Heleniak 'Old Kaspar. Pictorial Pacifism in the Napoleonic Period', 
The Art Bu/letin 72, 1, March 1990, p. 110. I am grateful to Dr. J. E. Cookson for this 
reference. 
65 Be/l's Weekly Messenger 105 April 29, 1798, p. 135. 
66 Morning Post 9358 Thursday January 3, 1799. 
67 The Annual Register for 1798, DD. 110 - 111. 
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An interesting letter appeared in the Gentleman's Magazine for July 1799. 
Calling himself 'Sica', the writer stated that he intended to enquire into 
Bonaparte's reputation as a general, and investigate 'the justness of his 
pretensions to such a rank',68 Although Sica acknowledged that Bonaparte 
possessed great courage, demonstrated by his behaviour during the Italian 
campaign, he qualified this by stating that Bonaparte lacked other qualities 
including restraint and coolness of judgement. This writer's conclusions are 
especially interesting as a snapshot of opinion about Bonaparte in the final 
months of the expedition. When summing up his beliefs about why Bonaparte was 
in Egypt, he returned to a revolutionary model, claiming that Bonaparte's means 
of conquest have been primarily not those of military power but of 
'Jacobinism'.69 
Revolutionist arguments in the summer of 1799 lead to the question: how 
much had British views of Napoleon Bonaparte changed as a result of his 
command of the Egyptian expedition? The answer seems to be very little, Perhaps 
the most significant development was the introduction of the theme of the 
manipulation of religion for political ends. Sica claimed that part of the reason 
behind Bonaparte's success had been his 
insinuating accommodation to popular prejudices in religion, so notoriously 
manifested in his letters to the Pope, his declaration of Mahometanism, 
and, long before this time, his acceptance of the .Jewish faith; these, all 
these, have principally concurred in putting this man in possession of many 
countries, where the credulity, want of energy, or treachery, of the 
natives have made them false to their own interests.70 
68 Letter dated 8 July in Gentleman's Magazine for July 1799, pp. 568 - 569. 
69 ibid., p. 569. 
70 ibid., p. 568. 
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In other ways, aside from new anecdotes with which to characterise Bonaparte as 
a revolutionary figure, this chapter has demonstrated that there was little 
conceptual change. Bonaparte was still a 'Jacobin' employing ideological trickery 
and his military abilities to pursue republican aims. The historian should be 
rightly wary about taking a single account as evidence of general opinion. But 
that an obviously literate and informed man could contribute a lengthy epistle to 
the Gentleman's Magazine about Bonaparte without mentioning domestic political 
ambitions, massacres or the poisoning of troops suggests strongly that these 
themes have been inaccurately located in this period. 
* * * * * 
Informed readers would have been aware of Bonaparte's triumphant return 
through France to Paris in October 1799, as newspapers reproduced accounts of 
this in some detail.71 A sense of expectation can be detected in these reports. 
There was speculation about where Bonaparte would be deployed next, and 
indications that relations between the Directory and the returning general were 
sensitive.72 The Morning Post discounted a rumour that Bonaparte was to be sent 
against Portugal, claiming that 'so great a man will not be despatched on so small 
an object.'73 But in the autumn of 1"799 British newspapers had no awareness 
that any major upheaval was about to occur; as late as September, one paper 
could publish an article about French politics entitled 'On the present state of 
French principles' without mentioning Bonaparte.74 The general's return did not 
71 Morning Chronicle 9490 Tuesday October 22, 1799; Morning Post 9708 Wednesday 
October 23, 1799; Morning Chronicle 9497 Wednesday October 30, 1799; Morning 
Post 9715 Thursday October 31, 1799; Bell's Weekly Messenger 184 November 3, 
1799, p. 345. 
72 Morning Chronicle 9502 Tuesday November 5, 1799. 
73 Morning Post 9725 Tuesday November 12, 1799. 
74 Morning Post 9568 Thursday September 5, 1799. 
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even dominate news coverage: considerable attention was paid to the conflict in 
the Low Countries. In late October The Observer was more interested in the 
campaign of the Duke of York in Holland than in the return of Bonaparte.75 In 
November 1799 Napoleon Bonaparte was stiil regarded as a republican general, 
and little more. That there was a sense of expectation about what might come next 
cannot be denied. But it would be unjustifiably Whiggish to claim that British 
newspapers displayed any kind of awareness of what was to come. 
* * * * * 
75 The Observer 409 October 20 1799; see also Bel/'s Weekly Messenger 178 
September 22, 1799; Bell's Weekly Messenger 180 October 6, 1799; Morning Post 
9701 Tuesday October 15, 1799. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Bonaparte as revolutionary ruler: from the coup of Brumaire to the summer of 
1800. 
In mid-November 1799 British newspapers learned that a change of 
government had taken place several days earlier in France. On the evening of 9 
November (18 Brumaire in the revolutionary calendar) Napoleon Bonaparte had 
participated in a military coup, leading troops into the Chamber of the Five 
Hundred and being wounded slightly in the fracas. It emerged that Bonaparte had 
been left in a position of authority and well able to take advantage of the 
circumstances that had placed him there. The Directory had been dissolved and a 
tripartite regime instituted, with Bonaparte as First among three consuls. News 
of Brumaire naturally stimulated a great deal of discussion in British 
newspapers in the following six months, with Bonaparte's new role as 
revolutionary ruler drawing him to the attention of the British public on an 
unprecedented scale. Debate about the direction of the Revolution and the 
prospect of an end to the Revolutionary war now focused on the new First Consul 
and the stability of his regime. 
* * * * * 
The question of who was behind the coup was the most important issue in 
the immediate reporting of the events of Brumaire. Historians have either, like 
Ashton, emphasised British concern that Bonaparte had overthrown the 
Directory upon his own initiative and that the general had enthroned himself,1 or 
have not examined the question in any detail. The issue was an intriguing one for 
1 'He arrived, dissolved the Council of Five Hundred, and the Triumvirate consisting of 
himself,· Cambaceres and Le Brun was formed': Ashton, The Dawn of the XIXth Century 
in England, p. 2. 
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contemporaries. The majority of newspaper opinion believed that former 
Director the abbe Sieyes had been the prime conspirator, and that Bonaparte had 
been in charge of the military reinforcement of the constitutional overthrow. 
Sieyes was believed to be reasserting his former influence as the architect of 
successive French constitutions through Brumaire.2 Commentators were aware 
that the coup had been planned while Bonaparte had been in Egypt, and that 
Bonaparte had not been the first choice of the conspirators. The Observer claimed 
that although General Moreau had been the figure initially settled upon to 
command the military side of the coup, the popular reception accorded to 
Bonaparte upon his return to France had forced the plotters to make him the 
vehicle of their ambitions.3 
The issue was complicated further by the spectre of the wily French 
politician Paul Barras, a leading member of the Directory to whom Bonaparte 
had known political links. The Morning Post argued that Barras and Sieyes had 
been the driving force behind the coup, and that Bonaparte had been their willing 
aide in securing the loyalty of the armed forces. The newspaper speculated that 
rather than intending to place Bonaparte in power, the coup had been planned 
instead to prevent the democratic republicans from gaining influence within the 
Directory.4 The Times, too, argued that the coup had gone much further than its 
architects had intended. It claimed that Barras had planned on becoming primus 
. 
inter pares within the Directory, and had intended to rule indirectly, rather 
than attracting the oppobrium of direct rule.5 Barras, rather than Bonaparte, 
was meant to be the main beneficiary of Brumaire. The minor role initially 
2 The Times 4644 Wednesday November 20, 1799; Morning Chronicle 9540 Thursday 
December 19, 1799. 
3 The Observer 416 December 8, 1799. 
4 Morning Post 9730 Monday November 18, 1799. 
5 The Times 4644 Wednesday November 20, 1799. 
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ascribed to the latter is instructive. Bonaparte was seen as the agent of the 
Barras faction. His criticism of Barras before the Councii of the Ancients and his 
general condemnation of the Directors were apparentiy to convince others of the 
honest and genuine nature of his intentions.6 It is clear that the initial British 
reaction to the coup located Bonaparte as the willing tool of the leading political 
figures. It was believed that his new position of power and authority had been 
achieved inadvertently rather than through concerted scheming. 
Fortuitous opportunism thus characterised the initial British view of 
Bonaparte's participation in Brumaire. Commentators then began to speculate 
about what would happen next, their indecision nicely illustrating the absence of 
any anticipation of Bonaparte's new role. The Morning Chronicle claimed: 'it is 
too much to suppose that men have always acted upon a systematic plan when they 
have achieved a grand object. BUONAPARTE himself, therefore, in all probability 
has not settled, even in his own mind, what he is to do." In the weeks following 
Brumaire British newspapers wondered about the direction events would take. It 
was entirely possible that Bonaparte might himself be replaced by one of the 
more experienced political figures. Would Sieyes reassert his influence over the 
genera! who had been elevated, perhaps temporarily, to a position of great 
influence and authority? Or would Bonaparte assert himself against those who 
had conspired to subvert the existing regime and who were responsible for his 
new position? 
Newspapers conveyed the uneasy relationship between Bonaparte and 
SieVes to their readers.8 The new First Consul was depicted as attempting to 
6 r"torning Post 9731 Tuesday November 19, 1799. 
7 Morning Chronicle 9514 Tuesday November 19, 1799. 
8 The Times 4642 Monday November 18, 1799; Morning Chronicle 9513 Monday 
Novernber 18, 1799. 
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assert an authority of his own by freeing himself of Sieyes' influence. (Barras 
had disappeared from reporting by this point.) The Public are apprized of the 
part [Bonaparte] espoused, and the immediate consequences;' The Observer 
commented, 'but they are yet to learn that he revolts at a state of tutelage 
attempted to be imposed upon him, and objects to parts of the System submitted 
by the great Manufacturer of Constitutions.'9 Awareness that Bonaparte was 
attempting to free himself from the influence of others was probably heightened 
by the attention paid to the mechanics of the Consulate. 10 British newspapers 
were soon convinced that Bonaparte dominated the new revolutionary 
government, despite the tripartite nature of the executive. Second Consul Roger 
Ducos, a former member of the Directory, was dismissed by the Morning 
Chronicle in December 1799 as being a lightweight. 11 Indeed, the other Consuls 
seem to have been regarded almost immediately as something of a standing joke in 
comparison with the obviously dynamic Bonaparte. In March 1800 The Times 
described the other Consuls as 'two Cyphers of his own nomination' .12 The strong 
impression in newspapers in the first few months following Brumaire was that 
Bonaparte had quickly seized a degree of power and influence which had not been 
intended by those who had planned the coup. 
Terminological change quickly accompanied recognition of Bonaparte's 
change in status. Within the first six months of 1800 'Buonaparte' generally 
became 'Bonaparte', and he was identified as the ; First Consul' or 'Chief 
9 The Observer 416 December 8, 1799. 
10 The Observer 417 December 15, 1799; The Times 4667 Mondav December 16, 
1799; The Observer 418 December 22, 1799; The Times 4674 Tuesday December 24, 
1799; The Observer 419 December 29, 1799; Bell's Weekly Messenger 194 January 
5, 1800, esp. p. 5; Beil's Weekly l'vfessenger 195 [sic] January 19, 1800, pp.18 - 20, 
11 Morning Chronicle 9540 Thursday December 19, 1799; Paul W. Schroeder The 
Transformation of European Polirics, 1763 - 1848 (Oxford, 1994), p. 207. 
12 The Times 4754 Thursday March 27, 1800. 
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Consul'.13 The former change may have been inspired by a declaration on the 
subject issued by the Consul himself not long after Brumaire; it may also have 
been simple recognition that the Francophone equivalent was now more 
appropriate. The Italianate form did continue in parlance, and the terms 'Chief 
Consul' and 'Bonaparte' seem to have been used interchangeably in most 
newspapers. The new First Consul was also catapulted into ali areas of news 
reporting and commentary. For the first time he began to be located in 
constitutional and political contexts. 14 This was to be expected, now that he was 
the arbiter of events within France and the director of the stream of 
revolutionary expansionism which had spread throughout Europe. Bonaparte also 
became a figure of intrinsic significance. The greater attention paid to him in 
newspapers was accompanied by the publication of both supportive and critical 
ephemera. These included polemical pamphlets and biographies, which in turn 
received attention from the reviews. Bonaparte's assumption of political power 
also encouraged a greater interest in his person, something reflected by the 
increasing proportion of newspaper anecdotes devoted to stories about him. The 
Morning Post noted on one occasion that Bonaparte had ordered women to cover 
up their decolletage by ordering a good fire be laid, punned as giving them a good 
roasting. 15 Such detal! had not been characteristic of his presence in newspapers 
prior to Brumaire. Stories such as this one fleshed out news reports and offered 
readers a more detailed portrait of the new revolutionary ruler. 
Encapsulated in British recognition of Bonaparte as First Consul was the 
belief that the course of the Revolution had been diverted. Newspapers were 
quick to point out that an oligarchy had been replaced by a personal regime 
13 For example The Observer 443 June 15, 1800. Bell's Weekly Messenger began the 
linguistic shift in its issue 190 December 15, 1799, pp. 393 - 394. 
14 This became standard in ali newspapers after Brumaire; for an example see Bel/'s 
Weekly Messenger 195 January' 19, 1800, pp. 17, 18, 20. 
15 Morning Post 9827 Tuesday March 11, 1800. 
,... ~ 
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dominated by a revolutionary general. But although there were strong concerns 
about this change, few lamented the demise of the Directories. These regimes had 
been regarded as corrupt, their constitutions being manipulated by a shrinking 
group of men who regularly purged themselves of moderates. Even The Times 
agreed that Bonaparte had not overthrown an innocent and uncorrupt regime, 
although it was cynical about the value of comparisons between successive 
revolutionary governments. 16 Soon after Brumaire the Morning Chronicle stated 
that the coup's supporters were using the corruption of the Directory as 
justification for Bonaparte's actions. It was fairly scepticai on this point, 
claiming that 'such is the apology for the 18th Brumaire, and such has been the 
apology for every unconstitutional act by which ambitious men have seized on 
power, and their partizans have justified it.'17 But there was a feeling that the 
Directory had betrayed the spirit of the Revolution. The Annual Register for 
1799 argued that the Directors had been more interested in jostiing among 
themselves for influence rather than applying themselves to the problems of 
their country.18 
Not every newspaper was willing to move beyond the question of the 
illegitimacy of the entire Revolution. The Times refused initially even to 
acknowledge the de facto existence of the Consulate. The conservative newspaper 
claimed that the only solution to the problems of the French would be the return 
of the Bourbon monarchy, rather than any degree of stability achieved by 
revolutionary governments. The Times informed its readers that they should not 
forgive Bonaparte his usurpation of the executive power merely because he 
16 The Times 4723 Wednesday February 1 g, 1800; for acknowledgement of the dubious 
nature of the previous regimes, see The Times 4711 Wednesday February 5, 1800 and 
The Times 4721 Monday February 17, 1800. 
17 Morning Chronicle 9521 Wednesday November 27, 1799. 
18 The Annual Register for 1799, p. 316. 
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seemed to be restoring some stability to France. 1g The virulence of some of the 
comment suggests that the paper believed the First Consul was being treated too 
sympathetically. 'It is melancholy to acknowledge that he wili be judged by 
success, and that the nations of Europe will treat with him, if he triumphs, who, 
if, defeated, will be no more than a bloody Tyrant and an impotent Usurper" it 
trumpeted when noting the forthcoming campaign Bonaparte was planning in 
Italy.20 
Nonetheless, even The Times was forced to adopt a rather more pragmatic 
attitude as the months passed and Bonaparte consolidated his position. The paper 
reluctantly acknowledged some of the beneficial actions of the new government, 
conceding that Bonaparte had allowed the exporting of French grain to Britain 
during provision shortages. 21 The reporting of the recalling of revolutionary 
committees from other countries in January 1800 was described not 
disapprovingly as relieving other countries of the revolutionary burden.22 But 
despite a grudging acknowledgement of the existence of the Consulate, the subtext 
in The Times remained stubbornly in favour of the Bourbons. The only reform 
the paper believed Bonaparte should undertake was to relinquish his exaited but 
illegitimate position. 
One critical feature of the British opinions about Bonaparte which began to 
develop after Brumaire was a reinterpretation of the events of his previous 
career. Some of these differed markedly from what had been believed even two or 
three months before. One good example of this was his linking to the French 
19 The Times 4694 Tuesday January 16, 1800. 
20 The Times 4752 Tuesday March 25, 1800. 
21 The Times 4742 Thursday March 13, 1800. 
22 The Times 4692 Tuesday January 14, 1800; The Observer 422 January 19, 1800. 
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invasion of Switzerland.23 which had been launched whiie Bonaparte had been in 
Egypt in 1798 and with which he had not been previously associated.24 
Commentators began to search for ways to explain how Bonaparte had ended up 
ruler of France; how a republican general who only months earlier had been 
bogged down in the Egyptian desert had become one of the most influential figures 
in Europe. From this need came the beginnings of the legend that Bonaparte had 
abandoned his troops in Egypt to return to seize power at home. The first 
sporadic references to the desertion of troops began to appear after the news of 
Brumaire. 25 They were probably mined from accounts of the expedition by 
British observers, wrlich began to circulate in the year following the coup.26 The 
theme was one which could only have originated after the event; as the second 
chapter of this thesis has demonstrated, before November 1799 there was no 
justifiable reason for Britons to believe that Bonaparte would end up as ruler of 
France. At the time of the coup The Times claimed that Bonaparte had been 
recalled by Barras,27 but over the following months most newspapers shifted 
their emphasis to claiming that Bonaparte had engineered his own return to 
23 Implied in the narrative of Reverend Charles Edward Stewart Thoughts on the Letter 
of Buonaparte, on the pacifick principles, and last speech of Mr Fox. By a Suffoik 
Freeholder. 1800, pp. 21 - 22. The Reverend Charles Edward Stewart (c. 1748 -
1819), rector of Reed in Suffolk. who identified himself as the 'Suffolk Freeholder' in 
his publications. is identified as an opponent of the liberal Critical and ,\-10ntlJly Reviews 
and a Tory pamphleteer by Emily Lorraine de Montiuzin The Anti-Jacobin 1798 - 1800. 
The Early Contributors to the Anti-Jacobin Reviellv (London, 1988), pp. 148 - 149. 
Stewart's pamphlet was probably written in the first two months of 1800, as It was 
reviewed on p, 359 of the Gentleman's Magazine for April 1800. 
24 G. Bonnard 'The Invasion of Switz@.rland and English Public Opinion (January to April 
1798)" English Studies. A journal of English Letters and Philology. 22, 1940, pp. 1 -
26. 
25 The Times 4709 Monday February 3, 1800. 
26 Review of The French Expedition into Syria, comprising General Buonaparte's 
letters, with General Berthier's Narrative, and Sir William Sidney Smith's Letters, 
from the London Gazette in Monthiy Review 31. January - April 1800, pp. 218 - 219. 
27 The Times 4644 Wednesday November 20, 1799. 
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Europe. He became 'the runaway First Consul! ,28 characterised in the Morning 
Post as a fugitive and described as having abandoned his troops for the acquisition 
of supreme political power Instead of receiving the death he deserved.29 
As Bonaparte seemed increasingly unlikely to be himself removed, 
newspapers also began to revise their initial ideas about his role in Brumaire. 
Historians have often insufficiently recognised that historical participants are 
capable of changing their minds. This certainly seems to have been the case in 
British newspapers in the first six months of 1800. Bonaparte came to be 
portrayed as playing a much more significant roie in Brumaire than had been 
believed at the time. His relationship with Sieyes was reconstructed to one more 
of plotting equals than political schemer and miiitary adjunct. The coup was now 
described as having been led by an apostate priest and a Corsican officer! 
together forcing a new constitution on France,30 This fascinating trend 
demonstrates that commentators were rewriting the recent past into an account 
which suited the state of affairs in their present. 
Much of the distorted historical picture has its roots in these revisions. By 
juxtaposing evidence from both the reception of the coup itself and the coverage· 
over the following months, historians like Ashton have echoed the contemporary 
trend without recognising i1.31 That Bonaparte was being regarded inaccurately 
as the leading figure in the coup was recognised by Bell's Weekly Messenger in 
May: 
Europe has assigned to BONAPARTE the exclusive honour of the 18th 
Brumaire, and posterity, judgiNg by appearances only, vvil! doubtless 
28 The Observer 432 March 30, 1800. 
29 Morning Post 4774 Wednesday January 8, 1800. 
30 The Times 4687 Wednesday January 8, 1800. 
31 Ashton. The Dawn of the XIXth Century in Enoland, P. 2. 
attribute the great events of that day to his genius. Nothing, however, can 
be more unfounded than this supposition. 
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The paper reminded its readers that Bonaparte had been controlled by the 
shadowy abbe Sieyes, and that it had been through the plotting of others rather 
than through his own influence that he had achieved his present position.32 The 
existence of a reconstruction of Bonaparte's role in Brumaire which responded to 
day-to-day news arriving from France demonstrates that contemporary opinions 
were considerably more sophisticated than has been admitted. Historians have 
overlooked this process in their quest to chart British awareness of Bonaparte's 
relentless seif-aggrandisement. 
'A question of high importance in the eyes of English observers was the 
stability, as well as the character of Bonaparte's domestic administration.' Thus 
has MacCunn accurately assessed the most significant aspect of the discourse 
about Bonaparte in 1800.33 British newspapers were by no means convinced in 
the months following Brumaire that Bonaparte's was a stable regime, or that it 
would last any longer than other revolutionary governments. These doubts need 
to be seen in the light of British views of events in Europe in the previous ten 
years. The achievement of stability had been promised by successive French 
revolutionary governments in the 1790s. In British eyes they had all become 
riven with factions and were overthrown as the Revolution lurched forwards. 
Many readers must have wondered whether the Consulate would go the same way 
as its predecessors, beginning boldly but being consumed by internal dissension 
and condemned by popular dissatisfaction. 
-_ .......... _._------
32 Bei/'s Weekly Messenger 211 May 11,1800, p. 145. 
33 MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, p. 30. 
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Rather than reducing the debate to the simplistic question of whether 
Bonaparte was seen as the 'child and champion' or the 'destroyer' of the 
Revolution, pace MacCunn,34 the following paragraphs will identify and analyse 
the major issues which were identified as being causes of real or potential 
instability to the Consulate in the six months foHowing Bruma.ire. While the 
nature of this discussion is an attempt to separate these issues so as to explore 
each more fully, of course each of them fed into and in many ways reinforced the 
others. So, for example, concern about whether Bonaparte was going to restore 
the legitimate monarchy led to questions about the stability of the regime because 
of probable hostiiity from republicans of all shades, which led in turn to doubts 
about the First Consul's ability to conclude a durable peace settlement. 
The idea that the Consulate was rendered unstable because of Bonaparte's 
Italian ethnic origin was promoted after Brumaire by The Times, Cottrell 
recognises this when she daims that there were divisions of opinion about 
whether Bonaparte represented the French nation or whether he was a Corsican 
interloper, but the chronological breadth of her generalisations devalues their 
credibiiity.35 The Times attempted to convince its readers of the illegitimacy of 
the new government by arguing that Bonaparte was not merely a revolutionary 
in the technical sense, but also in an ethnic sense. Immediately following 
Brumaire the paper speculated that Bonaparte would subside into his role as the 
First General of France because, as a foreigner, he would not be accepted as their 
ruler by the French people.36 The French were satirised as having their 
Republic usurped not only by an ambitious general, but by a foreigner. 37 
34 'b'd 32-<n I I " pp. - w-'. 
35 Cottrell, 'English views of France and the French', p. 231. 
36 The Times 4644 Wednesday November 20, 1799. 
37 The Times 4642 Monday November 18, 1799; more broadly, see also The Times 
4644 Wednesday November 20, 1799; The Times 4650 Tuesday November 26, 1799 
and The Times 4676 Thursday December 26, 1799. 
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This theme was pursued intermittently in the early months of 1800, the 
subject being brought up as a refrain when some new Consular political project 
or constitutional development was being reported.38 The Observer argued along 
similar lines on at least one occasion.39 But The Times should not be assumed to 
have dominated the debate, as the posited disqualification of Bonaparte from 
ruler over the French on ethnic grounds was soundly rejected by the opposition 
newspapers. The Morning Chronicle claimed that such allegations overiooked the 
fact that Corsica had been united to France under the monarchy,40 while the 
r ..1orning Post criticised 'The Ministerial Paper that has set up the hue and cry of 
"Corsican Robber" after the heels of BUONAPARTE'41 It is significant that these 
newspapers were cautiously supportive of the new regime, and therefore 
unwilling to accept what were regarded as the spurious arguments against the 
existence of the Consulate. 
The question of the stability of the new regime was linked with the prospect 
of peace, although the former was of more immediate concern. The Pitt ministry 
had conducted fruitless negotiations with the Directory in late 1796 and again 
from June until October 1797, the latter having been sabotaged by the Fructidor 
purge through which Barras and his supporters gained control of the 
Directory.42 That peace might emerge from the result of Brumaire was 
encouraged by reports of Bonaparte's comments during the coup,43 but was 
38 The Times 4687 Wednesday January 8, 1800; The Times 4692 Tuesday January 
14, 1800; The Times 4704 Tuesday January 28, 1800; The Times 4763 Tuesday Aprii 
8, 1800. 
39 The Observer 434 April 13, 1 L100. 
40 Morning Chronicle 9526 Tuesday Decernb9i 3, 1799. 
41 Morning Post 9772 Monday January 6, 1800. 
42 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, pp. 160 - 164; 173 -176. See 
also Cookson, The Friends of Peace, pp. 157 - 'j 58. 
43 r..,taming Post 9769 Thursday January 2, 1800; Be/!'s Weekly rv1essenger 194 
January 5, 1800, p. 5; The Times 4683 Monday January 6, 1800; Morning Post 9772 
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prompted more especially by his offer to open negotiations in a letter addressed 
directly to George i II at Christmas 1799. This received a swift and cold response 
from Grenville, Pitt's foreign minister.44 The opposition newspapers criticised 
this very heavily, although they recognised that the offer had been motivated by 
domestic as well as foreign policy concerns. The Morning Post described the 
First Consul's letter as being 'couched in remarkably polite terms' ,45 but these 
papers believed that official British policy was for the restoration of the 
legitimate government in France, and that this was why the offer had been 
rejected out of hand. 'Peace and the restoration of monarchy in France are wishes 
which do not exist separate in the minds of the English ministry,' the Morning 
Post stated.46 The opposition papers claimed that Grenville's response had been 
counter-productive. because it had been used by Bonaparte to justify his 
decision not to restore the legitimate king. The Morning Chronicle argued that the 
Pitt ministry's public rebuke of the offer could only aid Bonaparte, because 
rejection by a government committed to the return of monarchical government 
in France would 'remove from the character of the Chief Consul ail suspicions of 
a concealed attachment to FeudaHsm.'47 Pitt seemed to be ignoring the precedent 
of negotiating with revolutionary governments he had himself set in the past. 
Although The Times naturally did not share in these criticisms, its comments 
about the other papers indicates the depth of feeling that the technical 
Monday January 6, i 800; The Times 4687 Wednesday January 8, 1800; Morning Post 
9784 Monday January 20, 1800, 
44 The circumstances surrounding the reply and the ministerial reception of Brumaire 
are discussed in Piers Mackesy>War without victory. The Downfai/ of Pitt, 1799 -
1802 (Oxford, 1984), pp. 42 - 48. 
45 Morning Post 9772 Monday January 6. 1800. 
46 Morning Post 9769 Thursday January 2, 1800; Morning Post 9781 Thursday 
January 16, 1800. 
47 Morning Post 9769 Thursday January 2, 1800: BeU's ~VeeklV Messenger 194 
January 5, 1800, p. 5; Morning Post 9774 Wednesday January 8, 1800; Morning Post 
9829 Thursday March 13, 1800 (quotation). 
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iilegitimacy of the new regime should not prevent attempts at negotiations, or at 
least a civil answer to what seemed a good first step.48 
The idea that the installation of a dynamic individual in command of the 
Revolution might bring a peace closer was re-examined many times in this 
period. Like much of the British discourse relating to Bonaparte, the nature of 
the debate and the interpretation of the Christmas letter was linked to the 
opinions of the day about the stability of the Consulate. Some commentators took 
as their benchmark Bonaparte's reputation prior to Brumaire, and compared 
this with his proclamations as First Consul in order to judge his 
trustworthiness. The pamphlet Thoughts on the Letter of Buonaparte, on the 
pacifick principies, and iast speech of Mr Fox by the Reverend Charles Edward 
Stewart is a good example of this. Although ostensibly a consideration of whether 
a peace negotiated with Bonaparte couid be a lasting settlement, the pamphlet was 
also a satirical vehicle for castigation of opposition leader Charles James Fox's 
support for the new regime in France. As well as criticising the First Consul's 
presumptuous styling of his letter as from one crowned head to another,49 
Stewart argued that Bonaparte's military career rendered him an untrustworthy 
individual with whom to negotiate for peace. The author referred to a speech 
made by Bonaparte before Brumaire, in which 
he maintained that the existence of the French Republic, and of the British 
Government was incompatible, addressed his soldiers as the future Army 
of England, and promised them laureis yet more glorious, to be plucked on 
the banks of the Thames.50 
.... _ .. _._ ...... _. ---
48 The Times 4687 Wednesday January 8, 1800. 
49 Stewart, Thoughts on the Letter of Buonaparte, pp. 13 - 14. 
50 ibid., pp. 14 - 15. 
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Stewart concluded that the First Consuj's military background and his previous 
warlike proclamations were evidence that peace was not in his nature, an 
assertion with which the pamphlet's reviewer in the Gentleman's Magazine 
agreed.51 
More revealing than pamphlet literature obviously written in support of 
the ministerial position were persistent references to the idea of Bonaparte as 
potential peacemaker in the press. These probably reflect the state of war-
weariness in Britain in 1800. The author of the pamphlet Considerations 
concerning peace professed to believe that Bonaparte's offer of peace was a 
strategic manoeuvre. but queried anxiously whether Britain was to fight until 
another revolutionary ruler took Bonaparte's place. or even further, until the 
Bourbons themseives were restored, something the French people themselves 
might not accept.52 An article entitled 'BONAPARTE. in his relations to England' 
in the Morning Post in March 1800 reminded readers of the peace offer of three 
months before and undertook a detailed examination of the question.53 The fact 
that this issue was still being discussed in newspapers some four months after it 
had been rejected officially, in a medium which concentrated on day-to-day 
news, indicates that the idea of Bonaparte as potential peacemaker was still being 
regarded as a serious possibility well into the new year. Recognition that the 
offer had been for domestic consumption in both countries did not prevent it 
from being grasped as a potential blueprint for peace. Perhaps any approach was 
taken seriously, regardless of awareness of the ulterior motives behind its offer. 
51 ibid .. p. 15. Review of Thoughts on the Letter of Buonaparte in Gentieman's Magazine 
for April 1800, p. 359. 
52 Considerations concerning peace. By a fellow of St. John's Coliege, Cambridge, 
1800, pp. 20 - 21. 
53 Morning Post 9829 Thursday March 13, 1800. 
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Whether or not Bonaparte (and in the first few months, Sieyes) were 
intending to restore the legitimate monarchy was another factor which British 
commentators saw as mitigating against the potential stability of the Consulate. 
There was a feeling that Bonaparte might have accepted the office of First Consul 
solely to remove some of the extremes of revolution ism and as a prelude to 
recalling the Bourbons. Certainly there were strong reports of this belief in the 
immediate aftermath of Brumaire. The Morning Post claimed that reports of the 
impending restoration of the legitimate king were circulating in London.54 The 
paper itself was more dubious, as it was in early December when it noted that 
the Brest fleet had mutinied in favour of a royal restoration and that many people 
saw this as an indication that the legitimate monarchy was about to be restored.55 
Commentators believed that early moves such as allowing the return of royalist 
emigres were tentative steps towards a moderated regime, leaving the door open 
for the eventual restoration of the legitimate governmenL56 
The question of the potential restoration of legitimate religion accompanied 
early considerations of the possible restoration of the monarchy. Some 
newspapers speculated in the early months of 1800 that Bonaparte was 
sympathetic to the restoration of traditional worship. The Morning Post noted 
that Bonaparte had agreed to the return of the Archbishop of Paris, and expressed 
the hope that the First Consul would restore the Christian religion in France.57 
British newspapers did realise, however, that there were strong reasons against 
believing that Bonaparte would restore either the legitimate monarchy or organs 
of the ancien regime in France. The most significant of these was an awareness 
54 Morning Post 9730 Monday November 18, 1799. 
55 Morning Post 9743 Tuesday December 3, 1799. 
56 Morning Post 9772 Monday January 6, 1800; The Times 4692 Tuesday January 14, 
1800; The Observer 422 January 19, 1800. 
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that the First Consul was not likely to give up his new power and authority. 
Should he and Sieyes attempt to create a constitutional king (such as the son of 
the Duke of Orleans, who had accepted the Revolution), they would alienate their 
republican supporters of all shades while failing to gain support from 
royalists. 58 The issue of whether Bonaparte was going to restore the Bourbon 
monarchy receded as the new formal constitution was revealed, SieVes faded into 
the background of events and Bonaparte entrenched himself into a benevolent 
suzerainty over the French republicans. 
British recognition that Brumaire marked the hijacking of the Revolution 
by miiitary intervention59 also prompted concern that the Consulate would not 
prove to be a stable form of government. The argument that the new government 
would not even last as a revolutionary regime because of its violent origins was 
one conducive to some commentators. Bell's Weekly Messenger described the 
Consuiate in earlY 1800 as the 'fabrication of military despotism' and on these 
grounds denied that the new government was any more stable than its 
predecessors.60 The Reverend Charles Edward Stewart stated in Thoughts on the 
Letter of Buonaparte on the pacifick principles that Bonaparte's regime was 
based on military power, despite the First Consul's attempts to assume the 
mantle of constitutional !egitimacy.51 Events forced newspapers to confront the 
issue of the Consulate as a military government. The news from France in 
February and March was dominated by reports of the preparations for the 
renewed campaign in Italy.62 The presence of 3. military revolutionary ruler 
58 Morning Post 9743 Tuesday December 3, 1799. 
59 This point is brought out nicely in Schroeder's The Transformation of European 
Politics, p. 207, and by Cookson in The Friends of Peace, p. 169 - 170. 
60 Bell's Weekly Messenger 197 February 2, 1800, p. 36: aiso Bell's Weekly 
Messenger 194 January 5, 1800, p. 5. 
61 Stewart, Thoughts on the Letter of Buonaparte, pp. 13 - 14. 
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posed a considerable problem for those newspapers relatively sympathetic to the 
Revolution, and they resorted to tortuous means of justifying Brumaire and the 
existence of the Consulate. The Morning Chromcle claimed in December that the 
Bonaparte faction might make beneficial use of the power which it had 
acquired.53 The paper stated several weeks later that although the coup was 
technically a military usurpation, it could be justified because the French people 
had both acquiesced in it and seemed content with its result,54 
The theme of the introduction of military power into the Revolution 
permated the discourse. Explicit references were often made to Bonaparte's 
military background and the military features of the new regime. The Observer 
claimed that the military nature of the regime was demonstrated by the First 
Consul's frequent reviews of troops in person,65 whiie The Times noted 
satirically that 'BUONAPARTE continues to review the troops, and to receive 
oaths of fidelity, which have only been six times violated already.'66 This was 
linked to a belief that the First Consul's continuing political existence depended 
on the consent and support of the armed forces. The support the army had given 
to Bonaparte during Brumaire, it was argued, would require recompense,57 
These concerns had obvious consequences for considerations of whether or not a 
durable peace could be negotiated between France and Great Britain. if the First 
Consul were to offend his supporters in the armed forces, he might be removed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
62 Beli's Weekiy Messenger 1 97 February 2, 1800, p. 33; Bell's Weekly Messenger 
203 March 16, 1800, p. 81; Morning Post 984 i Thursday March 27, 1800; Morning 
Post 9851 Tuesday April 8,1800. 
63 Morning Chronicle 9531 Monday December 9, 1799. 
64 Morning Chronicle 9543 Monday December 23, 1799" 
65 The Observer 432 March 30, 1800. 
66 The Times 4655 Mondav December 2, 1799. 
67 The· Observer 416 December 8, 1799; see Morning Post 9924 Tuesday JUlY 1, 
1800 for the persistence of this idea. 
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and replaced by a figure more responsive to their needs. The author of the 
pamphlet Considerations concerning peace doubted that the Bonaparte regime 
could sustain a peace, claiming that Bonaparte himself would be succeeded by 
other military Consuls who would reject previous agreements.58 
indeed, a case can be made that British readers might not have regarded 
Bonaparte's politica! position as being secure until the victorious conclusion of 
the renewed campaign against the Austrians in the summer of 1800. Upon 
Bonaparte's departure for Italy in April The Times claimed that the new 
government was still insecure, and criticised the First Consul for not making a 
decisive first move in the campaign which would reassure his supporters in 
Paris. 59 Political undercurrents were present in reporting and commentary on 
the battle of Marengo in June. Bonaparte was described as planning the battle 
carefu!ly because the security of his government depended on his ability to re-
establish successfully the French position in Italy. The Morning Post stated that 
A defeat of BONAPARTE would be dangerous indeed not only to his 
reputation and power, but to the existence of the French government; and 
possessing, as he does, the choice of his station and army, he will insure 
victory before he draws his sword'? 0 
Similar ideas were repeated in July, Bonaparte's political power being depicted 
as both relying upon and being reinforced by his military abilities and 
experienceJ1 
68 Considerations concerning peace, pp. 12 - 14. 
69 T/1e Times 4780 Monday April 28, 1800. 
70 Morning Post 9883 Wednesday May 14, 1800. 
71 Morning Post 9924 Tuesday July 1, 1800. 
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The most significant issue in the British reaction to Brumaire was the 
relationship between Bonaparte as revolutionary ruler and the other 
republicans within France. This question has been recognised by historians, 
MacCunn devoting an entire chapter to it. Unfortunately the chapter continues 
the rather muddled use of evidence from different periods characteristic of the 
entire book,72 However, Hedva Ben-Israel sums up the position taken by 
historians well when he states: 
English opinions on Napoleon can therefore hardly be reduced to any hard 
lines and even on the favourite question of whether he was the Mir or the 
destroyer of the Revolution the party writers were hopelessly muddled, 
changing their ambiguous views under the influence of the latest news or 
the current politlca! debateJ3 
As the following paragraphs will make clear, the major preoccupation of British 
discussion of the relationship between the new First Consul and the Revolution 
was the question of the stability of the new government. 
Initially the British conception of this relationship was rather confused. 
A.side from the obvious fact that he was a revolutionary, and awareness of his 
previous political relationship with Barras, British newspapers had little 
information with which to speculate about Bonaparte's exact shade of 
republicanism. The Morning Chronicle claimed immediately after Brumaire that 
the new ruler would establish a more democratic form of government than had 
existed under the Directory.74 But encouraged by the emergence of a single 
figure to revolutionary rule and the news which began to emerge from France in 
72 Chapter entitled 'The Relations of Bonaparte to the Revolution' in MacCunn, The 
Contemporary English View of Napoleon, pp, 32 - 47. 
73 Ben-Israel, English Historians on tl1e French RevolutIOn, p. 26. 
74 Morning Chronicle 9521 Wednesday November 27, 1799; aiso Morning Chronicle 
9531 December 9, 1799. 
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the weeks after the coup, British newspapers began to portray Bonaparte as an 
umbreila~like figure superimposed over the various republican factions. As 
First Consul he was seen as attempting to reinvigorate the Revolution through a 
policy of reconciling the diverse and antagonistic republican factions. 
Bonaparte's initial appointments of men of differing political persuasions 
on merit were noted as evidence that the concept of the umbrella republican 
leader seemed to be working. The author of the article 'BONAPARTE, in his 
relations to France' envisaged the First Consul as strengthening the executive 
arm of the French government in order to deal equally firmly with the 
oligarchical and democratic factions. The article stated that Bonaparte nad been 
placed on the republican throne because he was a talented, commanding man of 
proven ability. The stability which the installation of a strong revolutionary 
executive was giving to France would allow the Revolution to progress without 
injury to property, the protection of property being the basis of stabilityJ5 The 
underlying implication was that from this would come the opportunity for an end 
to the Revolutionary war. The elevation of a national hero into what was 
essentially a monarchical position was regarded as overcoming the deficiencies 
which the Directory had represented: an internally divided revolutionary 
executive. The article hoped that the moderate form of republicanism Bonaparte 
was pursuing, coupled with the restoration of a slngie figure to rule, might be 
enough to attract support from the moderate royalists,?6 One suspects that these 
arguments were developed not only in response to news from France, but that a 
degree of wish~fulfilment was also present. It must have been tempting to 
75 Morning Post 9827 Tuesday March 11, 1800. The paper was carefui to once again 
stress that it deplored the means by which Bonaparte had entered government. but 
given the detailed and sympathetic tone of the article such comments begin to seem 
formulaic rather than convincing. 
76 ibid. 
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portray Bonaparte as bringing the chaotic elements into which the Revolution 
had descended into some kind of order. 
The attempts to reform some of the more virulent features of 
revolutionism and the introduction of a more stringent morality were accepted 
cautiously as steps towards moderation. Through policies such as the restoration 
of pre-revolutionary parlance, Bonaparte was believed to be playing down 
republican anti-monarchical sentiment.?7 The Morning Post reported that he had 
ordered the removal of the inscription which recorded the date of the fall of the 
monarchy in France from the gates of the Tuileries,?8 The same newspaper 
related in Juiy that the First Consul was removing the physical landmarks of the 
Revolution in an attempt to efface reminders of revolutionary excesses. It 
claimed that the decision to change the Place de la Revolution to the Place de la 
Concorde, and the erection of fountains to wash away the blood from the square 'is 
certainly a measure of great policy in BONAPARTE. It is not enough to persuade 
men by reasoning. Something to eye as weil as the mind, has a much more 
powerful effect on the multitude than is commonly imagined.'79 Thus was the new 
regime believed to be removing physical evidence of its predecessors, and 
depriving its opponents of metaphorical reference points. 
British newspapers also recognised that these policies were provoking the 
Jacobins, and thus undermining much of the stability the new regime was 
striving to create. One anecdote in the 1,,1orning Post commented that Bonaparte 
was being charitable in providing a hospital for the blind, particularly as he had 
recently thrown dust into the eyes of so many republicans. 80 The unpopularity of 
-----------------------------
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the First Consul with democratic revolutionaries was conveyed by reports of 
assassination attempts. in April the l'v1orning Chronicle stated that Bonaparte had 
been delayed in setting out for the campaign in Italy because of a Jacobin plot 
against his person. Ironically, the paper stated that the news had been kept 
secret in Paris because of the First Consul's policy of not irritating the various 
republican factions by accusing them.8i And Bonaparte's hasty return to Paris 
without concluding a settlement with the Austrians in July was attributed by The 
Times to disturbances generated by opposing republican factions. 82 
Thus in the first six months of 1800 Bonaparte was regarded as having 
achieved mixed results in his roie as republican conciliator. Part of the reason 
for this was hardly his fault, as the democratic revolutionaries were as opposed 
to a strong revolutionary executive as they were to the legitimate king. But 
commentators also recognised that the First Consul's vigorous exercise of the 
powers of his office had also contributed to his unpopularity. The Morning Post 
claimed that the 'party of the philosophical Republicans' were jealous of the 
party of 'Concord' who were sacrificing republican principles for unanimity and 
stabiiity, and 'who, under pretence of crushing all factions, assume a sovereign, 
a despotic authority.'83 The genera! impression the newspapers conveyed to their 
readers was that although events in France appeared to be moving towards a 
moderated republicanism, the underlying dissatisfaction of the democratic 
republicans threatened any stability which Bonaparte managed to achieve. 
* * * * * 
~~~~~--------------------------------.. ------.. ----.. --... --.---~~~~~-------
80 Morning Post 9769 Thursday January 2, 1800. 
81 Morning Post 9856 Monday April 14, 1800. 
82 The Times 4842 vVednesday July 9, 1800, and set:J also The Times 4854 Wednesday 
July 23, 1800. 
83 Morning Post 9941 Monday July 21, 1800. 
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MacCunn's claim that 'the importance of Marengo does not lie in its being a 
decisive stroke against the Austrians, for it was Moreau's victory at Hohenlinden 
which ended the war, but in its confirmation of his power' is an accurate 
assessment of the state of British ideas about the immediate stability of 
Bonaparte's regime. 84 The conclusion of the summer campaign in Italy in july 
1800 marks the end of the period in which attention of the British press was 
focused mainly on the stability of the Consulate, and relations between the First 
Consul and other republicans. Of course, many of the themes and questions 
discussed in this chapter remained a feature of the period covered in the next, 
which will look at the following eighteen months until the conclusion of peace 
preliminaries between France and Britain in the autumn of 1801. But it is 
worth reiterating that the debates in the first six months of 1800 were fuelled 
in most part by questions about the stability of the new revolutionary regime, 
rather than the concerns about peace which dominated the following year. 
84 MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, p. 29. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Bonaparte and peacemaking: from the summer of 1800 to the autumn of 1801. 
The eighteen months of peace negotiations between the summer of 1800 and 
the autumn of 1801 was a period in which British views of Napoleon Bonaparte 
were a response to events and trends of unprecedented direct interest to their 
own country. The following paragraphs will demonstrate that the major concern 
was whether Bonaparte was willing and able to negotiate a durable peace. 
Historians have established that Pitt and his ministers were prepared to 
negotiate with any government in France they believed to be stable. This had been 
the basis of the negotiations undertaken with the Directory in 1796 and 1797. 1 
These insights were denied to the newspapers. They remembered the hostile 
response to Bonaparte's peace offer at Christmas 1799, and would also have been 
aware of the legacy of previous negotiations which had ended in acrimony or 
simply trailed off without conclusion. Opinion was therefore divided about 
whether the primary obstacle to a settlement between France and Britain was 
Pitt or Bonaparte. The pacification of Europe at Luneville in the spring of 1801 
and the replacement of Pitt with Addington seemed encouraging signs, but a 
settlement was never regarded as a certainty. Commentators were aware that 
peace between France and Britain depended on whether this was what Bonaparte 
truly desired, and whether domestic conditions wouid enable him to achieve his 
aims. 
1 John Clarke British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 1782 - 1865. The National interest 
(London, 1989), p. 90; Michael Duffy 'British Policy in the War against Revolutionary 
France' in Coiin Jones (ed.) Britain and Revoiutionary France: conflict, subversion and 
propaganda (Exeter, 1983), p. 21; Mackesy, War without victory. p. 33. 
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British newspapers conveyed to their readers the impression that a 
general seitlement was now possible with the news in July oi the signing oi an 
armistice between France and Austria.2 Over the following months newspapers 
charted and analysed events in Europe, subjecting Bonaparte's behaviour and 
possible motives to an intensive scrutiny. Some papers were optimistic of a 
rapid settlement in the aftermath of the French success at Hle battle of Marengo. 
Beil's Weekiy Messenger predicted an early peace,3 and the Morning Post 
reminded its readers that Britain was the only state still formally fighting for 
the restoration of the Bourbons, the implication being that peace could be 
achieved ii Britain relinquished its support for the exiled French king.4 
Recognition that Bonaparte was conducting peace negotiations did not, however, 
preclude awareness of the effect of his wider activities in Europe on the prospect 
of a settlement. It was believed that the First Consul was about to embark on a 
further round of revolutionising in Italy, having driven the Austrians out of the 
region. This was the main reason why the ~,,1orning Post doubted the prospect of a 
general settlement when reporting news of the armistice between France and 
Austria. The paper believed that Bonaparte wished to carry revolutionary 
expansion further into Italy and perhaps even to Greece, 5 while The Times 
claimed in September that the First Consul's grand plan was to 'expose every 
frontier in Europe to the destructive in-roads of the French hordes'. 6 The legacy 
2 The Times 4840 Monday July 7, 1800; Morning Post 9936 Tuesday July 15. 1800; 
Bel/'s Weekly Messenger 221 .July 20, 1800, pp. 223 and 227; The Times 4859 
Tuesday .July 29, 1800; Bell's Weekly Messenger 223 August 3, 1800. p. 245: 
1\-1orning Post 9974 Wednesday August 27, 1800. 
3 Bell's Weekly Messenger 217 June 22, 1800, p. 195. 
4 Morning Post 9967 Tuesday August 19. 1800; also The Observer 451 August 10, 
1800. 
5 Morning Post 9955 Tuesday August 5, 1800; Morning Post 9967 Tuesday August 19, 
1800 and see also Morning Post 10 049 Monday November 24, 1800. 
6 The Times 4912 Monday September 29, 1800. 
82 
of revolutionism thus persisted in British perceptions of Bonaparte's strategic 
objectives during the peace negotiations. 
The major issue in the autumn of 1800 was whether Britain and Austria 
would both be included in any settlement with France.? The two states were 
coalition partners in the Revolutionary war. But while negotiations between 
France and Austria progressed, those between France and Great Britain faitered. 
Peace preliminaries were concluded between France and Austria in the late 
summer, and these were reported widely in British newspapers in August and 
September. 8 The commentaries reveal an underlying sense of disapPointment, 
perhaps of betrayal. Newspapers were very concerned that the Austr!ans had 
negotiated an agreement which did not include Britain.9 Professing support for 
Pitt and his ministers, The Times claimed that this was a ploy on Bonaparte's 
behalf to isolate Great Britain from her ally.1 0 
But there were suspicions from some quarters that the British ministry 
was insincere in its stated wishes for peace, and that the issue of discontent at 
separate negotiations between France and Austria were being used to prolong the 
war. 
It will ever be thus tiil we have at the head of English Government men who 
sincerely wish for peace, and who will watch the most favourable 
7 ,'IAarning Post 9936 Tuesday July 15, 1800; Beli's Weekly Messenger 221 July 20. 
1800, pp. 223 and 227; The Times 4859 Tuesday July 29, 1800; Bell's Weekly 
Messenger 223 August 3, 1800, p. 245; The Times 4876 Monday August 18, 1800; 
Morning Post 9974 Wednesday August 27, 1800; The Times 4912 Monday September 
29, 1800. 
8 The Times 4873 Thursday August 14, 1800; The Times 4876 Monday August 18, 
1800; ,\-1aming Post 9974 Wednesday August 27, 1800; Morning Post 9997 Tuesday 
September 23, 1800; Bell's Weekly Messenger 231 September 28, 1800, p. 306. 
9 For exampie The Times 4849 Thursday July 17, 1800; Beli's Weekly Messenger 239 
November 23, 1800, p. 372. 
10 The Times 4876 Monday August 18, 1800. 
opportunity of conciuding it. Not those who spurn the overtures oi a 
dismayed enemy, and cringe to him when triumphant, 
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the Morning Post opined. 11 The newspaper told its readers that the Pitt ministry 
was hoping that by intertwining their interests with the Austrians, they would 
be able to proclaim to the British people that Bonaparte was insincere in his 
peace pronunciations. 'All this joint negotiation means only joint war', it 
stated. 12 The reactionary British ministry, rather than Bonaparte, was 
presented as the true barrier to peace. Pitt himself was believed to have insisted 
on a restoration of the Bourbons as a condition for any settlement. The Morning 
Post claimed that both Pitt and Bonaparte wished to make names for themselves, 
the First Consul by erecting a great regime, Pitt 'by making a King, and re-
erecting a great Monarchi .13 
interwoven with commentary on these negotiations was a continuing 
exploration of issues relating to Bonaparte's role as head of the revolutionary 
government. The nature of the Consular regime and of Bonaparte's reforms were 
subjected to searching analyses. Such reforms had begun in the six months 
following Brumaire. But because of the trickling down of news and opinion 
through newspapers into pamphlets, reviews and ietters of comment to 
magazines, much commentary percolated through the British press during the 
eighteen months which constitute this chapter. Considerations of the social, 
political and ideological consequences of the First Consul's domestic reforms 
appeared at the same time as day-to-day news of peace negotiations and the state 
of affairs in Europe. 
1i Morning Post 10 011 Thursday October 9, 1800. 
12 Morning Post 9974 August 27, 1800; Morning Post 10 046 Thursday November 20, 
1800 (quotation). 
13 ibid. 
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Newspapers concentrated on the link between Bonaparte's activities within 
France and on the international stage. Opinions about his attempts to strengthen 
France from within influenced commentary about peacemaking. Much of the news 
which trickled into Britain in this period seemed to indicate that France under 
Bonaparte was a more stable revolutionary state, probably raising hopes of a 
durable peace. 
In the whole of the financial plans, or, as we would say, the budget of 
Buonaparte, there is an air of justice, equity and lenity to the great mass, 
and at the same time an address to the sanguine temper of the French 
nation. ever prone to sacrifice a great deal to hope. 
The Annual Register claimed. The article conciuded with approbation that the 
Consuls seemed anxious to foster internal reconstruction rather than applying 
their energies to further predations on European states. 14 Desiring the title of 
Grand Pacificator at home and abroad was regarded by many as Bonaparte's main 
ambition. His persistence at negotiations despite difficulties and breakdowns 
seemed to be evidence of this.15 It was argued that these aims would reinforce 
each other. A settiement in Europe in his favour would allow Bonaparte to 
cultivate support domestically and undertake further reforms. The peace 
settiement would in turn be made secure because of the First Consul's security at 
home. 16 
Attention was focussed on Bonaparte's personal dominatIon of the 
Revolutionary government, and whether this would allow him to take a firm 
position during peace negotiations. The general consensus was that peace was 
-----------.-
14 The Annual Register for 1800, pp. 44 - 47, 55; quotation, p. 47. A footnote to p. 
167 states that this volume was being written in September 1800. 
15 Morning Post 9974 August 27, 1800. 
16 Beil's Weekly Messenger 223 August 3, 1800, p. 245; the idea is reiterated Bel/'s 
Weekly Messenger 251 February 15. 1801. p. 49. 
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more likely now that French political life was controlied by a singie figure; the 
issue was no longer the pawn of rivai factions within the Directory. British 
conceptions of Bonaparte as a quasi-monarchical figure were underlined by 
awareness that Bonaparte was the man who could play a key role in concluding 
the Revolutionary war. 17 James Gee described Bonaparte in the Gentleman's 
l'v1agazine as 'the new Corsican King in France', commenting that it would be an 
astonishing act of Providence should Bonaparte be the vehicle for the restoration 
of peace in Europe. 18 The statement that 'the Consulate is hardly one remove 
from Monarchi in an article in Bell's Weekly Messenger urging the formation of 
a Franco-British alliance against Russia seems very matter-of-fact, with little 
obvious condemnation of the nature of Bonaparte's office. The First Consul's 
personal exercise of foreign policy was instead implied to be valuable in 
rendering French behaviour more consistent than that of his squabbling 
predecessors. 19 
Recognition of Bonaparte's moves towards peace and acceptance of the 
existence of a French pseudo-monarch did not mean that commentators ignored 
concerns about what seemed only sketchy iimits to the First Consul's powers, He 
was, of course, the first man to occupy the office, and there is a strong sense that 
he was making the office into something in his own fashion. Comments were 
certainly made which betray an underlying concern about the amount of power 
concentrated in one man's hands. In February 1801 the A10rning Post noted that 
Bonaparte had the right of nomination in all organs of government.20 The Annual 
Register suggested that the office of First Consul had almost unlimited powers of 
17 Morning Post 9967 Tuesday August 19,1800. 
18 James Gee, letter in Gentleman's Magazine for June 1801, pp. 504 - 505, 
1 9 Bell's Weekiy fv1essenger 243 December 21, 1800, p, 401, 
20 {'vtaming Post 9815 Tuesday February 25, 1801; see also Morning Post 10 050 
Tuesday November 25, 1800 and Bell's Weekly Messenger 249 February 1, 1801, p. 
33. 
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influence, the strong implication being that the effects of the exercise of such 
powers were unknown, The magazine hoped that Bonaparte would 'mingle his 
power with moderation, benignity, and all the arts of a humane and generous 
policy' .21 Although concerns about high-handed behaviour were expressed,22 
outright accusations of tyranny or conspiring to usurp from the Revolution were 
rare in the autumn of 1800. Probably this stemmed from awareness that the 
position was an elected one, and a belief that Bonaparte would in time be 
succeeded by others. Optimism that a strong figure would be able to restrain 
revolutionary energies and bring about a workable settlement overshadowed 
concerns about the nature of the office. British newspapers believed that the 
First Consul was empioying his wide powers to guide his people towards peace 
with the other states of Europe through both diplomacy and domestic 
reconstruction. 
The belief that Bonaparte's cuitivation of internal stability boded well for 
external pacification was stimulated further by awareness that he was actively 
fostering the arts and the sciences. The Annuai Register described the First 
Consul's cultural activities as complimenting his military background and 
making him a more well-rounded figure: 'By the former, his mind was 
humanized as wei I as enlarged, and his ruiing passion, the love of glory, 
confIrmed and exalted: from the latter, his understanding derived additional 
vigour, precision and promptitude,' the magazine asserted. 23 Such activities 
were more usually ascribed to politica! motives. 8eii's Weekiy Messenger 
claimed that Bonaparte's desire to open the French Academy owed more to self-
---------------- --------
21 The Annual Register for 1800 narrated the extensive powers of the First Consular 
office on pp. 59 - 60, and then noted the almost unlimited influence they offered on p. 
61. For the quotation, see p. 63. 
22 BeN's Weekly Messenger 241 December 7, 1800, p. 391; Beli's Weekly Messenger 
270 June 21, 1801, p. 198. 
23 The Annual Register for i 800. p. 10. 
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aggrandisement than literature. and that the cultivation of culture was part of 
the weakening of extreme revolutionism in language and manners,24 A few days 
later, the Morning Post reported the reopening of the University of Pavia in 
Italy, characterising the event as occurring so that romantic writers could 
praise Bonaparte's recent military achievements.25 Nevetheless, the association 
of the First Consul with non-military activities is likely to have removed some 
of the stigma associated with his military background. The encouragement of 
internal reconstruction and awareness that the First Consul was involving 
himself in arts outside that of war boded well for the difficult art of peace, 
The theme of religious reconciliation was also linked to the First Consurs 
attempts to pacify France. and to foster acceptance within Europe of what was 
still technically a revolutionary state. That Bonaparte intended to restore 
legitimate religion was believed to be increasingly likely after the summer 
campaign in Italy. His attendance at a Te Deum for General Dessaix in June was 
noted, accompanied by reports that the First Consul had written to the other 
Consuis from Milan, stating that he would attend the Mass tor his fallen comrade 
regardless of the atheists of Paris.26 News that the Consulate had opened 
negotiations with the Pope circulated from the autumn.27 
Commentators recognised that the restoration of Roman Catholicism, like 
all of Bonaparte's policies, was being undertaken as a prop for his government. 
The Morning Post commented satirically in September 1800 that while Britain 
was drawing up great alliances with European states, the First Consul was 
24 Beil's Weekly Messenger 219 July 6, 1800, p. 209. 
25 Morning Post 9931 Wednesday Ju!y 9, 1800. 
26 The Observer 445 June 29, 1800. 
27 For example The Observer 452 August 24, 1800: Morning Post 9972 Monday 
August 25, 1800; Morning Post 9987 Thursday September 11, 1800; Morning Post 10 
023 Thursday October 23, 1800. 
88 
relying on support from the Pope and priests because he was in need of the 
popularity they would give him.28 Bell's Weekly (v1essenger devoted a long article 
to the issue in March 1801, in which it stated that the First Consul recognised 
the benefit of religion in the legitimation of state authority, and that his 
dailiance with the Moslem religion in Egypt had been motivated by po!itical 
realism. The intransigence of negotiations between the Consulate and the Papacy 
was attributed to the arrogance of the Pope, rather than to any scheming by the 
First Consul: the article appealing to traditional British antipathy for temporal 
papal influence. Bonaparte was portrayed as genuine in his approaches, with the 
cunning Pontiff insisting on impossible articles: 
We are however in hopes that Bonaparte wiil be able to elude the snares of 
the Court of Rome, and re-establish the Christian religion in France, or at 
least a system of faith and perfect morality, without which no government 
can be of long duration.29 
It is interesting that there was a distinct tendency in some newspapers to 
portray Bonaparte as the weil-meaning victim of legitimate authorities. We have 
seen already that the Morning Post believed that Pitt was using Bonaparte as an 
excuse for perpetuating the war. Bonaparte's attempts to restore the established 
religion of much of Europe seemed to be an indication that France was returning 
to the community of nations while maintaining its unique revolutionary nature. 
Doubts about the strength of the First Consul's position were directed 
towards whether his regime was strong enough to negotiate a durable settlement. 
The Morning Post claimed in October 1800 that although doubts remained about 
the sincerity of Bonaparte's desire for peace, the fact that his regime was 
republican in form but monarchical in substance rendered him the best hope for 
---------------------~----
28 Morning Post 9987 Thursday September 11, 1800. 
29 Belf's Weekly Messenger 253 March 1, 1801, p. 55. 
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a sett!ement30 A corresponding concern was whether this hybrid regime was 
alienating democratic republicans; those alienated from the Consulate would also 
be hostHe to any settlement it negotiated. Beil's Weekiy t,,1essenger stated in 
December that the First Consul was unpopular with this faction, and that if this 
unpopularity were to become more widespread the Consulate and its agreements 
would be no more secure than any other regime. 31 The resentment from the 
democrats had its obvious manifestation in several attempts on Bonaparte's 
person. News of one such attempt in early 1801 prompted a panicky Bell's 
'vVeekly Messenger to claim that had it succeeded, Europe would have been thrown 
back into revolutionary conflict. The failure of the assassins had saved Europe 
from 'a renewal of the dreadful scenes of revolutionary calamity and horror;. 32 
If the First Consul should die, would his agreements die with him? Certainly 
revolutionary regimes in the past had shown few qualms about repudiating 
agreements made by their predecessors. The prospect of a lasting peace was 
therefore linked firmly with the continuing presence of Bonaparte on the 
republican throne. and his attempts to rally the majority of republican opinion 
behind him. 
The Austrians resumed their campaign against the French in the winter of 
1800. They were defeated decisively by a French army under General Moreau at 
Hohenlinden on 3 December, and moved for a rapid settiement. Under the 
provisions of the treaty signed at Luneviile in February 1801, the Austrian 
Emperor acknowledged the existence of French satellite republics in Holland and 
in Lombardy and Liguria in northern Italy.33 Europe was at peace for the first 
30 t'v1orning Post 10 023 Thursday October 23, 1800. 
31 Be!i's Weekly Messenger 241 December 7, 1800, p. 391. 
32 Bell's Weekly Messenger 245 January 4, 1801, p. 5. For other reports, see also 
The Times 4921 Thursday October 9, 1800; Bell's Weekly Messenger 235 October 26, 
1800, p. 337; The Times 5194 Thursday August 13, 1801; The Times 5194 Tuesday 
August 23, 1801. 
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time in nearly eight years, leaving Great Britain alone in the war agaInst 
Revo!utionary France.34 On the international front. the British position 
deteriorated further with the news of the conclusion of an anti-British Armed 
Neutrality between Russia. Sweden, Denmark and Prussia in April. 35 There was 
little chance of her gaining an ally among the European states in the immediate 
future, and every reason for Britons to believe that their own country would 
soon be forced to come to an arrangement with France.36 At the same time, for 
domestic reasons the Pitt ministry was replaced by that of Addington, which 
immediately reopened negotiations.37 It is difficult not to believe that the spring 
of 1801 must have marked a major turning point in British awareness of their 
circumstances. 
The reception accorded to news of the pacification of Europe depended on the 
sympathies of the particular periodical. It would be inaccurate to claim that 
Bonaparte was regarded universally as a peacemaker. It was not, after all, the 
peace which people had been hoping for: an end to their own conflict. So while 
Bell's Weekly Messenger was prepared to comment favourably on the news,38 
The Times accused the First Consul of attempting to make the Austrians seem the 
aggressors during negotiations, and daimed that the Luneville settlement masked 
the First Consul's true ambitions.39 Reaction to Luneville depended largely on 
33 Mackesy, War without victory, p. 185. 
34 Schroeder, The Tmnsformation of European Politics. pp. 223 - 224. 
35 Mackesy. War without victory. p. 185. 
36 ibid., p. 211. 
37 The Times 5026 Tuesday February 10. 1801; The Times 5031 Monday February 
16.1801; Bell's Weekly Messenger 251 February 15,1801. p. 49, pp. 53 - 54. 
38 Bell's Weekly Messenger 237 November 9, 1800, p. 353; Bell's Weekly t'v1essenger 
259 April 12, 1801, p. 113 - 114. 
39 The Times 5014 Tuesday January 27, 1801" 
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whether the newspaper was broadly sympathetic to the First Consui's position, 
and to the prospect of a Europe in which France remained in possession of a 
revolutionary government. 
The likelihood of peace in Europe did stimulate one of the most interesting 
and hitherto unrevealed ideas of this period: that the Consulate was regarded as a 
potential ally in the diplomatic reconstruction of Europe after the Revolutionary 
war. Raised in Bell's Weekly Messenger first in December 1800,40 the idea that 
the British monarch should assist the First Consul in the reorganisation of 
Europe was suggested in articie 19 of the same paper's 'Plan for general 
Pacification' in January 1801. Included in the provisions of the article was the 
suggestion that many territories should be rationalised further, and that the 
temporal power of the Pope should be dissolved.41 Similar ideas were proposed 
three months later in an article entitled 'Prospect of an Equitable and Permanent 
Peace in less than two months', which formed the basis of Bell's Weekly 
Messengers reaction to the Luneville settlement. The author envisaged a world 
ruled co-operatively by France and Great Britain. and argued that the 
prerequisite for any peace should be the formation of a coalition between the two 
states. 
Great Britain and France will then consolidate their power, and establish 
tile tranquillity of the world, so as to prevent the calamities of war for the 
future - a biessing that will endear to the remotest posterity the names of 
our Ministers, as weil as that of the First Consul of France.42 
The argument referred to the contemporary belief that Bonaparte's 
attempts to end the Revolutionary war were stimulated by a desire to strengthen 
40 Bell's Weekly Messenger 243 December 21, 1800, p. 401. 
41 Bel/'s Weekly Messenger 247 january 18, 1801, p. 18. 
42 Bell's Weekly Messenger 259 Apri! 12, 1801, p. 113; revisited in Bel/'s Weekly 
Messenger 263 May 10, 1801. p. 145. 
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his position at home, the implication being that an ailiance with Britain was the 
best way to achieve this aim. 
The reasons for the suggestion of an alliance between France and Britain 
are not immediately clear. Perhaps the idea was floated as a response to concern 
about unprecedented Russian influence in Europe and the Mediterranean over the 
previous two years. 43 But the very existence of such an article demonstrates that 
some commentators were assessing the likely security of British interests in the 
neiN Europe. Luneville left France vastly expanded outside her eighteenth-
century boundaries, with an acknowledged suzerainty over Western Europe. This 
must have appeared threatening to British trade with the continent, and a 
potential future threat to the British world position. France could pose a very 
real threat to British foreign interests should she embark on a course of naval 
expansion. The arguments in Bell's Weekly Messenger illustrate, therefore, both 
a sense of the opportunities it was believed the conclusion to the Revolutionary 
war offered, but also a fear that the initiative in world affairs might pass to 
France. 
Luneville may have encouraged speculations along these lines, but the fact 
that Britain remained at war with France for another seven months should warn 
against the idea that a settlement was regarded as inevitable. \-"lhile conclusion of 
an armistice in March and the reopening of negotiations must have appeared good 
omens,44 doubts persisted about the outcome across the summer. The newspapers 
available to this study for these months were pessimistic in their assessment of 
the chances of peace. In August, for instance, The Times reported a rumour 
circulating through the City of London that negotiations had been called off 
43 I am grateful to Dr. J. E. Cookson for this suggestion. 
44 The Times 5068 Wednesday April 1, 1801; Ashton, The Dawn of the XIXth Century 
in Engiand, pp. 55 - 58. 
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because of the First Consul's insistence on terms unacceptable to the British 
ministers. 45 
The actual course of negotiations was not followed in detail, probably 
because detailed information was scarce. Permeation, rather than saturation. 
characterised reporting and commentary.46 Newspapers concentrated on the 
ways in which the First Consul was conducting the negotiations, and used these as 
an indication of the measure of his sincerity. The threat of force was one of these. 
During the negotiations in the autumn of 1800 The Observer and the Jl.1orning 
Post had noted the massing of troops near Boulogne, the latter linking this tactic 
directly with the invasion scare of the winter of 1797 - 8.47 in the summer and 
autumn of 1801 The Times and Bell's Weekly Messenger both stated that the 
presence of troops on the French coast was a crude warning from the First 
Consul about the potential consequences of intransigence during peacemaking. The 
Messenger described the massing purely as a ruse de guerre.48 Reiterating the 
theme of domestic constraints on the First Consul's foreign policy, The Times 
claimed that an invasion of Great Britain was not a realistic option for 
Bonaparte: the French people would not accept an invasion of a state with whom 
France seemed close to a peaceful settlement.49 The invasion threat was believed 
instead to be a manifestation of the failure of the First Consul's other projects on 
45 The Times 5194 Tuesday August 23, 1801. 
46 For example The Times 5136 Thursday June 18, 1801; Bel/'s Weekly Messenger 
270 June 21, 1801, p. 197; Bell's Weekly Messenger 282 September 6, 1801, p. 286. 
47 Morning Post 9943 Wednesday July 23, 1800; The Observer 456 September 21, 
1800. 
48 Bell's ~Veekiy Messenger 263 May 10, 1801, p. 151. The concerns about invasion in 
the spring of 1801 are recognised by Wheeler and Broadley. Napoleon and the Invasion 
of England, vol. I, pp. 159 - 164, and Carol a Oman Britain against Napoleon (London, 
1942), pp. 106 - 107. 
49 The Times 5134 TueSday June 16, 1801; The Times 5163 Monday July 20, 1801; 
The Times 5172 Thursday Ju!y 30, 1801; The Times 5189 Wednesday August 19, 
1801. 
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the international stage. The French were in retreat in Egypt, Britain had 
captured Malta and the prospect of further co-operation between France and 
Russia had collapsed with the death of Czar Paul earlier in the year.50 
But newspapers were not altogether certain that Bonaparte's intentions 
were purely strategic. An impetuous revolutionary ruler was not necessarily 
bound by the traditions and logic of the diplomacy of legitimate states. Should the 
peace negotiations with Britain look in doubt, then the First Consul might ignore 
the domestic consequences and launch an invasion. Thus the papers also claimed 
that Bonaparte was dragging out the peace process unnecessarily. in the hope that 
the French international position would take a turn for the better. His 
concentration of troops on the northern coast was in case it did not.51 In August 
The Times wearily described the negotiations to date as being 'four unprofitable 
months consumed in hypothesis, virtuality and evasion', and ciaimed that British 
forbearance could no longer put up with the strategic delays made by the French 
government. 52 Similar sentiments were expressed by Bell's Weekly Messenger 
in September. 53 Discussion of the use of invasion threat as a negotiating tactic 
contributed further to the belief that the First Consul had a special prejudice 
against Great Britain, because of defeats he had suffered at British hands.54 
That these arguments were being advanced as late as September 1801 casts 
considerable doubt on any idea that the primary conception of Bonaparte was as a 
50 The Times 5172 Thursday July 30, 1801; The Times 5189 Wednesday A.ugust 19, 
1801; see aiso Bell's Weekly Messenger 272 JUlY 5, 1801, p. 209. For the 
international situation in the summer of 1801 see Mackesy, War without victory, pp. 
203 - 205. 
51 The Times 5189 Wednesday August 19, 1801; The Times 5199 Monday August 31, 
1801; The Times 5201 Wednesday September 2. 1801. 
52 The Times 5189 Wednesday August 1 g, 1801. 
53 Seil's Weekly Messenger 282 September 6, 1801, p. 286. 
54 The Observer 451 August 10, 1800. 
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peacemaker. This is particularly striking when one considers that the Franco-
British preliminaries arrived only a few weeks later, and were greeted with 
great public joy. The pessimistic approach taken here is not to deny that 
Bonaparte might not have been regarded in some quarters as a figure who had 
concluded peace in Europe, and might yet do so with Great Britain. Close analysis 
of the arguments deployed by newspapers more favourable to Bonaparte and the 
Revolution than those available to this study will reveal more on this subject. 
Peace preliminaries were finally concluded between M. Otto and Lord 
Hawkesbury in iate September. and the news arrived in Britain on 1 October 
1801.55 Historians have stressed the rapturous reception accorded the arrival 
of the preliminaries in London, although the celebrating crowds would have had 
little idea of their content. General Lauriston, aide-de-camp to Bonaparte, was 
mobbed in front of Reddish's hotel in St. James' Street, and crowds dragged his 
coach to Downing Street. News of the peace was celebrated in the traditional 
fashion, with many buildings being decorated with transparencies and their 
windows being illuminated after darkness,56 These outpourings should probably 
best be regarded as a spontaneous reaction to an end to war, and to months of 
drawn-out negotiations. It was not without reason that The Times greeted news of 
the arrival with the statement that 'The Public have long been prepared to expect 
the final issue of the Negociation with the French Government.'57 The newspaper 
reported extensively on the festivities held throughout the country, noting those 
in Maidstone, Gloucester, Bristol, Lewes, HarNich and Hull on 8 October.58 
55 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 226. 
56 Wheeier and Broadley, l\Iapoieon and the Invasion of England vol. I, pp. 259 - 264; 
Ashton, The Dawn of the X/Xth Century in England, pp. 39 - 44; Oman, Britain against 
Napoleon, pp. 104 - 105, 120. The incident with the carriage was reported in Bell's 
Weekly rv1essenger 288 October 18, 1801, p. 335. 
57 The Times 5227 Saturday October 3, 1801. 
58 The Times 5232 Thursday October 8, 1801. 
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Although historians have commendably narrated the popular reception of 
the preliminaries in vivid detail, and their comments are born out by the content 
of the newspapers, this has been at the expense of examining contemporary 
opinions about the articles themseives. Of the many acquisitions it had made in 
the course of the war, Britain was to keep only the formerly Spanish islands of 
Ceylon and Trinidad, while France regained all of her overseas possessions. Malta 
was allocated to the Knights of St. John, under the nominal supervision of one of 
the major European powers. France was to evacuate Egypt, Naples and the Papal 
territories. 59 
Reflecting on the state of conflict reached immediately prior to the 
announcement of peace, The Times claimed that the war had reached a standstill, 
and that domestic concerns had pushed each side towards a settlement.50 The war 
was described as having been necessary because the French as a people had been 
possessed by ideologies which had made them a danger to the internal security of 
the other states of Europe. The paper emphasised that the conflict was by its 
nature unprecedented in history: 'which neither in its native character or object 
can be fitly compared with any scourge or calamity with which the earth has 
been visited, since the subversion of the Roman Empire, and the darkness of the 
middle ages.'61 This point was emphasised both to remind readers of the 
ideological nature of the war, and to disarm potential criticism of the 
preliminaries. The implication was that any settlement couid not be judged by 
the norms of eighteenth-century wars, the conclusions to which had seen Britain 
vastly expand her overseas possessions. Because the war had been an ideological 
one, there was no dishonour in Great Britain relinquishing the territories and 
---------.----_.-._----------
59 Mackesy, War without victory, p. 208. 
60 The Times 5230 Wednesday October 7, 1801. 
61 The Times 5227 Saturday October 3, 1801. 
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advantages she had captured over the previous eight years. 'There was no 
question of glory in its vulgar and ambitious sense; for the very principle and 
directing spring of the Negociation was, to surrender whatever could be given 
without danger and dishonour,' The Times claimed. By restating that the war had 
not been one of expansionist imperialism, the newspaper could affirm its 
support for the preliminaries while marking out a pOSition of British virtue. 
The peace might not be a glorious one in eighteenth-centurl terms, but it was an 
appropriate one.52 
Bell's Weekly Messenger regarded the preliminaries as a vindication of the 
Addington administration. 'Our old rulers shewed a laudable boldness in drawing 
the sword, but their hand trembled in the attempt of sheathing it,' the paper 
stated, in one of several such comments.53 Criticism of Pitt as a war-mongering 
minister was contrasted with fulsome praise of Bonaparte's moderation and 
Addington's talents. The Messenger argued that Bonaparte had been turned away 
from contemplating serious negotiations with Britain because of the spurning of 
his initial overtures by the Pitt ministry. This was despite the fact that he had 
long desired a settlement with Great Britain, 'for the purpose of promoting the 
happiness of aU mankind'. 64 The blame for the prolonging of the war was thus 
laid squarely with Pitt, rather than Bonaparte, and the credit for the peace was 
attributed both to the sincerity and gifts of Addington, and to Bonaparte's 
recognition of the opportunities presented by Pitt's resignation.65 
62 ibid., The Times 5230 Wednesday October 7, 1801. 
63 Bel/'s Weekly , .... 1essenger 286 October 4, 1801, p. 316; Beil's Weekly Messenger 
290 November 1, 1801, p. 345 (quotation). 
64 ibid. 
65 Bell's Weekly Messenger 288 October 18. 1801, p. 329. 
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The peace was argued to be honourable as wei! as slightly in the British 
favour, because although France had gained population and territorial influence, 
Britain had retained all her pre-war foreign possessions while extending her 
trading opportunities.66 The 11Aessenger judged the preliminaries on the whole a 
fair settlement of the interests of both sides.57 Those who were critical, and who 
were opposed to negotiating with a revolutionary government, were 
characterised as ignoring Bonaparte's successful attempts to dampen the excesses 
of democracy in France over the past two years. The paper argued that under the 
guidance of the First Consul, France had been transformed into a state with a 
strong executive, and the decisiveness which was the key feature of Bonaparte's 
rule had allowed a firm decision to be made in favour of peace.58 
Consideration of the peace preliminaries offered Bell's Weekly Messenger 
another opportunity to argue in favour of an aliiance between France and Great 
Britain. The details of this newspaper's advocacy of such a scheme in December 
1800 and in the spring of 1801 have already been related. The nature of the 
peace preliminaries was regarded as a vindication of the paper's previous stance. 
Britain and France were no longer even rivals, but two Gullivers in a world of 
European Lilliputians.69 The Messenger argued that the two states should co-
operate to ensure that was no revival of conflict which would damage the 
interests of either. 'France and England in their present glorious condition may, 
by a weH-concerted union, form a balance of power calculated to prevent future 
discord in any part of the civilized world,' the newspaper speculated in an article 
entitled 'No war for fifty years',YO An alliance would also have the benefit of 
56 ibid. 
67 Bell's Vv'eekly Messenger 290 November 1, 1801, p. 345. 
68 Bell's Weekly Messenger 286 October 4, 1801, p. 316. 
69 Bell's Weekly Messenger 290 November 1, 1801, p. 345. The metaphor is that of 
the source. 
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reducing the expense of defence costs, a pressing issue for Britons who believed 
themselves to be oppressed by war taxation.?1 
While Bell's Weekly Messenger was willing to congratulate Bonaparte for 
his good sense in concluding peace, it also revisited its earlier attempts to refute 
any suggestion that France might overtake the British world position. The paper 
claimed that despite its hegemony over western Europe, France was no economic 
threat to Great Britain. It pointed to the devastation of much of the trading sector 
of the French economy by revolution and war, and claimed that the French were 
not a sufficiently commercially-minded people to chalienge Britain on that 
frontJ2 There is an anxiousness to these arguments which belies their content. 
Any alliance between Great Britain and France 'vvas presented as being strongly in 
the interest of the latter. But the strongest message from the attention devoted to 
such a point is the writer's insecurity about the possible future for his own 
country. 
Many of the issues with which British commentators were preoccupied in 
the eighteen months between the summer of 1800 and the autumn of 1801 were 
a continuing assessment of trends which had begun in the immediate aftermath of 
Brumaire. Commentators were still concerned with whether the Consulate was a 
70 Bell's Weekly Messenger 288 October 18, 1801, p, 329, 
71 This comes out particularly in the discussion in Bell's Weekly Messenger 296 
December 13, 1801, the implication being that a Franco-British alliance would reduce 
or even eliminate Britain's need to defend herself and her foreign possessions from the 
cost of wars which would not be allowed to occur. For the unpopularity of the income 
tax in particular. see Cookson. The Friends of Peace. pp. 78 - 81, and Clive Emsley 
'The Social Impact of the French Wars' in H. T. Dickinson (ed.) Britain and the French 
Revolution 1789 - 1815 (Houndsmill. Basingstoke, 1989). p. 213. 
72 Bell's Weekly Messenger 296 December 13, 1801, p. 393 and Bell's Weekly 
Messenger 290 November 1, 1801, p. 345. 
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stable regime. But at the same time they were responding to news of peace 
negotiations. Considerations of the First Consul's domestic reforms were shaped 
by awareness of these negotiations, and an underlying belief that If Bonaparte 
was willing and able to bring about an end to the Revolutionary war in Europe, 
then a peace with Great Britain was also a strong possibility. The conception of 
Bonaparte as a peacemaker shouid not be overstated; the reaction to the 
settlement between France and Austria at Lunevilie depended on the sympathies 
of the relevant periodical. And awareness that France was at peace with Europe 
did not mean that contemporaries believed that peace between France and Great 
Britain was an inevitable event. What peace in Europe did stimulate were 
questions about the possible role of France in a post-Revolutionary conflict 
world, and concern about the position of Great Britain in such a world. 
1 01 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Peace of Amiens: from the autumn of 1801 to Aprii 1803. 
Historians have been slow to examine the British reaction to events during 
the Peace of Amiens. The definitive article in English languishes in a journal 
published nearly ninety years ago; 1 while in their haste to consider the return 
to war and the flood of hostile Hterature which began in the summer of 1803, 
historians have paid little attention to the themes and concerns of the previous 
eighteen months. MacCunn's nine pages fail to demonstrate the relationship 
between opinions and events in any depth.2 He cautiously advises of a limited 
measure of popularity, defined only in negative terms, by stating that Bonaparte 
was popular because he had not done the things which were going to come 
(participate in the assassination of the Bourbon pretender the Duc D'Enghien, 
declare himself Emperor, display outrageous personal behaviour)) Bonaparte 
was not unpopular because he had not done anything terrible yet, a very 
circumlocutionary approach. Cottrell's model runs along similar lines; although 
she acknowledges that Bonaparte was popular in Britain for a time after 1801, 
she qualifies this hastily by arguing that one of the reasons that the literature of 
1803 was so virulent was to counteract perceptions of Bonaparte as 
peacebringer. 4 Wheeler and Broadley continue the teleological approach which 
pervades their narrative, charting the extension of the life consulship as 
1 Conrad Gill 'The Relations between England and France 1802', The English l-listorical 
Review 24, 1909, pp. 61 - 78; but see also Helene Maspero - Leclerc 'Un journaliste 
emigre juge a Londres pour diffamation envers Ie premier consul', Revue d'l-listoire 
Moderne et Contemporaine 18, 2, avril - juin 1971, pp. 261 - 281. 
2 MacCunn, The Contemporarl English View of Napo/eon, pp 57 - 66. 
3 ibid., pp. 57 . 58. 
4 Cottrell, 'English views of France and the French', p. 248. 
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another stage on the long trek towards the imperial throne without considering 
the issues of the peace in their context.S 
One recent diplomatic history of this period depicts Britain, like the other 
states of Europe, as attempting to co-exist with France on the basis of the 
settlements made at Luneville and Amiens, rather than seeing the year of formal 
peace as merely a temporary halt to hostilities between France and the rest of 
Europe. Paul W. Schroeder argues that !the British, though wary, were 
interested in peace, willing to try coexistence with France, and relatively 
indifferent at this time to the fate of Europe, including even the Low Countries.'6 
The latter point is especially significant, given that it represented a failure to 
achieve the aims with which Britain ostensibiy entered the war against 
Revoiutionary France in 1793.1 Schroeder argues that the other states of Europe 
were wiiling to accept the hegemony France had achieved over Western Europe, 
as long as they were satisfied with Bonaparte's management of that hegemony. 
Thus the return to war between France and Great Britain in the spring of 1803 
was because Britain could no longer accept 'the way he exercised French 
hegemony, or better, his refusai to be content with hegemony, his insistence on 
empire.'8 Schroeder argues that the points of friction within the peace were over 
colonial concerns - Malta, the French expansion In the West Indies and 
indications of renewed French presence in the eastern Mediterranean - rather 
than about the state of Europe. But as the following paragraphs will demonstrate, 
British acceptance of French hegemony within Europe did not equate with a lack 
of concern about events in that sphere. The newspapers and magazines consulted 
5 Wheeler and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion of England, vol. i, p, 270. 
6 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 228. 
7 Michael Duffy 'British Diplomacy and the French Wars 1789 - 1815' in H. T. Dickinson 
(ed.) Britain and the French Revolution (Houndsmiil, Basingstoke, 1989). pp. 129 -
130. 
8 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 229. 
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in this study were far more concerned about the expansion of French influence in 
Europe than outside it. 
* ... ... * * 
In strict geographical terms Napoleon Bonaparte was only connected 
indirectly with the final negotiations at Amiens. which took place between 
November 1801 and April 1802. In the spring of 1802 Bonaparte was 
ensconced in Lyons in the south of France. and his presence was reported and 
commented upon in British newspapers. The Times reported in early February, 
for instance. that the First Consul was regarded as a supernatural attraction, and 
that people were pouring in from all the surrounding areas to see him.9 Despite 
a geographical distance, Bonaparte's role in the final approval or rejection of the 
terms of the definitive peace was not underestimated. The British press were 
aware that the settlement would be shaped by Bonaparte's strategic and political 
concerns; their lamentations that the negotiations were being unnecessarily 
prolonged stemmed from recognition of this.10 Although Bel/'s Weekiy Messenger 
had been optimistic in the final months of 1801 that a final settlement would be 
reached by the end of the year,11 by the spring of 1802 concern about these 
delays was permeating the commentary. Contemporaries were rather less 
confident that the preliminaries of October 1801 would lead inevitably to a 
definitive settlement than historians have been. French negotiators were 
believed to be attempting to confirm possession of territories they had captured 
after the preliminaries of the previous autumn, while insisting that Britain 
9 The Times 5320 Wednesday January 20, 1802; The Times 5325 Tuesday January 
26, 1802; The Times 5327 Thursday January 28, 1802; for the anecdote about his 
'supernatural' presence, see The Times 5332 Wednesday February 3, 1802. 
10 The Times 5349 Wednesday February 24, 1802. 
11 Bell's Weekly Messenger 288 October 18, 1801, p. 333; Bell's Weekly Messenger 
290 November 1, p, 349, p. 350; Bell's Weekly Messenger 294 November 22. 1801, p. 
381; Bell's Weekly Messenger 296 December 13, 1801, p. 393. 
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relinquish her wartime gains,12 This idea was fuelled by the French recapture of 
their former possessions in the West indies, but more significantly by 
Bonaparte's unilateral reorganisation of the Italian states in December 1801 and 
January 1802. Consular prociamations decreed that Tuscany was to become a 
French client state, the Kingdom of Etruria, Parma was annexed to the Cisalpine 
Republic, and Bonaparte assumed sovereignty as President of this renamed 
Italian Republic. 13 
There is a strong sense of resentment at such arbitrary behaviour in The 
Times over the winter of 1801 - 2. The newspaper claimed that the peace 
negotiations still dragging on at Amiens were threatened by Bonaparte's 
'ambition and encroachments in Itaiy' ,14 The Times sought to undermine the 
significance of this action by suggesting that it weakened rather than 
strengthened the First Consul's domestic power: he was, after all, a 
revolutionary ruler and there \Nere still hopes that he might be repiaced by the 
legitimate monarch. 15 It noted that the move had not been popular with the 
French people, arguing that it insulted them by suggesting that their ruler was 
more interested in the sovereignty of the Italians.' 6 
Not only did the annexations and interference in Italy represent a tangible 
threat to the negotiations, but it also generated an enormous amount of suspicion 
about whether Bonaparte could be trusted in the aftermath of any conclusion of a 
definitive peace. An event such as this one appeared to demonstrate that 
12 The Times 5355 Wednesday March 3, 1802. 
13 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Poiitics, p. 239. 
14 The Times 5349 Wednesday February 24, 1802. 
15 The Times 5353 rv10nday March 1, 1802; The Times 5362 Thursday March 11, 
1802. 
16 The Times 5349 Wednesday February 24, 1802. 
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Bonaparte was not likely to be restrained by agreements of any kind, and that in 
nature he was little different to his revolutionary predecessors, who had felt 
iittle compunction in breaching diplomatic agreements and informal 
understandings. The Italian reorganisation seemed an uncomfortable example of 
the role France was to play in a post-Revolutionary war Europe, Bonaparte 
rearranging states to suit himself while the other states looked on in impotence. 
It was a message not missed by British newspapers; Bonaparte had abused the 
trust accorded to him at the first available opportunity. 
There were definite iimitations, however, to the expression of concern 
about these events. France and Britain were formally at peace from April 1802, 
and although the First Consul had demonstrated that he felt little compunction in 
making the preliminary peace subject to revision, it was hoped that this was the 
last incursion he would feel was necessary for the security of France. 17 There 
were indications from the final phase of negotiations that this might not be the 
case, although The Times was reluctant to stress the point. it reminded its 
readers that although Lord Cornwallis had suggested the French exchange the 
island of Tobago as settlement, Bonaparte would not agree to any alienation of the 
territories of the Republic. 18 This inflexibility might have struck a chord with 
readers, for whom the image of Bonaparte refusing to bargain with colonial 
possessions must have contrasted with the British willingness to bargain to gain 
a durable peace. But the issue had been settled; suspicions were not evidence that 
Bonaparte was about to embark on a policy of open expansion. 
Although The Times relayed the same degree of information and 
commentary about events abroad to readers in 1802 as it had done during the 
iT The Times 5365 Monday March 15, 1802; also The Times 5475 Thursday .July 29, 
1802. 
18 The Times 5379 Wednesday March 31, 1802. 
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war, a measure of introspection and concentration on domestic affairs on the 
behalf of readers seems to have ocurred. Attention was focused on the general 
election in the summer of 1802, and its accompanying controversies, notably 
the election of Sir Francis Burdett in Middlesex. 19 Nonetheless, coverage of 
Bonaparte's activities and news from the Continent continued and would have 
found interested readers. The news seemed to indicate that the First Consul was 
assuming the role of arbiter of Europe in his relations with other states. Holland 
was cited as one state to which the First Consurs 'protection' was to be 
extended. 20 The geographical and economic hegemony which the treaty of 
Luneviile confirmed to France made such a role an easy one for Bonaparte to 
exercise, and The Times claimed that this was an echo of the policies of his 
revolutionary predecessors. 21 Subdued concerns about France's reiations with 
neighbouring states allowed the newspaper to argue that those who had supported 
the First Consul as an acceptable substitute for democratic revolution ism were 
being proven wrong. Monarchical form was not alterin9 revolutionary 
substance; like all the other revolutionary rulers Bonaparte too found it 
difficult to resist the temptation to meddle in the affairs of his neighbours. The 
paper iamented that for so many years Great Britain's major rival had been 
removed from the securities provided by legitimate monarchical government, 
either by fugitive and provisional governments, upon whose permanence 
there was stili less reason to rely Ulan upon their sincerity; or at last. by 
the present military Constitution, which reduces the national will, 
sentiment. and engagements to the unknown design and private arbitrement 
of a private bosom.22 
19 Clive Emsley British Society and the French Wars 1793 - 1815 (London. 1979), p. 
94" 
20 The Times 5347 Monday February 22, 1802. 
21 The Times 5424 Monday May 24, 1802. 
22 The Times 5475 Thursday JU!y 29, 1802. 
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The state of peace was depicted as precarious not simply because it depended on 
the actions of a single individual. Previous peace settlements with France had 
depended on the honour of the French king not to repudiate the agreement at will 
purely on the grounds of self-interest. No, The Times argued. the peace was 
insecure because the revolutionary ruler of France was not bound by the 
traditions and conventions of civilised intercourse between states. 'It is upon the 
good-faith of BONAPARTE, not that of France, that the peace reposes, and that any 
peace must repose which is concluded with an absolute Monarch and a Nation of 
soldiers,' the paper claimed. The alienness and untrustworthiness of a 
revolutionary and military government were invoked as reasons why the peace 
was less secure than it would be with a France with a iegitimate government.23 
Intervention and manipulation along these lines could take many forms. The 
belief that Bonaparte as revolutionary ruler was fundamentally either unable or 
unwilling to abide by the laws of the nations seemed to be confirmed by the 
erratic and irresponsible behaviour of the officiai journal of the French 
government, Le Moniteur. Through its calumnies both of Great Britain and the 
other states of Europe, the journal was regarded as flouting the convention that 
diplomatic disagreements were not aired in public. With a tartness which 
suggests a response to attack from the journal in question, The Times claimed in 
August that Le Moniteur, inseparable from Bonaparte because of his domination 
of the French state, was a vehicle through which the Consular government 
threatened other states and attempted to dictate their behaviour. The paper 
quoted criticisms of the British freedom of the press and his manipulation of the 
late Czar of Russia as evidence that Bonaparte was attempting to enforce his own 
wiil on other states.24 Readers were reminded that according to the accepted laws 
23 ibid. 
108 
of nations, the expression of legitimate concerns between states should be 
restricted to the official secret channels, to avoid unnecessary humiliation and 
embarrassment 25 
Revolutionism was given as the reason for this behaviour. Attacking the 
governments of other states was a way of distracting attention from the 
illegitimacy of Bonaparte's own regime. Britain, The Times stated confidently, 
had no need for such behaviour: 
whether the English Government be or be not as firmly established as the 
testamentary Monarchy of the French Republic, it is certain that it has no 
necessity of diverting attention from its own titie or practice, and 
sustaining its tottering state by an eternal succession of ambitious and 
rancourous wars.26 
The twofold message was clear. Like the office and behaviour of its master, the 
French official journal was a hybrid creation attempting to communicate with 
the other states of Europe. But because of its revolutionary nature. it was 
intrinsically unable to succeed. Moreover, its intemperate outbursts were 
alienating attempts by legitimate states to co-exist with France. Bonaparte's 
attempts to regulate communication between states, and his failure to recognise 
and obey the laws of the nations, were a regrettable demonstration of the 
inherent deficiencies of revolutionary states. 
24 Here characterised as 'the unfortunate Paul', his assassination a year previously 
depriving him of the abuse he had been subjected to in this newspaper during his reign: 
The Times 5491 Tuesday August 17, 1802. 
25 The Times 5493 Thursday August 19, 1802. 
26 The Times 5491 Tuesday August 17, 1802, 
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The reader will have noticed the reiiance of the preceding paragraphs on 
arguments presented by The Times. Previous chapters have demonstrated that 
this newspaper persistently favoured the restoration of the legitimate monarchy 
in France, arguments the discussion above reveals to have also coloured its 
consideration of Bonaparte in this period. Thus it is probably inaccurate to cite 
the content of The Times as conclusive evidence that there were few attempts to 
come to terms with Bonaparte and France during tile Peace of Amiens. There are 
tantalising hints in other publications that some commentators were struggling 
with the issue. One writer in the Gentleman's Magazine wondered whether the 
laws of the nations should be modified to take account of the revolutionary nature 
of France, using the First Consul's attempts to bring the republics of Genoa and 
Venice more firmly under direct French influence as a template for his study. He 
argued that even if the war had altered the nature of European governments in 
favour of republican regimes, Bonaparte's behaviour was still unacceptable by 
any standards which could be considered reasonable. 'The destruction of a 
republic neutral in name, but in effect a dependent and obedient ally, is, in one 
act, a subversion of the new and old principles together' .27 The First Consul 
seemed as little inclined to conform to any new system regulating relations 
between states as to the established laws of diplomatic intercourse. 
A new group of valuable sources enters this study at this point. The Peace 
of Amiens offered a new stage in potential British views of Bonaparte: the 
opportunity for those who could only previously have read about the man to see 
and meet him for themselves. The British tradition of continental travel had been 
proscribed for nearly a decade.28 In an age without photographs, the desire to see 
27 Review of A Letter to **** ****; Esq. on Bonaparte's Proposais for opening a 
Negaciatian far Peace; in which the British Guarantee of the Crown of France to the 
House of Bourbon, contained in the Triple and Quadrupie Alliances, and renewed by the 
Treaty af the Year 1783, is considered; together with the Conduct of our National 
Parties relating to it. by J. Brand in Gentleman's Magazine for Juiy 1802, p. 647. 
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Bonaparte and post·war France among those with the ability to travel was 
obviously strong. A cross·Channel rush followed the resumption of the reguiar 
mail packets between Britain and France on 18 November 1801, although 
Britons had begun to visit France not long after the suspension of hostilities in 
March of that year.29 Much of the British aristocracy. including opposition 
leader Charles James Fox and his nephew Lord Hoiland, were inciuded among 
these thousands of visitors. (Fox, who ostensibly visited Paris in the autumn of 
1802 with his newly-acknowledged wife to research a book he was writing on 
James II, was subjected to criticism from The Times over what it regarded as his 
adulation of the First Consul.)30 offered attractions aside from the 
opportunity to see and meet Bonaparte. The great art treasures of Europe, looted 
and placed on display in the museums and art galleries, were now open free of 
charge to the public, for example.31 
MacCunn poses an extremely important question when he asks of the 
British visitors to France during the of Amiens: 'How far did their 
impressions tend to confirm the views of Bonaparte and his Government, 
previously entertained in Engtand?,32 MacCunn argues that the unieashing of 
------ - ---~---- ----~-----------------.---------------------------.--.--~----------------
28 John Goldsworth Alger Napoleon's British Visitors and Captives 1801 - 1815 
(London, 1904, reprinted New York, 1970), p. 17. Alger's work is less useful than it 
might seem, because although he includes very detailed lists of tllose who were 
detained and the conditions in which they were kept. there is little on what they 
thought about their host. 
29 Alger. Napoleon's British Visitors and Captives, pp. 23 . 26, and Carola Oman 
Britain against Napoleon (London. 1942), p, 130, 
30 Alger, Napoleon's British Visitors and Captives, p. 34, Ashton. The Dawn of rhe 
XIXth Century in England, pp. 52 - 53, and Oman, Britain against Napoleon, p. 146; for 
commentary and criticism of Fox's viSit, see The Times 5509 Wednesday September 
8, 1802; The Leeds Mercury and General Advertiser 1848 October 2. 1802: Leeds 
Mercury 1850 October 16. 1802; The Times 5563 Thursday November 11, 1802. 
31 Elizabeth Mavor (ad.) The Grand Tours of Katherine Wilmot, France 1801 - 3 and 
Russia 1805 - 7 (London, 1992). p. 4. 
32 MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, p. 48. 
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British visitors into France from late 1801 untii the spring of 1803 had little 
impact on the nature of British opinions about Napoleon Bonaparte.33 This seems 
remarkably unlikely. John Alger claims that British ambassador Lord 
Whitworth would not receive some pro-Bonapartist visitors because it was feit 
that they would convey the impression to the French government that there was a 
strong pro-French party within Great Britain. 34 t\l1any British visitors were 
impressed with what they saw, and many were not; it is almost certain that at 
least some of those who visited France changed their opinions of the man. These 
impressions would have been transmitted to a wider audience upon their return 
home, both through word of mouth and the publication of their accounts, although 
much of this process would have occurred in the years which follow the 
conclusion of this study. 
One such visitor whose recorded impressions are available for study was 
Bertie Greatheed, a middle-aged man from near Warwick who arrived in Paris 
with his wife and son in December 1802. The Greatheed family had connections 
with parliamentary Whigs and the sugar interest, Greatheed having been raised 
by his uncle, the fifth and last Duke of Ancaster. Their journey was undertaken 
so that the younger Greatheed could study the great works of art now on display 
in Paris.35 The family were rather unusual among the thousands of British 
visitors because of their personal connections with the most prominent figures 
of the Consulate, including General Berthier and Bonaparte's mother; Bertie fils 
even sketched the First Consul personally. The Greatheeds remained in France 
after the resumption of war in May 1803, removing eventually to Germany and 
then to !taly,36 Another visitor was the Irish noblewoman Katherine WHmot, 
.....• _ ... _. __ . ---------
33 'b' . I lei., p. 56. 
34 Aiger, Napoleon's British Visitors and Captives, p. 162. 
35 Bertie Greatheed (1759 - 1826): J. P. T. Burf and J. C. Barry (eds.) An Englishman 
in Paris: 1803. The Diary of BERTIE GREATHEED (London, 1953), ix - xii. 
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from G!anmire, near Cork. She journeyed from Ireland to London with her 
friends Lord and Lady Casheli and their daughters in the autumn ot 1801. The 
party had originally intended to embark on a tour of Great Britain. but diverted 
to the continent when they learned of the conclusion of peace preliminaries. 
Katherine was in her twenties at the time of her tour of France. Elizabeth 
Mavor, the editor of a collection of her letters, claims that Katherine Wilmot 
was a well-educated, broadminded and uncensorious woman, but notes that her 
choice of topics and expression were probably restricted by the fact that she was 
writing to her iawyer brother.37 The final source of visitor opinion is that of the 
painter and diarist James Farington, who visited Paris between August and 
October 1802 and who met the First Consul on several occasions.38 
Fairly naturally, many of these visitors were more interested in 
Bonaparte the individual than the dipiomatic and political issues which dominated 
the newspapers at home. Katherine Wilmot dined at the Tuileries in June 1802. 
She described the First Consul as being polite in conversation, "his air, tho' 
reserv'd, announcing everything of the poHsh'd gentleman," , but noted that the 
reception was a strange mixture of old and new conventions: Bonaparte adhering 
to the traditional royai prerogative by walking out of the room first, but sitting 
do,,'m to dinner without regard to place.39 Pushing through the crowd outside the 
palace in September to see the Consul passing on his horse, James Farington 
--- ------------------------------_._----_._-------------------------------------------------------.---.. ----------------.--------.------.-------
36 ibid., Introduction, xvi - xviii. 
37 Elizabeth Mavor (ed.) The Grand Tours of Katherine Wilmot, introduction, xi - xiii, 
pp. 1 - 2. Katherine Wilmot also toured Rome, Itaiy and Naples and went on an 
extensive tour of Russia from 1805 - 7. She moved to France for reasons of health. 
living initially at Moulins and then in Paris where she died of a lung condition in 1824 
(p. 176). 
38 Kenneth Garlick and Angus Macintyre (eds.) The Diary of Joseph Farington vol. V, 
August 1801 - March 1803 (New Haven and London, i 979). 
39 The Grand Tours of Katherine Wiimot Dimanche prairiai 30me/Sunday June 19, 
1802, p_ 39. 
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thought he had an intent look and confident expression. The artist noted that 
Bonaparte's simple dress contrasted with the splendour of the parade, 'which 
gave him additional consequence, for the power & splendour of his situation was 
marked by the Contrast, as commanding ail that brilliant display.'40 
As well as their opinions about Bonaparte the man, British visitors were 
not backward in recording their impressions of the changes which had been 
wrought on France since the early days of the Revolution. Farington's view was 
an optimistic one, that the French were changing rapidly from being a gloomy 
and savage people to one whose nature was that of cheerfulness and civiiity.41 He 
also described a conversation he had with a man named Cade, who had been at 
Havre when the First Consul had attended a public bail there. Farington noted 
Cade's comment that the inhabitants believed that Bonaparte on the throne gave 
them security and order.42 Many accounts stressed that the regime was a 
military one, a perception probably aided by Bonaparte's frequent personal 
appearances at reviews, inevitably accompanied by soldiers. These reports were 
not necessarily expressed in negative terms; Katherine Wilmot was very 
impressed by a review outside the Tuileries, stating that ' "the entire spectacle 
was extremely brilliant and I was more gratified than I ever was by a warlike 
pageant in all my life," , and Bertie Greatheed echoed these sentiments in his 
description of another such review. 43 Glamour and spectacle clearly played a 
large part in the formation of opinions about Bonaparte among some of those who 
saw him in person. 
40 Farington Diary Thursday September 2, 1802, p. 1821. 
41 Farington Oairy Sunday September 5, 1802, p. 1829. 
42 Farington Diary Monday December 27, 1802, p. 1953. 
43 The Grand Tours of Katherine ~Vilmot Dimanche pluviose 11 me 1802!Sunday 
January 31, 1802, p. 24: The Diary of Bertie Greatheed Sunday April 3, 1803, pp. 
114-115. 
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Others were less dazzled by spectacle, and more willing to look for and find 
France under Bonaparte as a repressive military state. In May 1802, some five 
months before his own visit, James Farington encountered a man named Smith, 
who was convinced that Consular government resembled that of the Praetorian 
bands in ancient Rome, with military power aweing the population into 
submission.44 The diarist's suspicions were confirmed during his own visit in 
the autumn. He noticed a military presence everywhere, even at a fete at the 
Tivoli Gardens, and observed that visitors to the Louvre were only allowed in and 
out through two guarded gates. ' "The Civil power is not distinguishable in Paris. 
It is the Musket & bayonet that settles aU differences." , Farington recorded in 
his diary on 19 September. and he returned to the theme on several other 
occasions.45 Bertie Greatheed, too. wondered whether the price of stability under 
Bonaparte had been too great for a people to abandon their hard-won liberty, and 
expressed his famiiy's concern about being spied upon.46 
Viewing and meeting Bonaparte in person allowed the visitor to investigate 
common beliefs about the man for themselves, sometimes with interesting 
results. James Farington did not think that Bonaparte lived in a state of 
perpetual fear (as some newspapers in Britain often stated). because he allowed 
those with petitions to approach him in person. One of his impressions was that 
rather than enjoying the numerous inspections of troops which dominated French 
public life, Bonaparte appeared to be bored and indifferent with the activity: 'It 
was more like a r,,1an waiting for a ceremony to be over which occupied little of 
his regard,'47 The connection between the First Consul and the military state was 
44 Farington Diary Friday May 14. 1802. p. 1778. 
45 Farington Diary Sunday September 19, 1802, p. 1861; Wednesday September 22. 
1802, p. 1870. 
46 The Diary of Bertie Greatheed Wednesday January 26, 1803, p. 37. 
47 Farington Diary Thursday October 7, 1802, PP. 1905 - 1906. 
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not as straightforward for contemporaries as newspaper coverage would suggest. 
Those with the opportunity to see and meet Bonaparte for themselves were 
provided with ways to modify the assumptions with which they had arrived. 
British commentators and visitors remained aware of Bonaparte's 
manipulation of French domestic opinion through institutions, notably that of 
religion. The major development in this period was the conclusion of the 
Concordat between the Consulate and the Pope in the spring of 1802, after over a 
year of haggling and several near-breakdowns.48 The significance of this 
agreement was not lost on contemporaries. it was not for nothing that its 
conclusion was described by The Times (albeit with a measure of journalistic 
hyperbole) as forming 'one of the most memorable epochs that ever occurred in 
the annals of the Christian Religion.'49 The Pope, the religious leader of most of 
Europe, had accepted the First Consul as the legitimate ruler of France, and the 
Consular regime was to be accorded the same treatment by the Papacy as the 
states of the ancien regime. This would be a major stimulus for the 
reconciliation of the Consulate to the Roman Catholic states of Europe; in one 
very considerable way the atheistic revolutionary nation was seen as attempting 
to return to the fold of legitimate states. 
Naturally the British were especially interested in the re!ationsnip 
between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism in the new French religiOUS 
polity. The general conclusion was that although the toleration of Protestant 
worship was an apparently enlightened step, both the restoration of religion and 
this toleration were being undertaken for reasons of political expediency. They 
were an attempt by a ruler of indifferent personal beliefs to reconcile the 
48 For details of the negoiiations between France and the Papacy, see William Doyle 
The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford, 1989). pp. 385 - 390. 
49 The Times 5388 Monday April 12, 1802. 
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maximum number of his subjects to his regime, a sop to distract the attention of 
the French people from the autocratic nature of their government.50 The 
arrangements were decidedly in the favour of the French state; it must have 
seemed obvious that the restoration was motivated by politics rather than 
conscience, The Times described a grand dinner given by Talieyrand as proof of 
how the government wished to be associated with the benefits which would accrue 
from the revival of legitimate religious worship.51 It is this period which marks 
the frequent expression of the assumption that Bonaparte's religious beliefs 
were those of convenience - a belief stimulated by the publication of various 
detailed accounts of the Egyptian expedition and the circulation of stories about 
Bonaparte's cruel behaviour.52 The Times claimed in one anecdote that relations 
between France and the Dey of Tunis were good because both rulers shared the 
same religion. 53 It would have been a short step from commenting satirically on 
the flexible nature of Bonaparte's own religious beliefs to seeing his active role 
in the restoration of religion as politically motivated. 
The discussion of the religious question also threw up other interesting 
elements. The traditional British antipathy for Catholicism and papal influence 
is unsurprisingly present, Bonaparte on one occasion being described as a figure 
'whom God has raised up and filled with zeal against the errors of the Popish 
communion.'54 Katherine Wilmot witnessed in Paris the official celebrations for 
~~~-----------.------------------.-.. ---------
50 The Times 5277 Tuesday December 1, 1801. 
51 The Times 5397 Thursday April 22, 1802. 
52 Review of History of the British Expedition to Egypt in Gentleman's Magazine for 
December 1802, pp. 1121 - 1130. Historians have regarded this pamphlet as the 
semina! example of British views of Bonaparte; the relatively late date at which this 
influential pamphlet was in circulation is a further indication that stories of cruelty and 
poisonings belong to thiS period, and that which followed, rather than to that of the 
expedition itself. 
53 The Times 5397 Thursday April 22, 1802. 
54 Leeds Mercury 1854 November 13, 1802_ This pOint is recognised by Cottrell in 
'English views of France and the French'. P. 229. 
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the re-establishment of Roman Catholicism. and lamented the revival of the old 
religion as a support for the new regime, commenting that the bishops: 
"gave me the notion of fell enchanters, who through the witchery of their 
spells and necromancy caused a resurrection of the departed spirit of the 
Roman Catholick religion, as a new species of passtime to Bonaparte the 
king, and made the phantom flit before his eyes in ail the changes of the 
gaudiest pageantry.;,55 
The commentary in these months seems to have moved on from the belief in 
1800 - 1 that Bonaparte was restoring pre-revolutionary institutions to 
buttress his position in the French government, to one that they were to be used 
to support his autocratic rule, a subtie yet significant distinction. 56 The issue 
was also linked to questions of the First Consul's wider trustworthiness. One 
writer in the Gentleman's IlI.tfagazine argued that if Bonaparte's endorsement of 
religion was motivated by politics, then there was little reason to believe in his 
belief in other traditional European understandings such as adherence to 
treaties. 57 Information and assumptions generated by knowledge of previous 
events in Bonaparte's career, in this case, the Egyptian expedition were now 
proving important in determining reactions to new events. If it was believed that 
Bonaparte had demonstrated manipulative behaviour in Egypt, it could be argued 
that all his actions had similar motives. 
The militaristic nature of Bonaparte's domestic rule also remained a 
prominent theme in the newspapers at home. 'Genera! Bonaparte' remained an 
alternative title for the First Consul in The Times. 58 The membership of the 
55 The Grand Tours of Katherine Wilmot Dimanche florial 5me/Sunday April 25, 1802, 
pp. 33 - 34. 
56 Leeds Mercury 1854 November 13, 1802. 
57 Review of A Letter to HH H .. , Esq. on Bonaparte's Proposals for opening a 
Negociation for Peace; ... in Gentleman's Magazine for July 1802, p. 648. 
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Corps Oiplomatiques, now staffed by generals, was regarded as a prime example 
of the military influence which had permeated French society and government in 
the two and half years in which the First Consul had exercised power.59 Military 
power was seen as the basis for the day-to-day government of France, with the 
threat of forcible repression hanging over every event. 60 It was noted that the T e 
Deum held at Notre Dame for the formal restoration of the Roman Catholic 
Church was attended by four battalions of soldiers, while the laity were excluded 
from the ceremony. 'Although Peace be established, the FIRST CONSUL seems 
determined not to part with the "pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious War," 
, The Times stated. The strong implication was that regardless of the event or the 
international conditions the First Consul was unable to give up his passion for 
things military and his need to cultivate the support of the arrny.6i The Times 
also lamented the anxiety and expenditure forced upon other states by the 
presence of a revolutionary miiitary regime in their midst, although it was 
careful to disclaim the need for concern about any impending return to war.52 
The belief that Bonaparte alone dominated the lives of the French became a 
central assumption in this period, building on the foundations which had been 
laid and nurtured in the aftermath of the coup of Brumaire two years previously. 
The existence of a formal constitution was regarded as being of little 
significance. Recent French history was filled with examples of regimes ignoring 
or actively conspiring to subvert their grand constitutions. 'The Constitution is 
----- ....... _--_ .................. _ ............ _ ........ __ ._ ....... _._ ......... _ ..... _ .. _--------
58 For example The Times 5306 Monday January 4, 1802. 
59 The Times 5462 Wednesday July 14, 1802; The Times 5474 Wednesday July 28, 
1802. 
60 The Times 5372 Tuesday March 23, 1802. 
61 The Times 5397 Thursday April 22, 1802 (quotation); The Times 5400 Monday 
April 26, 1802. 
62 The Times 5475 Thursday July 29, 1802. 
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at the Thuilleries - the initiative of every measure is in the Chief Consul,' 
commented The Times in January 1802.63 What mattered was Bonaparte, and 
more especially, his physical presence. In a fashion which increasingiy 
resembied the French kings of old, politics in France appeared to revolve around 
the person of the Consul. Political life was described as ending when he left the 
capital. 64 The obvious emergence of an energetic, quasi-monarchical government 
prompted derisive comments about the ostensibly representative institutions. 
The activity of the executive. combined with their careful proscription under 
the constitution, led the Legislature and the Tribunal to be described as 
redundant organs of government. James Farington noted after h~s visit to the 
Legislative Assembly in Paris in September 1802 that all it was allowed to do 
was to hear and vote legislation, and that there was no debating. It was' "all 
dumb shew, as far as the Deputies are concerned." '65 This was made clear to the 
reader in The Times! coverage of their participation in the peacemaking process; 
the iegislative bodies had found in their acceptance of the peace preliminaries a 
'momentary importance', the newspaper claimed in December 1801. The role of 
the legislative bodies in domestic reconstruction was a clever feint on 
Bonaparte's behalf, a means of distracting the attention of members from their 
redundancy.66 
British conceptions of the relationship between Bonaparte and the French 
people in this period were dominated by monarchism. Commentators were aware 
that the First Consul was channelling poiitical !oyalty to himself rather than to 
the Revolution, and grafting further monarchist elements on to what was already 
83 The Times 5313 Tuesday January 12. 1802. 
64 The Times 5330 Monday February 1, 1802. 
65 Farington Diary Sunday September 19, 1802, p. 1859. 
86 The Times 5277 Tuesday December 1, 1801; The Times 5282 Monday December 7, 
1801 (quotation). 
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a strangeiy hybrid regime. Rather than the state-run festivals of the 1790s, 
which had directed loyalty to the Revolution itself, the Consulate's activities 
were celebrating the existence of the First Consul. Thus Bonaparte became the 
'Majestic Unit' of the French state, in the words of The Times,57 while the 
newspaper pointed to the restoration of royal symbolism through grand state 
banquets and the elaborately liveried retinues of the Consular footmen as 
evidence of his pretensions to royal status.58 Comparisons began to be made 
between the First Consul and the pre-revolutionary French kings. The 
presentation of the Regent Diamond of Louis XV to the First Consul in November 
1801 offered one such opportunity,69 These trends were regarded as a foretaste 
of impending constitutional change. The first indications that such change was in 
the offing were reported in March 1802, significantly before the completion of 
the final negotiations at Amiens. The Times reported that Bonaparte was to 
become Chief Magistrate and sole Consul, with the subsidiary Consuls being 
drafted into a Conservative Senate. The effective abolition of the ten-day 
republican calendar through the ordering of government officers to rest every 
seven days was also noted as part of the retreat from revoiutionism.r0 This was 
the first indication that Bonaparte was overtly attempting to modify the 
constitution of December 1799. It seems to have strengthened suspicions about 
Bonaparte's ability or desire to co-exist with the other states of Europe, coming 
so soon after the news of his unwarranted intervention in the Italian states. 
67 The Times 5514 Tuesday Septernber 14, 1802. 
68 The Times 5521 Wednesday September 22, 1802 (banquet), The Times 5407 
Tuesday May 4, 1802 (footmen); see aiso Farington Diary Friday May 14, 1802, p. 
1778. 
69 The Times 5260 Wednesday November 11, 1801, and The Times 5267 Thursday 
November 19, 1801. 
70 The Times 5377 Monday March 29, 1802. 
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There 'oNere two events within France which attracted British attention in 
the summer of 1802, and which inspired concern that Bonaparte's restless 
activities on the international stage had a domestic equivalent. The establishment 
of the Legion of Honour indicated a distinct shift towards vesting loyalty and 
sovereignty in the person of the First Consul rather than in the revolutionary 
state. Through the implementation of a system of rewards which in many 
respects mirrored those of the anciens regimes, France was seen as taking a step 
away from democratic sovereignty and towards an aristocratic system, albeit an 
aristocracy of merit open to ail classes. John A, Lynn has argued that 'Napoleon 
encouraged the personal interest of the soldier and strived to link it to that of the 
Empire by a system of awards and preferments.'71 British newspapers were 
more interested in the political and ideological consequences of the event than its 
military significance.72 They believed that the Legion of Honour was part of the 
Consul's drive to encourage loyalty to himself. Elitism was being created in what 
was still officially a revolutionary state. The Times noted that an administrative 
body had been elected to supervise the Legion, and that this had attracted 
opposition from the democratic republicans of Paris. 73 The implications of this 
were self-evident: the construction of an unlimited pseudo-monarchy in France 
was being supplemented by an extra-constitutional organ which owed allegiance 
only to the monarchical part of the government. As Lynn notes, in the eighteenth 
century honour was 'an aristocratic sentiment vital to the functioning of 
monarchy',7 4 and the creation of the Legion of Honour was believed to be evidence 
71 John A. Lynn 'Towards an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 
1789 • 1815', French Historical Studies 16. 1, Spring 1989, p. 153. 
72 J. E. Cookson discusses in detail the responses generated by the high profile 
lnaugural presentation in 1804 in the 'Armed Nationalism' chapter of The British 
Armed Nation, 1793 - 1815 (unpublished MSS, 1995). ! am grateful to Dr. Cookson for 
allowing me to consult his work in progress. 
73 The Times 5458 Friday July 9, 1802, 
74 Lynn, Towards an Army of Honor', p, 154, 
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that Bonaparte regarded himself rather than the revolutionary state as being 
sovereign. 
The other internal event in France in the summer of 1802 produced an 
unprecedented amount of comment in The Times. In May the paper suggested that 
the settlement of an hereditary succession on Bonaparte was soon to be an 
important issue.?5 At first this change did not seem unduly worrying. Bonaparte 
would fulfil his ambition to be confirmed in office for life. But later reports 
suggested that an hereditary succession was to settied on Bonaparte and his heirs. 
This was quite a different matter: the prospect became one of perpetual military 
rule in France. It was with these concerns in mind that The Times analysed the 
voting, which took place between May and July. The paper noted on ~~6 May that 
the first military division near Paris had voted unanimously in favour of the 
proposal to make Bonaparte Consul for life - a piece of news which would not 
have diminished reader awareness of the connection between Bonaparte's desire 
for unrestricted personal rule and the belief that the Consulate was anchored in 
military support.76 Readers would also have been aware that the measure did not 
have universal support within France. The Times reported in June that 
addresses were pouring in from the provincia! departments, congratulating 
Bonaparte on his conclusion of peace and restoration of religion. Among these a 
few also expressed their support for the establishment of the life consulship.?7 
The implication that revolutionary sentiment against the creation of an 
hereditary monarchical government remained widespread among the French 
people had the obvious corollary that the issue was seen as Bonaparte's personal 
75 The Times 5414 Wednesday May 12, 1802. 
76 The Times 5426 Wednesday May 26, 1802; The Times 5448 tv10nday June 21, 
1802. 
77 The Times 5433 Thursday ,June 3, 1802. 
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agendum, The Times stated in July that the fulfilment of the ambitions of the 
First Consul should be regarded as a foregone conclusion, regardless of the fact 
that the representative bodies were yet to signify their consent.7 8 Given the 
nature of events over the previous two and a haif years, this was an entirely 
understandable assumption. One of the most interesting things about the British 
commentary on the life consulship is how removed Bonaparte as an individual 
was from the centre of the discussion. It was assumed that he was behind it all, 
assumed that the votes were being manipulated at his behest. There was a 
fundamental belief by this point that any constitutional change in France was of 
his making. This was surely influenced by the frequent pronouncements that the 
First Consul was the centre of all political activity, and that littie occurred 
without his explicit consent. The beginnings of Bonaparte's semi-mythical status 
can be clearly identified in assumptions such as these. 
Although The Times was sure that Bonaparte would be able to confirm 
himself in the life consulship with little opposition, it was less certain that he 
would gain unopposed the right to name his successor. The revival of the 
hereditary principle in the French government was an issue which democratic 
republicans would surely oppose, and the paper began to consider the 
implications of Bonaparte's assumption of the life consulship without the 
hereditary succession. The question of stability would move from Bonaparte 
himself to the office of ConsulJ9 Fears of perpetual military rule in the 
Bonaparte family would be assuaged if the Consul's plans to assume the 
hereditary principle did not come to fruition. Bonaparte's tenure in office would 
be limited: to his lifetime, it was true, but this was preferable to an apeing of 
legitimate dynastic tradition. 
78 The Times 5460 Monday July 12, 1802. 
79 The Times 5438 Wednesday June 9, 1802, 
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The news that the First Consul had overridden the feeble opposition and 
achieved both goals was received in the second week of August It generated a 
sustained barrage of concerned commentary from The Times, which questioned 
not only consequences of the event for France but also for the state of peace in 
wider Europe.ao The newspaper claimed that those who had voted for the measure 
had betrayed the legacy of the Revolution, claiming that at least those who had 
offered the crown to Cromwell had not been supporters of Charles 1.81 It 
reproduced in detail the address given by Barthelmi, President of the 
Conservative Senate, to the crowd assembled at the Tuileries. The speech was 
derisively described as being a 'durable monument of the happy pliability of his 
principles under every circumstance and change', while The Times lamented 
especially the lack of questioning about any limits to this new constitutional 
authority. France was to have no relief from an oppressive military 
government; instead it had concurred to the unopposed will of a military ruler. 82 
The First Consul was now the most powerful ruler in the history of France, 
possibly even of Europe. He possessed the authority to appoint and dismiss at 
wi!! all major national and provincial officials including the electoral college 
presidents and mayors in the municipal councils, and alone had the power to 
declare war and make peace. The Times believed that the assumption of the life 
consulship had shifted France from being a revolutionary state with an executive 
dominated by one man to a military despotism, still underscored by the alien 
uncertainties of revolutionism with all its connotations of historical 
groundlessness.83 France was depicted as a state with no grounding in tradition 
aD The Times 5484 Monday August 9. 1802; The Times 5486 Wednesday August 11, 
1802 and The Times 5491 Tuesday August 17, 1802. 
81 The Times 5484 Monday August 9, 1802. 
82 ibid. (quotation): The Times 5486 Wednesday August 11, 1802; see alSO Leeds 
Mercury 1848 October 2,1802. 
83 The Times 5486 Wednesday August 11, 1802. 
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and historical experience which might restrain both the ambitions and practices 
of a ruler willing and able to exploit his circumstances. Without representative 
bodies with some power and the tradition of freedom under the law, The Times 
argued, France had effectively been delivered to a man who couid make policy 
based on his unbridled personal desires. That this was dressed up in fine 
language about fundamental laws and plans for organic consultative bodies 
(which were responsible only for general laws rather than official policy) did 
not alter this fact.84 And the consequences for the surrounding states was also 
invoked as an important issue. The constitutional confirmation of an unlimited 
revolutionary monarch ruling the dominant state in Western Europe threatened 
the security of all of France's neighbours; The Times informed readers that the 
balance of Europe was threatened by the creation of an unlimited military state 
in its midst,85 
The virulence of the initial reaction to these events is clear evidence of 
British concern. Certainly some of the language used can only be charitably 
described as intemperate. The Times labelling the new French government on one 
occasion as 'the present unqualified form of White-Slavery'. 86 But the issues 
raised had to be subsumed into a cautious concern. The British press realised 
that they had to accept that Bonaparte was now Consul for life, and attempt to 
find a way of incorporating this into reporting and commentary without causing 
offence to a state with which Britain was at peace. It is here that the reactive 
rather than active role of newspapers as a medium is dearly illustrated. The 
Times was able and willing to express its concerns about the effect this latest 
development would have on the existence of the French people. It also raised 
concerns about the international consequences of Bonaparte's new powers. But 
84 ibid 
85 The Times 5493 Thursday August 19, 1802. 
86 ibid. 
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the newspaper was also aware that the British ministers did not regard internal 
changes in France as a casus bellum. Although Bonaparte might be making his 
neighbours edgy about the prospect of continued peace, co-exist they must. Thus 
there were tentative attempts to see the changes as less threatening than they at 
first appeared. Having allocated himself an unopposed civil power in France, The 
Times hoped that the First Consul might settle down and consolidate his power 
without risking the peace. 'He has made his Republic so like a camp, that he has 
little to gain by changing Paris for the field, and for his sceptre the Baton.'87 
Recognition of the new French pseudo-monarchy began to be included in the 
reporting and commentary, although orten with a distinctly ironical edge. The 
Times noted in December that the Court Calendar had listed the First Consul 
among the sovereigns of Europe: 'in the current specification of each Monarch's 
birth, &c. states that he was born on the 15th of August 1769, and "began to 
reign" the 15th of December 1799:88 In the late summer of 1802 it remained 
to be seen how this constitutional change would affect France's behaviour 
towards other states. Over the next nine months, the trust which had been 
extended to Bonaparte was to be progressively undermined. A series of events 
indicated that the Consul was more interested in using his new power to make 
relations between European states, and even in some cases within them, 
dependent on his authority. 
Historians have cited the First Consul's prosecution of French journalist 
jean Peltier as an example of British concern that Bonaparte was attempting to 
suppress freedom of speech. Peltier, the editor of the anti-Bonapart!st journal 
L 'Ambigu, was resident in Great Britain. This has been seen as an example of 
British concerns over Bonaparte's attempt to interfere with their cherished 
87 ibid. 
as The Times 5597 Tuesday December 21. 1802. 
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liberties. 89 This issue did not figure significantlY in The Times. The paper noted 
in the late summer that the French government was insisting on prosecution,90 
and made the odd comment on the issue over the following months,91 but the issue 
was not dwelt upon at any length. Nor did the substantial reorganisation of the 
German states undertaken by France and Russia in 1802 attract much interest. 
In October The Times stated rather anxiously that it felt that readers were not 
paying enough attention to the events occurring at the Diet of Ratisbon, and 
claimed that genuine sovereigns should be affronted by the unnatural connection 
between the legitimate and the revolutionary rulers. Once again the First Consul 
was attempting to manipulate the affairs of his neighbours for his own reasons, 
and The Times expressed dissatisfaction that the Austrian Emperor had been 
subjected to 'the unjust and insolent dictates of the First Consul' .92 This seemed 
direct evidence to the paper that boundaries between the revolutionary Consul 
and the legitimate monarchs of Europe were being blurred.93 The issue of 
legitimacy was one which The Times raised at every available opportunity, but 
the minimal amount of coverage accorded the German issue does seem to confirm 
Schroeder's comment that the British paid little attention to French interference 
in Germany, and that this was not a major reason for the return to war in the 
spring of 1803.94 
From the autumn of 1802 the British ministry attempted to negotiate a 
workable relationship with France which adhered to the spirit of the Amiens 
89 MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoieon, pp. 62 - 63; Ben-Israel, 
English Historians on the French Revolution, p. 37. 
90 The Times 5502 Tuesday August 31, 1802. 
91 The Times 5656 Wednesday March g, 1803. 
92 The Times 5531 Monday October 4, 1802. 
93 The Times 553:3 \Nednesday October 6, 1802. 
94 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 2~i8. 
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settlement. Addington and his ministers were stailing over the provision under 
which Great Britain would evacuate the island of Malta, because they were 
unable to trust the French not to simply occupy the island. In exchange for a 
demonstration of Bonaparte's good intentions, ministers offered to recognise 
officiaily the French client states, the italian and Ligurian republics and the 
Kingdom of Etruria.95 Schroeder argues that this illustrates a genuine desire to 
avoid a return to war, and claims that these attempts to re-negotiate a basis for 
peaceful co-existence with France ruled by an ascendant Bonaparte have gone 
largely unnoticed by historians. According to this argument, the ministers were 
not hostile to French hegemony in Western Europe; rather, through these 
negotiations they were trying to persuade Bonaparte to manage that hegemony in 
a different fashion. 96 This argument is one which has yet to be subjected to 
questioning and modification by other historians, but the model can be argued to 
have some relevance when considered in relation to the British press in this 
period. Newspapers were aware of the negotiations taking place between British 
ministers and French, although they were referred to only obliquely. That 
newspapers were making efforts not to provoke the First Consul unduly, and 
were exercising their prerogative of free speech with a measure of restraint, is 
illustrated by the degree of circumspection evident in their reporting and 
commentary on the events of the autumn and winter of 1802 - 3. 
The most significant example of this carne with the response to the military 
invasion launched into Switzerland by Bonaparte in the autumn of 1802. 
Switzerland had been an effective client state of France since the Directory had 
ordered the 'liberation' of the Swiss in 1798, an action with which Bonaparte 
had not been associated at the time.97 By the spring of 1803 the French Act of 
95 ibid., p. 243. 
96 ibid., pp. 242 - 243. 
97 Bannard, 'The Invasion of Switzerland and English Public Opinion'. 
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Mediation had confirmed Bonaparte as the effective arbiter of the destinies of the 
Swiss, and a consular-style constitution was imposed on the cantons. 98 
Historians have rightly pointed to this direct interference as a major cause of 
hostility towards Bonaparte in Britain. Across the autumn and winter months of 
1802 - 3 newspapers expressed their indignation at this action. The invasion of 
Switzerland significantly accelerated the distrust and suspicion which had been a 
feature of commentary to that point. Bonaparte was now seen to be resorting to 
military force to achieve his goals. The invasion demonstrated that the First 
Consul had not renounced the expansionist policies of his predecessors; 
Bonaparte's revolutionary monarchism was revealed to be equally as susceptible 
to self-aggrandisement as previous French regimes. 99 A new theme, that of 
Bonaparte as a man of insatiable ambition, began to feature in commentary as it 
had never done before. 100 Without the reVOlutionary democratic justification of 
the 'liberation' of other peoples, the invasion of Switzerland could be construed 
only as evidence of Bonaparte's appetite for power and his lack of qualms about 
openly flaunting the laws of the nations. 
it is interesting that the Swiss invasion attracted much greater attention in 
British newspapers than did the surreptitious intervention among the German 
states. Probably indirect manipulation did not have the same stigma as open 
invasion, the former having at least the benefit of conforming to conventions of 
secret diplomacy and not involving the use of crude military force for diplomatic 
ends. 101 Although Bonaparte's management of the French hegemony in Western 
Europe by stealth was now recognised as being supplemented by the open use of 
98 Schroeder. The Transformation of European Politics, pp. 232 - 233. 
99 The Times 5566 Monday November 15, 1802; The Times 5568 Wednesday 
November 17, 1802, 
100 For example The Times 5543 Monday October '18, 1802. 
101 An idea suggested in Cookson, The Friends of Peace, pp. 172 - 173. 
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force, newspapers were also aware that manipulation by stealth continued as a 
French diplomatic tool. Plans were announced in November for the transfer of 
Parma to France in a further reorganisation of the French client states in 
Italy,102 and several Italian states were allocated to the King of Spain. 103 At the 
same time the failure to abide by the laws of nations and persistence in 
interfering in the affairs of other states was regarded as firm evidence that, 
despite her military monarchist government, France under Bonaparte was still a 
state conditioned by revolutionism. The Times ciaimed that it was important for 
the security of Europe as well as for European civilisation that 'one lawless and 
unprincipled Government should not prolong and perpetuate a system of plunder 
and spoliation.' It was an interesting and subtly different position for The Times, 
the persistent if now understated champion of legitimacy, to take: legitimacy was 
denied to Bonapartist France because the revolutionary pseudo-monarchy was 
refusing to play by the rules of the legitimate monarchies. 104 
The continuing need to remain on at least civil terms with the Consulate at 
a time of formal peace dictated that coverage was accorded a measure of 
discretion, even in the pages of the hostile Times. Thus direct criticism was 
often veiied through the use of coded terms such as 'military force' and 
governments 'fashioned on the French model'.105 Bonaparte was not often 
mentioned directly in connection with the invasion, although the implication that 
he was responsible was never absent. 1 06 This circumspection il!ustrates that 
even as late as the winter of 1802 - 3 one of the most conservative of 
102 The Times 5566 Monday November 15, 1802. 
103 The Times 5568 Wednesday November 17, 1802. 
104 ibid. (quotation); The Times 5611 Thursday .January 6, 1803. 
105 Tlle Times 5526 Tuesday September 28, 1802. 
106 The Times 5507 Monday September 6, 1802; The Times 5531 Monday October 4, 
1802; The Times 5568 Wednesday November 17, 1802. 
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newspapers was making efforts to avoid undue provocation. The Times was aware 
that barely a year had passed since the formal suspension of hostilities in the 
Revolutionary war and the jubilant reception of peace preliminaries in L.ondon, 
and that Britain and other states were still recovering from that conflict. The 
paper had stated in November 1801 that Britain had no place in opposing French 
interference in Holland and Switzerland aione, 'while all the mighty Potentates 
are dividing its spoils, and all the secondary States either absorbed in 
indemnities, or whiriing around the axis of Revolution.,107 A year later, it was 
not the role of Great Britain to declare war 'for the sake of such countries as are 
unabie or unwilling to stand forward in their own rights, and most near and 
immediate interests.' European states ought to be protesting more loudly 
themselves about Bonaparte's encroachments. This was a none-too-subtle dig at 
what The Times regarded as the intransigence of Austria, Britain's traditional 
European aHy.1 08 Such an argument marked out a position within which the 
newspaper could express strong indignation at events in Europe, and urge the 
states which surrounded France to do the same, while reserving the right not to 
advocate formal British intercession and drawing back from open hostility. 
Switzerland was not, however, the only issue prominent in British 
newspapers at this time. Stirrings about the French presence in the 
Mediterranean first occurred in the late summer of 1802. In August The Times 
stated that there were many pressures on British ministers because of the 
events which had occurred since the signing of the treaty of Amiens, and was 
sympathetic to the ministeriai dilemma over whether or not to evacuate 
Malta. 1 09 This issue seems to have been temporarily eclipsed by concern in the 
autumn over the invasion of Switzerland. But over the winter and spring months 
107 The Times 5258 Monday November 9, 1801. 
108 The Times 5568 Wednesday November 17, 1802. 
109 The Times 5481 Tuesday August 5, 1802. 
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of 1802 - 3 the Malta question was accompanied by concern about indications 
that Bonaparte intended to increase French power in the Mediterranean and 
possibiy recapture Egypt. thereby threatening British trade with India. Britain 
would also have been cut off from her traditional European ally, Austria, and 
from entry to any potential military campaign in Europe through Italy. These 
strategic issues were particularly important now that France controlied an of 
the Dutch coast, the traditional British entry point into Europe. The fact that 
British ministers were openly displaying their distrust of the First Consul 
encouraged the cautious expression of similar sentiments in the newspapers. The 
Times believed that French diplomatic agents in the East were working to 
undermine British influence, questioned why a French fleet had been despatched 
from Genoa into the area, and was extremely suspicious of the close relationship 
France was cultivating with the Turks, nominally the overlords of Egypt. 110 In 
October the paper reiterated its support for the Addington ministry's attempt to 
renegotiate the provisions of the Treaty of Amiens as a resuit of these 
suspicions. 111 
This issue assumed greater significance in early 1803. Newspapers were 
aware of a French expedition into the r,,1editerranean, conducted by one Colonel 
Sebastiani. The expedition's report, which was published in Le fll10niteur for all 
the states of Europe to read, stated that it would be simple for France to 
recapture Egypt. 112 The Times treated this as a virtual statement of intent. It 
reminded readers that interference in Egypt had been prohibited under the terms 
of the treaty of Amiens. The continuing British presence in Malta was argued to 
be justified because Bonaparte had abrogated the spirit of the original 
settlement, and through his interference in other states had indicated that he had 
110 ibid, 
111 The Times 5538 Tuesday October 12, 1802. 
112 Schroeder. The Transformation of EurODean Politics. D. 231. 
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no qualms about breaking the agreement in his own interest. 113 Colonel 
Sebastiani's expedition was conceived as an attempt to dissuade the natives of 
Egypt against returning to Turkish suzerainty, and Sebastiani was believed to 
have assured the Egyptians that they would have French financial and military 
support for their independence once Britain had evacuated Malta. The Times 
vented its anger on Sebastiani, who was described as 'Commercial Agent, Spy, 
Ambassador, and Incendiary Extraordinary to every rebel in the Turkish 
provinces,'114 although once again the newspaper held back from overtly hostile 
criticism of the First Consul himself. 
These arguments betray a sense of seif-justification which must have been 
deemed necessary. After all, technically it was the British who was in the wrong 
through their failure to evacuate Malta. The attention paid to the Sebastiani 
expedition reflects contemporary fears that France was going to establish her 
dominance in the world through stealth while Britain, which did not share the 
First Consul's lack of qualms about disregarding formal agreements, would be 
alienated from trade and influence in regions such as the Mediterranean. 115 The 
diplomatic deadlock over Malta was regarded as further evidence that Bonaparte 
would resort to subterfuge as a means of avoiding his obiigations while 
demanding virtuously that Great Britain fulfil hers.116 
Concerns about the uncontrolled nature of Le Moniteur, the official journal 
of the Bonaparte government, were raised again in January 1803, The Times 
reiterated many of the arguments which had featured several months previously, 
113 The Times 5623 Thursday January 20, 1803; The Times 5636 MOnday February 
7, 1803. 
114 ibid. 
115 ibid. 
116 The Times 5623 Thursday January 20, 1803; The Times 5636 Monday February 
7, 1803; The Times 5684 Tuesday April 12, 1803. 
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notably the questioning about whether open criticism and humiiiation of other 
governments was evidence of the inability of a revolutionary regime to 
communicate with legitimate states. The paper wondered whether these attacks 
were a self-justifying device, if the threatening of others was a way for the 
Consulate to reassure itself of its own security as the uitimate development of 
the Revolution. 117 The criticism of domestic politics in neighbouring states 
particularly rankled with The Times: 'Is it regular to discuss, censure, and 
criticise the speeches of individual Senators, composing a small and inefficient 
minority in a foreign Legislature?' it queried. 118 The newspaper informed its 
readers that the maintenance of peace would be impossible if one state persisted 
in undermining international relations by airing its grievances in public. On 
this occasion such behaviour was described as 'revolutionary attacks', 
illustrating the ideological currents still flowing beneath the surface of such 
discussions, The implication was that for ail his attempts to establish himself as 
a monarchical ruler, the Consul's revolutionary origins prevented him from 
behaving in any reasonable fashion.119 
The previous paragraphs have shown that the newspapers used in this 
chapter were profoundly suspicious of Bonaparte by the winter of 1802 - 3. 
Although some disillusionment had set in as a result of Bonaparte's interventions 
in Italy during the final peace negotiations in the spring of 1802, the fact that 
Britain and France were still at peace acted as a significant dampener on hostile 
commentary. While indignation and concern had been expressed at such events as 
Bonaparte's achievement of the life consulship, the interference in Germany, the 
attacks from Le Moniteur on the other states of Europe, and especially on the 
military invasion of Switzerland, a discernible note of circumspection still 
117 The Times 5611 Thursday January 6, 1803. 
118 ibid. 
119 ibid. 
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permeated the discussion. This had diminished by the early months of 1803, and 
there was an awareness that a return to war was a greater possibility than 
before. This should not be taken as evidence that a return to war was expected as 
early as January or February 1803. The commentary of these months does not 
seem markedly different in tone to that of the six months previously. Continuing, 
if muted, indignation was expressed about the state of affairs in Europe, and 
newspapers were aware of the continuing impasse between British ministers and 
Bonaparte's insistence on the evacuation of Malta. But at the same time, there 
are pessimistic undertones and smail indications which suggest that newspapers 
were preparing their readers for a possible return to war. 
The tone in British newspapers in March and Apri! 1803 was one of 
pessimism and half-hearted drift. The King's speech to the Houses of Parliament 
was seen as an indication that the peace would probably not last for much longer; 
The Times claimed that it seemed superiluous 
to prepare the minds of the people for any thing so daily expected as a 
cessation of the precarious and anxious truce, which, for nearly two 
years, our Government has been endeavouring to convert into a solid and 
permanent peace with the FIRST CONSUL of FRANCE.120 
There were also many rumours circulating in these weeks which illustrate the 
state of contemporary tension. One was that a French ship wrecked on the Sussex 
coast had been found to contain a huge cargo of weapons and green uniforms 
labelled 'Union', this being apparently taken as an attempt to invade Ireland, 
although The Times moved to scotch the rumour. 121 Newspapers began to prepare 
their case for the defence against any accusations that it was Great Britain which 
was responsible for any return to war. The Times claimed virtuously that all of 
120 The Times 5656 Wednesday March 9, 1803. 
121 The Times 5662 Thursday March 17, 1803. 
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Europe had noted the extent to which Britain had restrained herself from 
retribution despite considerable provocation from France. Great Britain had 
gone to great lengths to co-exist peacefully with the revolutionary state, 'under 
circumstances the most vexatious and trying.' It was France's insatiable 
military ruler Bonaparte to whom the blame for any return to war must be 
attributed. The First Consul was depicted as a figure who wouid ensure that he 
was not seen as the technical aggressor in any resumption of hostilities. 122 The 
newspaper argued further that British sincerity could not be doubted, because of 
their adherence to ail the other terms of the treaty where distrust of the French 
had little significance on Britain's ability or desire to carry them out. It listed 
the reception of a Dutch force at the Cape in South Africa and the surrender of 
Martinique as examples of this.123 But awareness that attempts to defuse 
diplomatic tension were taking place did not lead the newspapers to concentrate 
all their attention on the possibility of war; in Apri! The Times published an 
examination of the commercial state of France under Bonaparte detailing 
expenditure and the supposed disruption to the economy caused by Consular 
intervention. 124 
One significant theme emerges from the news and comments in British 
newspapers in the spring of 1803: a juxtaposition of concern about Bonaparte's 
unlimited domestic power and his apparent inabiiity to conform to diplomatic 
courtesies. Although aspects of Bonaparte's behaviour, such as his temper, had 
been the subject of the odd satirical anecdote in the six years in which he had 
occupied a space in British public consciousness, never before had the First 
Consul's personality been regarded as having any significant impact on relations 
----- -_._ .. _ .. _ .............. _ .... . 
122 The Times 5656 Wednesday March 9, 1803. 
123 The Times 5667 Wednesday ~,,1arch 23, 1803. 
124 The Times 5689 Monday April 18, 1803" 
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between France and other states. Now it threatened the peace with Great Britain. 
The most significant example of this was the First Consul's outburst at British 
ambassador Lord Whitworth at a ievee in March. This loss of temper, and the 
reported aftermath to the event, when Bonaparte summoned his foreign minister 
in the middie of the night before dismissing him again, caused a considerable 
stir, James Farington described the First Consul's behaviour as 'feverish', 
recounting his conversation with Lord Gardner about the summoning of 
Talleyrand ,125 The Leeds Mercury reported in early April that Bonaparte had 
been so outraged by his audience with Whitworth that he had wandered around 
the Tuileries like a madman, and had had to be restrained and quietened forcibly 
by Taileyrand. 126 Although MacCunn probably overstates the point when he says 
that madness and lack of control were the major behavioural characteristics 
associated with Bonaparte at this time,127 there can be little doubt that concern 
did exist about the impact of such an outburst on the peace. The Times asserted 
that the quarrel was behind the preparations for war in mid-March,128 and used 
the issue to open discussion about the probability of impending war. The paper 
claimed that although the First Consul desired war, his state of finance and 
military preparation were not yet ready, the implication being that Bonaparte's 
temper had gotten the better of him and that he had exposed his plans earlier 
than had been his intention .129 
There can be little doubt that The Times believed Britain and France to be 
on the verge of war in April. The paper charted the constant despatching of 
125 Farington Diary Tuesday March 15, 1803, pp. 1994 - 95. 
126 Leeds Mercury 1874 April 2, 1803. 
127 MacCunn, The Contempofc''lry English View of Napoleon. pp. 271 - 273; for some 
qualification, see p. 282. 
128 The Times 5661 Tuesday March 15, 1803. 
129 The Times 5667 Wednesday March 23, '1803. 
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messages between the French ambassador in London. General Andreossi. and Lord 
Whitworth in Paris. 1 30 The feeling was that Britain must be prepared for 
conflict because negotiations were uncertain in their outcome. Readers were 
informed that military installations were being strengthened on the other side of 
the Channel, ostensibly for colonial support, and were reminded of the First 
Consul's policy of using standing armies as a diplomatic tool. French military 
preparations were depicted as another of Bonaparte's attempts to intimidate a 
potential opponent through the threat of force. 131 Perceptive readers would have 
recognised this as the same tactic Bonaparte had employed during the negotiation 
of peace preliminaries in the summer of 1801. Despite these warning signals, 
The Times persisted in hoping that the 'ambitious, restless and unprincIpled 
Government of France' might be persuaded to back down over the issue of Malta 
and demonstrate its trustworthiness in some fashion. it pointed out that there 
was room for the French government to back down without complete 
embarrassment, as their martial preparations had been advertised as being for 
colonial purposes rather than war in Europe. 132 Regardless of whether war was 
to come or not, British newspapers and their readers were aware that the final 
decision was that of Bonaparte alone. The events of the past year and particularly 
of the past few weeks would not have inspired confidence that war was not 
imminent. 133 
* * * * * 
130 The Times 5674 Thursday March 31, i 803; The Times 5686 Thursday April i 4, 
1803; The Times 5691 Wednesday April 20, 1803; The Times 5695 Tuesday April 26, 
1803. 
131 Leeds Mercury 1870 March 5, 1803; The Times 5656 Wednesday March 9. 1803; 
The Times 5677 Monday April 4, 1803. 
132 The Times 5656 Wednesday March 9, i 803; a simiiar Idea, that Bonaparlt:! had 
trapped himself into action, was expressed in The Times 5667 Wednesday March 23, 
1803. 
133 The Times 5661 Tuesday March 15, 1803. 
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Britain returned to war with France in May 1803. One wonders, as Conrad 
Gill queried nearly ninety years ago, whether the final break came quicklY and 
unexpectedly despite all the provocations and the strains which British 
newspapers had been laying before their readers for months. 134 Gill claims that 
the reason for the final break was ministerial frustration at Bonaparte's 
encroachments and his apparently endless appetite for expansion, with the 
deadlock over Malta as the catalyst. Should Malta be evacuated and be captured by 
the French, British trade with the East would be endangered. 135 The British 
went to war simply because they couid not stand being further challenged and 
humiliated by Bonaparte; France went to war because Bonaparte could not stop 
doing it,' Schroeder has suggested. 136 The declaration of war in May concluded 
over a year of growing frustration with Bonaparte's activities and suspicion 
about his intentions. All of the issues which were prominent in newspaper 
commentary during the Peace of Amiens - the hostile behaviour of the officiai 
French journal, the subjugation of Switzerland, suspicion of French intentions 
in the Mediterranean - were all symptomatic of a growing loss of faith that 
Bonaparte could be trusted to abide by any agreement which he concluded. So 
although the actual break itself might have been unexpected, the readers of 
British newspapers wouid have been amply prepared for their ministers' final 
ioss of trust in the First Consul. 
* * * * * 
134 Gill, 'The Relations between England and France in 1802', p. 61. 
135 .. . . "3 ibid., pp. 0 , 67 - 8, 73. 
136 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 243. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Bonaparte and the language of tyranny: an exploratory analysis, 
One of the most significant themes of the historiography of British views of 
Napoleon Bonaparte is that he was regarded as a tyrannical and despotic figure. 1 
The standard work on the subject, MacCunn's The Contemporary English View of 
Napoleon, claims that from 1798 - 9 Bonaparte was generally depicted as 'a 
typical Oriental conqueror, hypocritically embracing Mohammedanism, 
displaying the most odious tyranny, barbarity and callousness, finally baffled by 
the honest bravery of a few British soldiers under Sir Sidney Smith'.2 The 
previous chapters of this thesis have shown that British views of Bonaparte 
were conducted within a revolutionary paradigm before November 1799, and 
that after Brumaire there was a reconfiguration to include themes of military 
and personal government. In an attempt to reveal more about this shift. this 
chapter examines the deployment of the terms tyranny and despotism between 
Brumaire and the weeks preceding the declaration of war between France and 
Great Britain in May 1803. it argues that the historical theme of repression 
associated with revolutionary and military government, a feature of the Whig 
political tradition, rather than the works of contemporary political theorists, 
was the major stimulus for the deployment of the language of tyranny. This is 
demonstrated particularly by the frequency with which Oliver Cromwell was 
cited in attempts to understand Bonaparte's office and behaviour as First Consul. 
1 Tilere is little appreciable difference in the use of these terms in contemporary 
sources, and the same policy has been adopted for this study. ! would like here to thank 
Dr. D. X. Powen for a valuable conversation from which this chapter has benefitted 
greatly, and to thank Dr. Poweil and Suzanne 0019 for their comments on an earlier 
version of this chapter. 
2 MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, p. 17. 
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* * * * * 
Historians of British political thought in the eighteenth century have 
concentrated on analysing what has been described as the 'Whig consensus': the 
belief that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 saved Britain from Stuart 
absolutism, that Britain was blessed with a balanced constitution and that 
Britons possessed liberties of person and expression guaranteed by what was 
known as the Revolutionary settlement. These analyses have generaily been 
confined to canonical texts written by 'representative' thinkers such as 
Bolingbroke and Burke, and, in one recent study, the enduring influence of 
classical antecedents on eighteenth~century thought 3 The same is largely true of 
the British intellectual response to the French Revolution: the major works, 
Edmund Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution, first published in 
November 1790, and Thomas Paine's The Rights of Man, published in two parts 
in 1791 and 1792, have been regarded as sufficient examples in themselves of 
the impact of the French Revolution on British political thought and language.4 
Only recently have some historians begun to look at the broader relationship 
between the text and public discourse as a legitimate way of exploring impact and 
textual meaning. Mark Philp has used this method In part to explain the 
significance of the literature of 1792 - 3. 5 This chapter explores the 
3 Peter N. Miller Defining the common good. Empire, religion and p.hilosophy in 
eighteenth-century Britain (Cambridge, 1994) (ciassical antecedents); on the nature of 
the Whig tradition, see H. T. Dickinson Uberty and Property. Political Ideology in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (New York, 1977); Wilfrid Harrison Conflict and 
compromise. History of British Political Thought 1593 - 1900 (New York, 1965); J. G. 
A. Pocock Virtue, Commerce and History. Essays on Political Thought and History, 
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1985), 
4 Thomas Philip Schofield 'Conservative Political Thought in Britain in Response to the 
French Revolution', The Historical Journal 29, 3, t 986, pp. 601 622. 
5 Mark Philp 'Introduction', pp. 1 - 17, and 'The fragmented ideology of reform' in 
Mark Philp (ed.) The French Revo/ution and British Popular Politics (Cambridge, 1991), 
pp. 50 - 77; see aiso his 'Vulgar conservatism, 1792 - 3', English Historical Review 
ex, 435, February 1995, pp. 42 - 69. Other attempts along similar lines include Sack, 
From ,Jacobite to Conservative, and, in a less developed fashion, H. T. Dickinson 
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deployment of the language of tyranny with reference to Bonaparte in the 
magazines, newspapers and reviews which were the primary vehicies for public 
discourse. 
Only by casting our net widely, rather than relying upon ostensibly 
'representative' texts, can we engage in the delicate task of reconstructing 
political languages by mapping out even apparently minor degrees of 
emphasis and variation in usage, and thus detect gradual but significant 
shifts in the deployment of key terms over time, 
Gregory Claeys argues, persuasively to this writer.6 The neglect of the study of 
British attitudes to the Revolution !n the years between 1795 and 1799 is the 
major reason that these shifts remain elusive'? The move into the wider realm of 
public discourse posited here does not imply any diminution in the si9nificance 
of the works of Burke and Paine. Philp comments perceptively that these texts 
were very important in setting the parameters of the debate on the Revolution. 
and Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace are especially deserving of Gioser 
examination in any attempt to chart shifts in British perceptions of the 
Revolution under the Directories.8 But it is the contention of this study that 
popular conceptions of Bonaparte as a ruler were sourced directly from the 
'Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism' in ibid. (ed.) Britain and the French 
Revolution 1789 - 1815 (London, 1989), pp. 103 - ·i25. 
6 Gregory Claeys 'The French Revolution debate and British political thought', History 
of Poiiticai Thought 11, 1, Spring 1990, p. 59. 
7 See Introduction, p. 2. There is no single good study of British attitudes to the 
Revolution beyond 1794, although Cookson, The Friends of Peace, pp. 142 - 169 and 
Ben-Israel, Engiish Historians on the French Revolution. pp. 3 - 45, contain useful 
information. This point is recognised by Phiip in 'The fragmented ideology of reform', p. 
57, n. 20. 
8 Philp, 'The fragmented ideology of reform', p. 53, 58. I would !ike to thank Dr. J. E. 
Cookson for encouraging a sceptical student in the direction of Burke generally, and for 
indicating to me certain passages in the Letters on a Regicide Peace. A study which 
assesses the impact of the works of Paine and Burke on the newspaper discourses of 
the 1790s would be invaluable. 
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themes of the Whig political tradition than from the theones developed in 
response to the Revolution. 
* * * * * 
The main themes which dominate the history of British politica! thought in 
the late eighteenth century have been summarised usefully by Philp. He 
identifies two major schools of historical thought on the subject. The first ciaims 
that the eighteenth-century themes of civic humanism and country party 
opposition remained the most significant feature of British thought during and 
after the 1790s. The second school identified by Philp believes that the 
Revolution initiated a fundamental paradigm shift, a marked break from the 
themes and patterns of the eighteenth century.9 It is the latter which is more 
persuasive to Philp. 
What is clear is that the period 1789 . 1803 is one in which the language of 
political debate undergoes a process of continua! transformation. in this 
process, positions are polarised, terms become invested with value and 
meaning only to be subsequently abandoned, and the stakes of controversy 
become extraordinarily inflated. 
Although pre-Revolutionary terms were reconstructed and continued to be 
deployed, the contexts in which they were used and their meanings were not 
necessarily the same as those of the eighteenth century.1 0 Philp cautions that the 
nature of language should not be confused with the ways it is used or possible 
meanings, so that even if the terms of the Whig consensus were the vehicle for 
the expression of opinion about the Revolution, 'there should be little doubt that 
new paradigms of political thought and participation were being tabled.'i1 This is 
9 Philp, 'The fragmented ideology of reform', p. 54. 
10 Philp, 'Introduction', p. 13 (including quotation). 
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an attractive suggestion, recognising, as it does, that discourses continued to be 
conducted in traditional language while avoiding the unconvincing idea that the 
deployment and meaning of such language remained static. 
The issue of whether terms can be regarded as having possessed universal 
meanings for contemporaries has been raised recently by Jonathan Clark in his 
synoptic work The language of liberty. Clark suggests that rather than having 
inherently universal meanings, terms such as tyranny and despotism might have 
been attributed meaning according to their contexts. He argues also that rather 
than being derived from works of high political theory, political language was 
based on 'standard themes of the folk memories of Protestant denominations.' 
This suggests that historical awareness of the political and constitutional 
upheavals of the seventeenth century was more important in conditioning the use 
of political language than the canonical texts used by historians. 12 
Plausible though Clark's arguments may be, they offer obvious difficulties 
to the student of political termino!ogy. The idea of polysemism undermines 
severely the ability of the historian to attribute identifiable definitions to 
terms; it implies that they can be understood only with reference to detailed 
contextual knowledge not usuaily available when analysing information taken 
from sources such as newspapers. A modified version of Clark's argument may 
resolve this problem. Accepting that the eXIstence of some common meaning is 
the logical conclusion to over a century of deployment of terms in the public 
domain, this chapter seeks to construct a model which can be used to explore 
profitably the application of political terminology to Bonaparte. As well as a 
universal meaning conditioned by assumptions about arbitrary Stuart 
11 Philp, 'The fragmented ideology of reform', p. 54. 
12 J. C. D. Clark The language of Uberty, 1660 . 1832: poiitical discourse and social 
dynamics in the Anglo-American world (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 24 - 25. 
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government and eighteenth-century Whig beliefs about the constitution, meaning 
would also have been determined by the social and politica! contexts of both the 
writer and the reader. The use of terms by the writer would have been 
determined by interaction between the universal and the local, and the meaning 
derived by the reader would have been a reconstruction involving the same 
process. 
The first issue which needs to be explored is whether the terminology of 
political repression was first applied after the coup of Brumaire which elevated 
Bonaparte to persona! revolutionary rule in November 1799. This was not the 
case. British newspapers did not hesitate to apply such language to the 
oligarchical Directory which governed France while Bonaparte was campaigning 
in Italy and encamped in Egypt. The Directors were described as tyrants and were 
compared with Oliver Cromwell in Lloyd's Evening Post in March 1798, for 
example. 13 Although the application of political language to French governments 
before 1799 is not within the province of this study, it seems from the 
comments surrounding the comparison that what was being criticised was 
repressive behaviour. What this example does demonstrate is that tyranny and 
despotism were not terms linked solely with rule by a single figure. 14 
13 Lloyd's Evening Post. and British Chronicle 6325 Monday 12 March Wednesday 14 
March 1798, p. 243. For other examples of this, see Morning Post 9373 Monday 
January 21, 1799; tl/laming Post 9466 Thursday May 9, 1799, 
14 This is an issue which deserves closer examination. There is a passage in Burke's 
Letters on a Regicide Peace, for example. which argues that although the British 
government is based on the personal liberty of the individual, and is therefore 
inefficient, that this is preferable to the repression of the rights of the individual 
inherent in the present Revolutionary government. which is described as 'mUitary in 
ils principle, in its maxims, in its spirit. and in all its movements. The stale has 
dominion and conquest for its sole objects; dominion over minds by proselytism, over 
bodies by arms'. The foilowing paragraph refers to France since the Revolution as a 
'despotism' Awareness of the use of force by a civilian revolutionary government 
should not be conflated with later recognition of a regime with a military figure at its 
r.ead. Letters on a Regicide Peace. Letter II. On the genius and character of the French 
lievolution as it regards other nations, 1796. in The Works of the Right Honourable 
Edmund Burke volume V (London, 1855), pp. 254 - 255. 
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Recognition that Brumaire introduced military power into the Revolution 
made Bonaparte potentially more dangerous to the liberties of his subjects than 
his predecessors. France was regarded as having exchanged a chaotic, overiy 
democratic government for military rule. The very title of Bonaparte's office, 
'Consul', had strong martial overtones, and The Times predicted that the 
prospective military dictatorship of Bonapa!ie was to be feared much more than 
the civilian one of Robespierre. 15 Many of the newspapers which had entertained 
a moderate sympathy for the original aims of the Revolution were extremely 
discouraged by its degeneration into military rule. The Morning Chronicie 
claimed that the coup 'delivers over the French people to a pure and undisguised 
military despotism' ,16 It is clear that the application of the language of tyranny 
to Bonaparte which began after Brumaire was linked intimateiy with the belief 
that he was a military ruler. 
Although the new regime seemed likely to be repressive, some 
commentators were prepared to suspend judgement until they found evidence. 
Awareness of the military basis of the new government was not sufficient in 
itself to provoke universal condemnation. One writer in the Critical Review 
hoped that friction between the French people and their governors might soon die 
down, 'as Buonaparte seems inclined to relinquish that arbitrary and imperio LIS 
spirit of encroachment which the late directory so frequently exhibited.'17 The 
offer of peace negotiations at Christmas 1799, only weeks after Bonaparte had 
taken power, encouraged some to believe that he was better-intentioned than 
previous revolutionary governments. 18 Over the next two years, however, many 
15 The Times 4644 Wednesday Novemb(?r 20, 1799. 
16 Morning ChrOnicle 9513 Monday November 18, 1799 (quotation); see also The 
Observer 416 December 8, 1799; Beli's Weekly Messenger 192 December 29, 1799, 
p. 412; The Annual Register for 1800, p. 38. 
17 'Review of Public Affairs' in Critical Review 28, 1800, p. 592. 
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commentators entertained subdued suspicions about the intentions of the First 
Consul. Reporting on the creation of new organs of government in February 
1800, the Morning Post stated that all positions were nominated by the First 
Consul, 'who thus, every day, is accumulating power in his own hands.' 19 The 
language of repression was used in this instance because Bonaparte was believed 
to be acquiring power with only sketchy limitations, and because he was 
recognised as exercising it in repressive ways. One good example of this \NaS the 
reception of the news in January 1801 that opponents of the Consulate were to 
be exiled to a French penal colony in Guiana, their exile being, according to The 
Times, 'because they do not like Corsicans or Consuls'. On another occasion, the 
banishment of individuals who had returned to Europe from the insurrectionary 
French territories in the Caribbean was described by the same newspaper as 'A 
fresh instance of the despotism exercised by the French Government.'20 
Bonaparte was regarded as repressing the existing right of citizens to freedom of 
expression, and the pointed mention of the military title of his office was an 
explicit reference to the belief that such a despotic action was the result of the 
military nature of the government. 
The language of political repression was deployed because of underlying 
assumptions about the behaviour of military governments, and in response to 
what was regarded as repressive behaviour. Although overt references to 
military government in general commentary declined in the years after 
Bonaparte's assumption of political power', this should probably not be taken as a 
diminution in the significance of the theme. Rather, awareness that the Consulate 
------------------------------------
18 See Chapter Three, 'Bonaparte as revoiutionary ruler: from the coup of Brumaire to 
the summer of 1800', pp. 69 - 70. 
19 Morning Post 9815 Tuesday February 25, 1800. 
gO The Times 5007 Monday January 19, 1801 (,Corsicans and Consuls'), and Th e 
Times 5199 Monday August 31, 1801 ('A fresh instance .. .'), 
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was a military regime. and therefore repressive. became an implicit assumption 
which could be invoked by the use of the language of tyranny or frequent 
references to 'the Consul' or 'Consuiar government'. Newspapers were more 
interested in events than in devoting attention to the nature of the government in 
France. 
From 1802 attention was focused on the removal of formal safeguards 
against Bonaparte's unlimited exercise of his powers.21 Previously the elective 
nature of the Consular office had been regarded by some commentators as a 
restraint on this possibility.22 The fact that two years of Consular government 
had brought about attempts at domestic reconstruction, the pacification of Europe 
and especially the conclusion of war with Great Britain was enough for some 
commentators to believe that Bonaparte might stili draw back from becoming an 
unlimited tyrant. This belief was to be undermined severely by news of the 
campaign for the life consulship in the summer of 1802. The iesponse to 
Bonaparte's achievement of virtual monarchical status complete with hereditary 
succession seems to have been an increase in the frequency of the use of the 
language of tyranny. The invasion of Switzerland by French troops, the erratic 
accusations of the official French journal and the expedition sent to survey the 
eastern Mediterranean were all described as the behaviour of a military ruler 
who was no longer subject to either formal or informal restrictions.23 
The increase in the frequency of the language of tyranny which accompanied 
the establishment of the life consulship does not seem to have diminished the use 
of revolutionary as well as military reference points. One anecdote which 
21 See Chapter Five, 'The Peace of Amiens: from the autumn of i 80 1 to April 1803', 
pp. 121 - 126. 
22 ConSiderations concerning peace, pp. 14 - 15. 
2" 
,:) See Chapter Five, pp. 127 - 134. 
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illustrates this well is The Times' criticism of complaints from Le Moniteur, the 
official French journal which was widely regarded as the mouthpiece of the 
Consul, that hospitality was being accorded to members of the deposed French 
royal family in Great Britain. The tale was described as proving, 'beyond all 
doubt, the despotic principles of the French Government, and the littleness which 
is no uncommon accompaniment of despotism.'24 Several layers of meaning can 
be discerned in this tale; what is especially significant is the relationship 
between the display of behaviour iabelled 'despotic' and the revolutionism 
implied to have generated it. The deployment of the term is underscored by the 
implication that Bonaparte's petulant behaviour has occurred because he is 
aware of his illegitimacy as a military and revolutionary ruler. The story 
implies that the First Consul is jealous that a neighbouring state would accept 
the family of an exiled ruler when he was trying hard to legitimate himself. The 
same accusations and use of terms. 'the despotic system which prevails in 
France', occurred on several later occasions.25 The usage here links underlying 
awareness of the revolutionary and military nature of the Consulate with 
evidence that once he had removed himself from restrictions, the First Consul's 
behaviour would be repressive. Note that the first statement begins with the 
assertion that the anecdote proves 'beyond all doubt' that Bonaparte's government 
is despotic. The protest against the treatment given to the Bourbons in Britain is 
being used here as evidence to convince those still uncertain about the nature of 
the Consulate even after Bonaparte had assumed office for life, and invokes a 
reference to generiC characteristics of despotism, 'the littleness which is no 
uncommon accompaniment', in support of this. 
24 The Times 5438 Wednesday June 9, i 802. 
25 The Times 5493 Thursday August 19, 1802; The Times 5519 Monday September 
20, 1802 (quotation). 
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Generalisations in this chapter about the persistence of underlying themes 
of revolutionism and the link between repressive behaviour and the language of 
tyranny must be qualified because of their reliance on The Times. As Chapter 
Five has revealed, this newspaper persisted in criticising Bonaparte as both a 
revolutionary and a military tyrant. Such a juxtaposition may very weB have 
been the norm. Visitors to France during the Peace of Amiens did describe the 
Consulate as a revoiutionary military despotism.26 But the inherent hostility of 
The Times to every aspect of the Revolution probably renders its 
pronouncements relativeiy unrepresentative. One suspects that the opposition 
newspapers, those which maintained some lingering sympathy for the moderate 
aims of the Revolution, would have regarded the creation of a military monarchy 
somewhat differently. 
The previous paragraphs have argued that the language of political 
repression, the terms tyranny and despotism, was not necessarily employed with 
reference to French revolutionary governments dominated by individuals, but 
that evidence of repression was probably a significant stimulus. The introduction 
of military power into the Revolution and signs that Bonaparte's regime was a 
repressive one seem to have been the major reasons that his government was 
labelled despotic. Revolutionism seems also to have been a significant factor 
generating the deployment of political terms in this period. But perhaps in 
looking for indications of contemporary beliefs about Bonaparte as a ruler we 
need to examine other rhetorical devices. Historical figures, notably James II, 
have been suggested to have been a significant feature of the Whig conception of 
the development of the British constitution.27 It is likely, therefore, that an 
exploration of those figures with whom Bonaparte was compared will reveal 
~---- ..•........... _._. 
26 See Chapter Five, pp. 112 - 115; The Diary of Bertie Greatheed, Wednesday 26 
January 1803, p. 37; Farington Diary Wednesday September 22, 1802. p. 1870. 
'"17 
"" See the works cited in n. 3 above, particularly Dickinson, Liberty and Property. 
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further information about the ways the First Consul was conceived as a political 
figure. 
One possible contemporary model for poiitical repression was prime 
minister William Pitt. Cookson has claimed that the liberal 'Friends of Peace' 
believed Pitt to be attempting to entrench his power beyond ail opposition 
through the creation of a 'war system', a belief shaped also by resentment at 
Pitt's exchange of the reforming causes he had supported in the 1780s for the 
repressive policies of the 1790s.28 Bonaparte and Pitt were compared on 
several occasions, most notably by Bel/'s Weekly Messenger in its commentary 
on the peace preliminaries in the autumn of 1801. But these comparisons 
contain little more than praise for the First Consul's conclusion of peace with 
Great Britain and condemnation of Pitt as a warmonger.29 The fact that Pitt was 
out of office between February 1801 and the end of the period examined in this 
study may account for the lack of detailed comparisons between the two figures. 
Another model for despotism was Czar Paul of Russia, MacCunn has noted 
the unpopularity of the Czar in Britain in the years 1800 - 1, when Russia was 
allied with France. He claims that Paul 'temporarily usurped the proper place of 
Bonaparte as the Enemy of Mankind in English opinion; and subsequently the two 
were frequentiy bracketed as types of despots liable to insane passion.'30 
Although the newspapers used in this study were hostile to the Czar, and were 
aware and resentful of his diplomatic relationship with France. 31 the 
-------~--~--------------------------------
28 Cookson. The Friends of Peace, pp. 144 - 149. 
29 See Chapter Four, 'Bonaparte and peacemaking: from the summer of 1800 to the 
autumn of 1801', pp. 82 - 83 and 97. 
30 MacCunn. The Contemporarj English View of Napoieon, p. 30. 
31 See Chapter Four. p. 85; Bell's Weekly Messenger 243 December 21, 1800, p. 405; 
The Times 5004 Thursday January 15. 1801; The Times 5049 Tuesday March 10, 
1801; The Times 5086 Thursday April 23, 1801. 
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relationship between this and the use of politicai terminology is less easy to 
determine. The fact that the same language was used in commentary about both 
rulers implies that common features were being recognised, Repressive 
behaviour may be the soiution to this question. Paul seems to have been regarded 
as an unbalanced figure, prone to erratic and oppressive behaviour, and he was 
of course unpopular because he had allied against Britain in the Revolutionary 
war. But the opportunities for comparison were probably cut short by Paul's 
assassination in the spring of 1801, an event which led to a softening of attitude 
towards him,32 
The study of relations between Britain and her foreign possessions is 
providing a great deal of valuable information about the nature of domestic 
political beliefs in the late eighteenth century. The work of C. A. Bayly and P. J. 
Marshall in particular reveals much about the themes and concerns which 
emerged from the loss of the American colonies and the extension of British 
power and influence in the Indian subcontinent.33 It is the contemporary 
reputation of Tipu Sahib, Sultan of Mysore, which is of greatest interest to this 
study. Bayly makes an explicit comparison between British views of Tipu and of 
Bonaparte, claiming (without reference to the historical literature about the 
latter) that they were regarded as complimentary figures: 
-----~----------~---.-
~"\? ,,~ Mackesy, War without victory, pp. 203 - 205; for the softening of attitude, see 
Chapter Five. n. 24. 
33 C. A. Bayly Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the Worid 1780 - 1830 
(Harlow. 1989) and P. J. Marshall' 'Cornwallis Triumphant': War in India and the 
British Public in the Late Eighteenth Century' in Laurence Freedman, Paul Hayes and 
Robert O'Neili (eds.) War, strategy and international politics. Essays in honour of Sir 
Michael Howard (Oxford, 1992). pp. 57 - 74. Bayly's study uses the language of 
tyranny as a tool for gathering evidence about the changing relations between the 
participants in imperial relations. but treats the terms as unprobiematic in themselves. 
This citational approach fails to examine the meanings with which terms were vested 
and the contexts in which they were deployed. See Bayly, pp. 131, 152 - 153, 156. 1 
would like to thank Dr. I. J, Catanach for a stimulating conversation on Tipu Sahib and 
for fleshing out my regretfully meagre knowledge of indian and imperial history_ 
the generation of the 1790s began to grasp a parallel between the 
wickedness of its European enemies and the fury of its Asiatic foes. 
Bonaparte, the embodiment of 'French tyranny', had already achieved the 
status of universal ogre before 1800. It is interesting how the European 
enemy was mirrored in the person of an oriental enemy. Tipu Sultan of 
Mysore now became the embodiment of 'Muhammedan tyranny' and he was 
similarly accused of violation of the conventions of war and the 
'intercourse of nations'. 34 
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The basis for Bayly's comparison is that Bonaparte was regarded as a 'universal 
ogre' before 1800, and that characteristics from this belief were applied to the 
Indian ruler. This study does not support such an idea. Bayly himself notes that 
Tipu and his father had been enemies of the British since the 17805,35 for over a 
decade before Bonaparte had first entered British consciousness as a 
revolutionary general. It seems much more iikely that the themes of erratic 
behaviour used to describe Tipu as a tyrant were transferred for application in 
the European sphere. 
The significance of Tipu is explored in greater detail in Marshall's article 
on the domestic reception of news about war in India in the late eighteenth 
century. He claims that British attitudes towards the Indian ruler were 
symptomatic of changing attitudes towards imperial rule. To the public at home, 
the British invasion of Mysore was presented 'not as conquerors but as 
liberators of the mass of the population from the 'tyranny' of Tipu. The 
annexation of new territories would be an act of benevolence, not of ambition.'36 
Marshall adds to Bayly's claim that stories of Tipu's brutal mistreatment of 
prisoners remained examples of tyrannical behaviour until well into the 
34 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, p. 113. 
35 ibid. 
36 Marshall, ' 'Cornwailis Triumphant' p. 72. 
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nineteenth century that the Indian ruler was regarded as an implacable foe who 
hated Christians, but the British in particular.37 Some of these themes can be 
detected in coverage of Bonaparte; several papers did claim that Bonaparte 
resented the British particularly because he blamed them for his defeats in 
Egypt. 38 Stock themes such as the massacre of prisoners have been argued not to 
have been a major feature of the discourse on Bonaparte between 1796 and 
1803, but they have been located by historians as a significant feature of the 
literature of 1803 - 4. It seems likely that these themes were absorbed into a 
pool of characteristics used to define despotic behaviour. Bonaparte and Tipu had 
two significant elements in common: they were regarded as barriers to the 
extension or maintenance of British interests, and they were at various times 
protagonists at war.39 Depicting them as entertaining an especial hatred for the 
British not only strengthened their identification as the enemy, but it also had 
the comforting effect of self-justification. 
The most sUbstantive examples of models for Bonaparte were figures from 
history. Historical comparisons were a valuable method of conceptualising 
events and figures in a society which looked to the past rather than to the future 
for understanding. Chapter Two has noted that Bonaparte's achievements in Italy 
in 1796 - 7 and Egypt in 1798 - 9 led him to be compared with the great 
generals of history.40 After the coup which established Bonaparte as ruler of 
37 ibid., pp. 70 - 71 and Bayly, p. 1 i 4. 
38 The Times 4865 Monday August 4, 1800; The Observer 451 August 10, 1800; 
Morning Post 10 023 Tt1Ufsday October 23, 1800 and The Times 5021 Wednesday 
February 4, 1801. 
39 It is tempting to speculate that the reason that themes of massacres do not feature 
before the return to war in the spnng of 1803, but may do so in the literature of the 
following months, is because all the conditions necessary for their eieployment were 
not fulfilled until this time: Bonaparte was now protagonist at war and an identifiable 
persona! threat to British interests (their own domestic security). 
40 See Chapter Two, 'Bonaparte as roving revolutionary: the Egyptian expedition, 
1798 - g', p. 52. 
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France, those often invoked were the great generals of antiquity. Foremost among 
these was Julius Caesar, the outstanding example of a general who had assumed 
political power upon returning from campaigning in foreign parts.41 Peter 
Miller has alerted historians to the enduring significance of classical models in 
eighteenth-century thought; the use of such reference points for Bonaparte 
supports his general thesis.42 But the most significant model for explaining the 
origins of Bonaparte's rule, his behaviour and his possible fate was much closer 
to home: Oliver Cromwell, seventeenth-century English Lord Protector, 
military conqueror and revolutionary ruler. The remainder of this chapter will 
examine the eighteenth-century reputation of Cromwell, explore his place in 
contemporary conceptions of military tyranny and argue that awareness of 
similarities between Bonaparte and Cromwell was a very significant factor in 
the deployment of the language of tyranny to Bonaparte. 
Research into the eighteenth-century reputation of Oliver Cromwell has 
been published recently by Roger Howell, Jr. He claims that the Protector's 
legacy was considerably more complex than has been generally recognised. The 
primary themes associated with Cromwell were those of military government, 
revolutionary illegitimacy and repression. While John Hampden and Algernon 
Sidney were depicted as examples of reasonable opposition to an unreasonable 
executive, Cromwell stood for violent overthrow and illegitimate personal rule -
the personification of tyranny.43 Howell argues that there was a secondary 
41 For comparisons with great generals, see ibid.: for those with classical generals 
who were also poiitical figures, see review of Campaign ot General Bonaparte in italy 
in 1796 - 7, translated from the French by T.E. Ritchie in Monthly Review 31 January 
- Apri! 1800, p. 219; The Times 4730 Thursday February 27, 1800; The Times 4986 
Thursday December 25, 1800. 
42 Miller, Defining the common good, especially the chapters 'The figure of Cicero' and 
'A classical iandscape', pp. 21 - 149. 
43 Roger Howell, Jr. 'Cromwell, the English Revolution and political symbolism in 
eighteenth-century England' in R. C. Richardson (ed.) Images of Oliver Cromwell. 
Essays for and by Roger Howell, Jr. (Manchester, 1993), pp. 64 - 68, 71. 
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strand of thought which associated Cromwell with national prosperity because of 
his achievements in trade and strengthening of Engiish national power. He judges 
support for this secondary strand of belief difficuit to assess, because of the 
strength of the ideological mainstream. It seems that although there was a deeper 
understanding of the circumstances of the man and his times by the late 
eighteenth century, 'the hostile image of him remained the dominant feature of 
the historiography of the period, regardless of the political stance of the author 
concerned.' Howell suggests that Cromwell's value as a weapon to suppress ideas 
regarded as dangerous to the ideological mainstream was the reason for the 
persistence of his image as a repressive figure. 44 Cromwell seems also to have 
been regarded as a tragic individual. An article entitled 'Cromwell, or the 
Picture of a Man conscious of having violated the natural and civil Rights of his 
Countrymen' was published in the liberal journal the Oeconomist in April 1799. 
This article provides further valuable indications of the reputation of Cromwell 
in the late eighteenth century, although the subject for implicit comparison was 
probably Pitt. Cromwell is depicted as a man who suffered greatly because of his 
illegitimate rule. The article claims that the greatness to which he aspired was 
beyond his grasp, and this was the cause of his enormous mental anguish. It is 
alleged that Cromweli ended up 'seeing nothing around him but treacherous 
friends or enraged enemies, possessing the confidence of no party, resting his 
title on no principle, civil or religious'. He became a pathetic recluse, a man 
forced to resort to absurd lengths for personal security. The implications of 
these comments are fairly obvious: he who possessed power through illegitimate 
means should not expect to sieep easily at night.45 
44 'b- id 64 I· ') . 0 71 I . " p, ,quotation, pp. 6~ - . 
45 'Cromwell. or the Picture of a Man conscious of having violated the natural and civil 
Rights of his Countrymen'. Oeconomist XVI April 1799, pp, 122 - 123 (quotation p, 
122), Similar sentiments were expressed in the article 'Retrospect of the Eighteenth 
Century' by T. Mot in the Gentleman'S MagaZIne for February 1800, p_ i 19, For the 
idea that Pitt was the intended subject of comparison, see Cookson, The Friends of 
Peace. pp. 130 - 1 and 144 - 149. 
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Even had they not shared so many obviously similar characteristics, 
comparisons between Cromwell and Bonaparte are likely to have been made. As 
Howeli comments, 'it is clear that, iong before Carlyle, people had discovered the 
applicability of CromweH to contemporary social and political problems.'46 
Bonaparte was not the first revolutionary ruler in France to be compared with 
the Engiish Protector. His predecessors, the Directors, were judged to be 
tyrannical on grounds of simiiarities to the Lord Protector on several occasions 
in 1798 and 1799.47 The justification for the deployment of the Cromwell 
analogy on these occasions is not immediately apparent; the Directories were not 
regarded as being military governments, aithough their use of military power to 
sustain their political position may have been motivating factors. Probably this 
is another example of the redefinition of concepts and language suggested by 
Philp; it is a logical assumption that, like the language to which it contributed 
meaning, the Cromwell metaphor was reconstructed for use in the ideological 
conflicts of the 1790s.48 
Allusions between Bonaparte and Cromwell began in the immediate 
aftermath of the coup of Brumaire, and were concerned initially with anaiysing 
the nature of the new regime and Bonaparte's operation of his office. Aithough 
conceding that there were differing circumstances surrounding the elevation to 
power of the two men, the Morning Chronicle argued that both used the 
fanaticism of the time to ingratiate themselves with others before their 
ambitions were realised. 49 The similarities in the careers and miiitary origins 
of both men were often referred to after Brumaire; differences were less often 
recognised. A minority of commentators did explore in detail the respective 
46 Howeil, 'Cromwell, the English Revolution and political symboiism', pp. 72 - 73. 
47 See n. 13 above. 
48 Philp, 'Introduction', p. 13; 'The fragmented ideology of reform', p. 54. 
49 Morning Chronicle 9513 Monday November 18, 1799. 
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situations of the two individuals just prior to their assumption of power. The 
Reverend Charles Edward Stewart, author of the pamphlet Thoughts on the Letter 
of Buonaparte, on the padfick principles, argued that while Cromwell had either 
to take the reins of government or become a private citizen. a near impossible 
situation, Bonaparte's situation was quite different; the new First Consul 
betrayed and abandoned all his friends by seizing power for himself upon his 
return from Egypt. Circumstances were cited as the distinguishing 
characteristic which separated the two men: Cromwell's position had been thrust 
upon him, but Bonaparte's participation in Brumaire was regarded as a 
calculated act.50 Detailed analysis of this kind was not typical of the newspapers, 
however. This probably owes as much to the nature of the publication as to 
inclination; the expository pamphlet offered greater room for such detail than 
the newspapers did. Commentators may also have been reiuctant to qualify what 
must have appeared a near-periect comparison. 
The Lord Protector was not the only figure from the English Fievolution 
with whom Bonaparte was compared. in the six months which followed Brumaire 
some commentators were willing to argue that the new First Consul might turn 
out to be a General Monk, a military figure thrust into a powerful position who 
had eiected in favour of the restoration of Charies Ii in 1660. The influential 
presence of the apostate bishop and arch-schemer Sieyes encouraged some to 
believe that Bonaparte would be a Monk, rather than a Cromwell. The Times 
suggested that Bonaparte, Sieyes and Barras (whom it believed was still a 
powerful if now shadowy figure) would 'not act the part of MONK, till that of 
CROMWELL can no longer be sustained.' Bonaparte and his associates would 
prolong their occupation of office for as long as possible, securing for 
50 Stewart, Thoughts on the Letter af Buanaparte, pp, 27 - 28. Contemporary 
revisionism of Bonaparte's rOle in Bruma!re occurred over the following months and is 
probably at work here: the idea that Bonaparte generated his own rise to power was a 
feature of the spring of 1800, not the autumn of 1799 (see Chapter Three, pp. 64 - 5. 
for a more detaiied discussion of this). 
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themselves a position of strength from which to negotiate for the return of the 
exiled Louis XVIII.51 References to Monk diminished as the months passed, 
Bonaparte won a significant victory at Marengo in the summer of 1800, and the 
prospect of a Bourbon restoration looked increasingly unlikeiy.52 The response 
to this was that the Cromwell metaphor assumed predominance in the discourse, 
illustrating further that the intellectual response to changing international 
circumstances included shifts in language. 
In the years between 1800 and 1803 the Cromwell analogy was often 
deployed as a generalised reference point for understanding Bonaparte's 
motivations and behaviour, events within France and French relations with other 
states. It was a useful way of referring to a defined range of characteristics it 
was implied Bonaparte and Cromwell had in common, circumventing the need for 
lengthy explanations. One allusion in Bel/'s Weekly Messenger in November 
1800, for example, seems simply to have been shorthand for figures who upset 
the status quo.53 Comparisons were also tailored to specific events; when noting 
that the First Consul was experiencing problems with the political loyalties of 
his brother Lucien, The Times stated that Cromwell also suffered from the 
disloyalty of family members.54 The themes of insecurity and neurotic behaviour 
were also applied to Bonaparte, particularly when referring to recurrent 
assassination attempts. The nervous state in which the First Consul was believed 
to exist was described pithily on one occasion as 'the dreadful barter of innocence 
---------------------.-----~-----
51 The Times 4650 November 26, 1799 (quotation); also The Times 4644 Wednesday 
November 20, 1799. 
52 The reviewer of the pamphlet Les Adieux a Bonaparte. which implored the First 
Consul to step down in favour of his legitimate sovereign, claimed that his self-
affirmation at Marengo had rendered any restoration unlikeiy: fv10nthiy Review 32 May 
- August 1800, pp. 439 - 440. 
53 BeU's Weekly tvlessenger 239 November 23, 1800, p. 374. 
54 The Times 4842 Wednesday July 9, 1800, 
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for power, and the exchange of ambition with repose', a phrase which could have 
been appiied equally well to Cromwel1.55 
After the summer of 1802, awareness that the Consulate was a military 
government was accompanied by the knowledge that Bonaparte had also usurped 
monarchical and hereditary principles through his assumption of office for 
life. 56 This issue offered significant new potential for comparison, because 
Cromweli had refused the offer of hereditary kingship. The Times observed that 
while it had never given credence to the many rumours of plots and attempts 
against Bonaparte's person, the example of Cromwe!1 might be a useful one to 
explain present events. It claimed that the English Protector had been 
apprehensive about the army officers who had elevated him to high office, but 
who had threatened his life if he had assumed the kingship. Might not one of the 
reported attempts on the First Consul's life succeed in line with this historical 
precedent, the newspaper queried.57 Once again the past was being used to 
understand the present and as an indication of what might happen in the future. 
But Cromwell was also used because it was an unthreatening analogy, one, in 
fact, which implicitly confirmed the righteousness of the existing social and 
political system in Great Britain. Commentators and readers would have been 
well aware that the Protectorate lasted only a year after Cromwel!'s death, and 
that although there was a further period of turbulence, from the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 had emerged the seeds of the political stability, guarantee of 
personal liberties and commercial prosperity of which Britons were 
vociferously proud. The use of the Cromwell analogy was, then, a 'safe' one; the 
English Revolution had ied ultimately to the seWed society in which the writer 
and readers existed. 
55 The Times 5538 Tuesday October 12, 1802. 
56 See Chapter Five, pp. 121 - 126. 
57 The Times 5431 Tuesday June 1, 1802. 
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* * "* * * 
This chapter has followed Gregory Claeys' suggestion to examine shifts in 
the nature of political language beyond the closed systems of canonical texts. It 
has explored the nature of the terms and allusions deployed with reference to 
Bonaparte between 1800 and 1803. The chapter has suggested that the theme of 
the repression of personal liberties was the major stimulus behind the 
deployment of the language of tyranny. The belief that certain governments were 
repressive in nature may explain why the same terms were applied to the First 
Consul's predecessors, but a combination of awareness that the coup of Brumaire 
represented the introduction of military power into the Revolution, and a belief 
that the Consulate was repressive seem to have been the reasons behind the 
application of the language of tyranny to Bonaparte. The chapter has also explored 
a variety of potential models for repressive behaviour, and has illustrated the 
prevalence of Oliver Cromwell as the figure with whom Bonaparte was most often 
compared. Cromwell represented the dangers of revolutionary and military 
government to personal liberties, and the obvious parallels with Bonaparte as 
First Consul were not iost on contemporaries. The fact that there was a 
resurgence in comparisons at the time of Bonaparte's assumption of office for 
life in the summer of 1802 illustrates this clearly. Finally, some assessment of 
the significance of these generalisations to Mark Philp's suggestion that new 
paradigms of thought were being tabled despite the persistence of existing forms 
of language is necessary. This is a complex question which requires much more 
detailed investigation than has been possible in this study. The fact that British 
commentators were mining the eighteenth-century political tradition in an 
attempt to understand the events of the present appears to mitigate against 
Philp's suggestion. But the specific choice of an historical figure who was both a 
revolutionary and a military figure suggests that commentators were selecting 
the most appropriate figure from their own history in their attempt to 
understand the nature of the latest government in France. 
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CONCLUSION 
The major aim of this thesis has been to examine British views of 
Bonaparte between 1796 and 1803 without reproducing faults identified in the 
existing historical literature. Foremost among these faults is the use of 
juxtaposed evidence in the construction of broad generalisations that Bonaparte's 
reputation was as an inhuman figure, a man who poisoned his troops and who was 
conspiring to overthrow the existing French government. Historians t.ave taken 
as their evidence for this comments from different points within the twenty 
years between 1796 and 1815, a practice encouraged in large part by the 
abundance of material generated during the invasion crisis of 1803 - 4 and the 
conclusion of the Napoleonic war in 1814 - 15. The themes present in these 
sources have been imposed both forwards and backwards when making claims 
about British beliefs; MacCunn, for example, cites evidence from 1803 and 
1798 when generalising about British views of the Egyptian expedition of 1798 
_ 9,1 
This study proposed to test the existing generalisations applying a 
chronological method. The thesis was divided into five event-based chapters, with 
material from outside these periods not being included in their analyses. The 
results have been to allow the study to assess both the relative significance of 
themes in response to events, and to assess changes in these themes in response 
to the changing circumstances of Bonaparte between 1796 and 1803. But 
inherent in the use of a chronological approach is the danger of disjointed 
particularism. Accordingly, the following paragraphs will outline briefly the 
ways this thesis has assessed the themes emphasised in the historical literature 
MacCunn, The Contemporary English View of Napoleon, p. 17. 
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and argued for their replacement with a revolutionist paradigm for the broader 
period 1796 to 1799. The contribution this study has made to the difficult 
question of the shifting perceptions of Bonaparte after Brumaire will be 
explored, and fina.lly questions which have been revealed as deservin9 of further 
investigation will be outlined briefly. 
The most significant theme emphasised in the literature is that of 
inhumanity: of Bonaparte being regarded by the British as a cruel figure 
conspiring to poison and abandon his troops in the Egyptian desert and scheming 
to seize political power. This thesis has demonstrated conclusively that this is an 
inaccurate, not to mention simplistic, representation of the subject. 
Revolutionism, rather than revulsion, characterised British views of Bonaparte 
in the three and a half years from the summer of 1796 until November 1799. 
During the Italian campaign and occupation of 1796 - 8 Bonaparte was conceived 
as a revolutionary general, engaged in the transmission of French republican 
ideologies to the Italians. Some newspapers sneered at what they regarded as the 
excesses of revolutionist enthusiasm; but rather ironically, it was Bonaparte's 
humanity which was emphasised in the newspapers and magazines which 
maintained a subdued admiration for the aims of the Revolution. Bonaparte was 
cast in these as a noble figure, restraining his soldiers from acts of barbarity 
encouraged by their liberation from the norms of civilised behaviour. 
And the revolutionist conception was little altered in that period from 
which the historical iiterature has mined so extensively, the Egyptian expedition 
of 1798 - 9. Chapter Two has demonstrated that a persona! commitment to the 
mission of ideological colonisation, rather than cruelty, was the primary 
conception of Bonaparte in these years. This is not to deny that British 
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newspapers were aware of the deaths which occurred among the troops under 
Bonaparte's command. or that Bonaparte might not have been blamed for these 
deaths. The reporting in the newspapers indicates a tone of implicit criticism 
that Frenchmen had died in an inhospitable environment far from their homes, 
for what seemed a progressively more futile reason. 
But while historians have conflated reports of deaths at this time with 
accusations of tyranny from iater years and of cruelties from the literature of 
1803, this study has found no evidence to suggest that at the time of the 
expedition Bonaparte was regarded as having callously poisoned his wounded 
troops, or that he was seen as plotting to launch an assault on the domestic 
government. The point at which stories of pOisonings do seem to have entered the 
discourse is during the last two years examined in this study, when accounts of 
the British expeditionary force to Egypt were published. And there is room for 
doubt about the impact of such stories even at this time. They were not, for 
instance. a significant feature of The Times, the newspaper most consistently 
hostile to Bonaparte and which would surely have referred to such emotive 
information in its criticism of the First Consul. 
Nor was Bonaparte believed to have been scheming for political power in 
the three years before 1799. His politics were those of revolutionary expansion; 
his ambitions were seen in career terms. The association between the Egyptian 
expedition and personal tyranny did not exist at the time of the expedition itself, 
and does not seem to have featured before 1803 either. When newspapers did 
comment on the expedition, and it seems very likely that it had a low profile 
after the news in the autumn of 1798 of Nelson's victory at the Nile, they 
concentrated on its ideological intentions. The expedition was characterised 
consistently as a republican venture. an attempt to take revolutionary ideoiogies 
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to foreign lands, and Bonaparte's command was seen as evidence of his personal 
belief in the cause. 
A significant subsidiary theme of this general picture has been that the 
British regarded Bonaparte as a religious hypocrite, who cynically adopted the 
Moslem religion while in Egypt. This thesis has demonstrated that until 
November 1799 at least, considerations of Bonaparte and religion were linked 
inextricably with his conception as a revolutionary. During the Italian period 
religion featured oniy in occasionally approving comments about his moderation 
in negotiations with the Pope, favourable treatment of established religion not 
being regarded as usual among the exponents of French revolutionism. Bonaparte 
was further associated with the apostatical tendencies of the Revolution in 
contemporary commentary on the Egyptian expedition. The second chapter has 
uncoupled the connection which has been made between contemporary awareness 
of Bonaparte's adoption of the Moslem religion and stories of his inhuman 
behaviour. Comments about Bonaparte and reiigion were wry or satirical, 
rather than damning; and the accommodation to native religious beliefs was 
regarded as much as a practical tactic employed in the wider attempt to cultivate 
republicanism among the Egyptians. 
After Brumaire and Bonaparte's establishment as First Consul, it is 
interesting to note the not unfavourable reaction to the news that he was 
attempting to restore the Roman Catholic church in France. There was little 
mention of any cynicism about his religious beliefs except in The Times. Rather 
Bonaparte was regarded as being more sympathetic to the resurrection of 
traditional worship than many others would be in his position. It is true that his 
negotiations with the Pope were regarded by some as being as much for political 
purposes as for any personal belief; and the official toleration of Protestantism 
was seen as an attempt to reconcile as many Frenchmen to the Consulate as 
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possible. And there does seem to have been a definite shift between the belief in 
1800 - 1 that Bonaparte was restoring pre-revolutionary institutions to 
strengthen his particuiar form of revolutionary government, to one by the time 
of the formal reconciliation in the spring of 1802 that religion was being 
restored to support Bonaparte's rule, a subtle but significant distinction. But the 
revolutionist subtext remained an integral part of this shift: the Concordat 
between France and the Papacy was conceived as the restoration of a 
revolutionary nation to the mother church of most of Europe, as much as an 
attempt by a tyrant to bolster his arbitrary power. 
* '* * * * 
It is clear, then, that revolutionism, rather than revulsion, was the 
fundamental paradigm for British views of Bonaparte between 1796 and 1799, 
and that a measure of reinterpretation was applied to events in following years. 
The intricate relationship between revolutionary, personal and military 
elements which was constructed after the coup of Brumaire was a very complex 
one. There seems to have been a shift from a revolutionist paradigm to one which 
accommodated both revolution ism and awareness of the military nature of 
Bonaparte's regime. This shift has not been easy to quantify, probably because 
this study has not had access to the opposition newspapers between 1801 and 
1803. Analysis of the arguments deployed in the papers which maintained a 
sympathy for the aims of a moderated Revolution would have been extremely 
useful. But an examination of The Times, the liberal magazines and the accounts 
of British visitors to France during the Peace of Amiens has revealed valuable 
new information about the nature of shifts in British views of Bonaparte. 
Opinions about Napoleon Bonaparte were certainly altered fundamentally 
by the coup of Brumaire. But reaction to the coup was not characterised by a 
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rejection of the revolutionist paradigm; instead Bonaparte was reconstructed as 
the military ruler of a revolutionary government One of the most striking 
features of the discourse after Brumaire is how quickly the shift from civilian to 
military revolutionary government was assimilated through the depioyment of 
the language of tyranny and comparisons between Bonaparte and Cromwell. 
Contemporaries were more interested in the opportunities presented by the 
events of the last two months of 1799 than they were in discussing the nature of 
the new government in detail. 
This was almost certainly because news of the coup was followed 
immediately by Bonaparte's offer to open peace negotiations.2 This juxtaposition 
had a significant impact on the ways the nature of Bonaparte's office and his 
policies were analysed during the next two years. Although British commentators 
in the first six months of 1800 were primarily interested in whether Bonaparte 
was succeeding in reconciiiating the squabbling republican factions, recognition 
that success at this was a major step towards reopening peace negotiations was a 
major subtext of the period. It moved into the forefront of reporting and 
commentary from the summer of 1800, in response to negotiations undertaken 
for an end to the Revolutionary war. 
The final shift in the conception of Bonaparte, to that of an unrestrained 
military ruler, occurred during the Peace of Amiens. Bonaparte's assumption of 
office for life in the summer of 1802 seems to have been the major stimulus, 
although it is probably not helpful to attempt to ascribe a single event or point at 
which the shift occurred. The sixth chapter has revealed that there was an 
awareness from Brumaire itself that the introduction of military power into 
revolutionary government. The events of the summer of 1802 removed lingering 
------..... - .......... - ............ . 
2 This is recognised by Cookson, The Friends of Peace, p. 171. 
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hopes that Bonaparte would be content with the hybrid government he had largely 
shaped. The campaign for the life consulship signalled a definite shift from the 
occupation of an elected, and therefore at least technically limited, position to one 
which was not subject to any obvious restraints. The creation of the Legion of 
Honour at the same time indicated that Bonaparte was attempting to divert the 
sovereignty previously vested in the Revolution into his own person. 
The resumption of French expansionism in the Mediterranean and in 
Switzerland from the autumn of 1802 was not attributed to the expansion of 
revolutionary ideologies, but to the ambitions of the First Consu!. Revolutionary 
undertones remained, however. The Times continued to imply that the erratic 
nature of Bonaparte's nature demonstrated the inability of revolutionary states 
to co-exist with legitimate ones; but it also conceived Bonaparte as a military 
dictator repressing the liberties of his people. It would be replacing one kind of 
teleology with another, however, to argue that contemporaries regarded this 
shift as an inevitable one. One is tempted to speculate that without the prompt 
offered by the life consulship, Bonaparte might have remained as that compiex 
hybrid of military figure and revolutionary ruler which characterised his 
British conception in the two years after Brumaire. 
British views of Bonaparte travelled a long way, then, from that spring of 
1796 when the campaign of the young and zealous republican general in italy was 
reported, to the spring of 1803 when he was seen to be in unchallenged control of 
a France with an hegemony over the whole of Western Europe. This study has not 
attempted to be the definitive account of these changes; rather, it has re-assessed 
the subject and attempted to reorient the historical picture away from the static 
accounts of previous historians. By emphasising the importance of assessing the 
importance of themes in their chronological context, this thesis has been able to 
posit a revolutionist paradigm for the seven years examined, and has been able to 
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discover significant new information about the shifts which occurred during 
these years. 
* * 'I: 'I: '* 
This investigation concludes with several questions which have been 
revealed as deserving of closer investigation. The first is the strength of 
revolutionism as a force in the British world view in and beyond the 1790s. The 
content of this thesis demonstrates that revolutionism as an issue did not 
disappear in November 1799, as historians have too often assumed. It was 
reconfigured after Brumaire and remained a significant subtext until at least the 
beginning of the Napoleonic war. This writer strongly suspects that a case can be 
made for its persistence after 1803, and recommends further detailed study 
along these lines to 1815 to assess whether this suggestion can be substantiated. 
The continuing significance of legitimacy, refiected in The Times, and the 
readiness of other papers to ignore this in favour of a regime which seemed to be 
moderating the Revolution, prompts this writer to recommend also an 
examination of the relationship between legitimacy and revolutionism. And 
looking finally for a moment to the wider question of Britain and the French 
Revolution, historians of British views of the Revolution after 1793 must 
account for the thorny issue of the relationship between civilian French 
governments and the expression of revolutionary zeal through military conquest. 
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